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WOLFHOOUNDS AND POLAR BEARS IN SIBERIA:
AMERICA'S MILITARY INTERVENTION, 1918 - 1920

by

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
ABSTRACT

In August 1918, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker ordered MG William S. Graves to assume command of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) - Siberia. MG Graves' missions were to assist Czechoslovakian troops loyal to the Allies escape Russia to reinforce the World War I Western Front, protect supplies furnished to Russia by the Allies, and assist the Russian people in their struggle for self-government. Two infantry regiments, the 27th and 31st, from the Philippine Islands reinforced by replacements from MG Graves' 8th Division formed the core of the expeditionary force. Great Britain, France, Japan, China, and other US allies also furnished troops and diplomatic missions. However, the Allies did not agree as to what their representatives and military forces were to do.

Allied bickering and dishonesty doomed the AEF's ability to complete its missions. The Czechoslovakians were in Vladivostok when the AEF arrived. Their departure was actually delayed by the Allied arrival because the Czechs stopped trying to escape. Instead they prepared to reestablished the Eastern Front. The Russian civil war was in progress when MG Graves arrived. Bolsheviks were fighting a hodgepodge of White Russian elements. MG Graves was determined to follow his instructions not to

take sides in the civil war. But most of the Allies were determined to destroy the Bolsheviks. When the AEF began guarding the Trans-Siberian Railroad, conflict with the Bolsheviks was inevitable. Unfortunately, the AEF also had to fight some of its White Russian allies.

The individual AEF officers and soldiers performed well but there was little need to send the AEF to Siberia given the missions assigned. The US experience in Siberia serves to highlight the need to coordinate political and military objectives between all participants. Not doing so ensures failure.



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As with any endeavor of this type, many people deserve my thanks. Several individuals were especially helpful and deserve mention here. Dr. Ted Wilson patiently worked around my schedule, always encouraged my research and academic work, and was key to my being accepted as a graduate student. Dr. Larry Yates was instrumental in selecting my thesis topic, sacrificed his personal time to help me with course work, and provided invaluable source material through the US Army Command and General Staff School Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, KS. Dr. Lloyd Sponholtz provided essential background information for the period and challenged me to think and analyze historical events. I cannot thank my committee enough.

Thanks must go to all those who helped my research on the AEF. Many people willingly answered my inquiries and provided essential source material. A special thanks must go to the US Army Command and General Staff College's Combined Arms Research Library (CARL). The librarians in CARL were of inestimable value. The hours they spent helping me find documents in and outside CARL cannot be calculated. Their willingness to help and cheerful enthusiasm buoyed me through many long hours.

Lastly, I must thank my family. My Dad, as always, constantly encouraged me to work hard and strive for

excellence. My children, Shannon and Amanda, put up with my demands to be left alone to conduct research. No young girls could have been more supportive of a father's desire to earn a graduate degree. Finally, my wife, Marilyn, must be singled out for singular praise. No man, least of all me, deserves such a wife. She has sacrificed an untold number of hours discussing my ideas, providing suggestions, correcting my spelling and grammar, and typing this thesis. Without her devotion and continuous encouragement, I would not have completed this thesis. She, above all others, warrants my thanks and love.

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Chapter 1. Introduction.

The date is 6 August 1918.¹ The time is 10:00 PM. The place is the Kansas City, Missouri, railroad station. MG William S. Graves, commander of the United States Army 8th Division, has just completed a two day train ride from his duty post at Camp Fremont, California. MG Graves is in Kansas City to meet Mr. Newton D. Baker, United States Secretary of War, regarding an unspecified mission. Time constraints force the two to meet at the station rather than in the Ealtimore Hotel as originally planned. Mr. Baker tells MG Graves that he will head the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) to Siberia. Mr. Baker says, "If in [the] future you want to cuss anybody for sending you to Siberia I am the man." Mr. Baker hands MG Graves a sealed envelope containing a seven page paper titled "Aide Memoire" dated 17 July 1918 (see Appendix B). The paper outlines US policy in Russia. Mr. Baker then tells MG Graves, "Watch your step; you will be walking on eggs loaded with dynamite. God bless you and good-bye."² Truer words were never spoken.

So began MG Graves' journey which would take him thousands of miles to the Siberian frontier. There he would walk on "eggs loaded with dynamite" as he balanced the demands of allies and various US officials with his instructions. Throughout this endeavor he would earnestly

strive to represent his nation as stated in the "Aide Memoire." His perseverance and that of 27th Infantry Regiment Wolfhounds³ and 31st Infantry Regiment Polar Bears⁴ form a little known saga in the annals of US military history.

The purpose of this thesis is to describe the reasons for America's military intervention in Siberia toward the end of World War I and the AEF's operations there. Events on the Western Front and in revolution-torn Russia will be discussed to provide necessary background material so the reader can understand why the United States and its allies intervened. The AEF's tactics, organization, battles, and lessons learned will be described in detail in order to portray what the AEF did and how the AEF attempted to accomplish its mission. This intervention was one of America's early twentieth century attempts to employ military might to solve political issues without waging a declared war. As such, the events in Siberia provide examples of the problems and considerations involved in military interventions. The lessons that should have been learned are summarized in the final chapter.

Chapter 1 Notes

1. There is some controversy regarding the actual date. MG William S. Graves in his America's Siberian Adventure 1918-1920 (New York: Jonathan Cape and Harrison Smith, 1931) states he was notified on 2 August to travel to Kansas City (p. 3), but an arrival time (10:00 P.M.) is provided with no date (p. 4). However, in his 25 September 1919 report to the Adjutant General of the Army, subject: Operations to June 30, 1919, MG Graves states he received the order to go to Kansas City on 3 August. He further states he arrived in Kansas City the "following Tuesday." A calendar quickly shows that Tuesday to be 6 August. R.E. Dupuy in Perish by the Sword (Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Co., 1939) states 2 August was the day of receipt of the instructions to go to Kansas City and cites MG Graves' book (p. 99). Richard Goldhurst in The Midnight War (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1978) gives 2 August as the day of notification but also states MG Graves had a two day train ride to Kansas City (p. 76). A specific reference is not listed. MG Graves' report is in the National Archives Microfilm Publication Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia 1918-1920 (Washington: National Archives and Records Service, M917, Reel 10, 1973). General Peyton C. March's The Nation at War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran, and Company, Inc., 1932) states Secretary Baker disguised his meeting with MG Graves by going to the "Leavenworth Penitentiary" to visit conscientious objectors. While there, Secretary Baker went to Kansas City on 4 August to meet Graves (p. 127). Unfortunately, the US Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth and the US Federal Penitentiary at Leavenworth, KS, have no record of the visit.

2. Graves, America's Siberian Adventure 1918-1920, pp. 3-4.

3. James A. Sawicki, Infantry Regiments of the US Army (Dumfries, VA: Wyvern Publications, 1981), p. 10. The nickname "Wolfhounds" grew from a story told by a Russian prisoner. The young man had outrun a Cossack patrol using wolfhounds as trackers near Spasskoe, Siberia in August, 1919. When the exhausted prisoner stumbled into an American guard sector, he tried to outrun the sentry that saw him. However, the American sentry caught the Russian and knocked him down with a rifle butt blow to the head. After recovering, the Russian was terrified of the men that could run faster than wolfhounds. The nickname stuck. The story is related in a memorandum by Mr. Nick Hochee concerning his tour with the 27th Infantry. The document

is in the US Army Military History Institute file of papers relating to the AEF in Siberia.

4. Sawicki, Infantry Regiments of the US Army, p. 106.
The nickname is attributed to service in Siberia.

Chapter 2. Strategic Setting

General

Gavrilo Princip's bullets ignited the first of the twentieth century's world wars 28 June 1914, by assassinating Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife. Princip, a Serbian by race and a member of the Serbian Black Hand terrorist society, provided the Austro-Hungarian Empire the pretext to attack Serbia in order to stop Slavic nationalistic feelings in its subjects. However, Russia was allied to Serbia, and the European powers were divided into two groups -- the Triple Alliance composed of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, and the Triple Entente (or Allies) composed of Great Britain, France, and Russia. Austria-Hungary's attempt to punish Serbia forced Russia's hand. The Tsar ordered general mobilization 31 July 1914. If Germany was to honor its alliance to Austria-Hungary, it now had to mobilize. But, Germany knew it faced a possible two-front war between Russia and France. A crucial decision was required.¹

In order to ensure victory in a two-front war, Germany's Schlieffen Plan called for an opening attack against France since Russia could not mobilize and attack Germany as fast as France could. Germany planned to advance through Belgium and Luxembourg to attack France.

Germany mobilized 1 August and demanded free passage through Belgium 2 August. Belgium refused the demand on 3 August. Germany disregarded Belgium's refusal and attacked. Great Britain's 1839 treaty obligation to guarantee Belgium neutrality (to which Germany was also a party) forced Great Britain to protest Germany's violation of Belgium territory. When Germany refused to stop, Great Britain declared war. A great patriotic adventure began.²

Western Front

The war quickly ground to a stalemate in the west with British and French troops facing German troops across a no-man's land of torn earth, tangled debris, and shattered dreams. This was not to be a quick victory. Losses to both sides were appalling. Massive artillery barrages obliterated villages. Rotting bodies dotted the landscape. The land resembled the Moon more than France. Airplanes, machine-guns, and chlorine gas debuted to increase the carnage. In July 1916, Great Britain had at least 57,000 casualties from one day of battle.³ Europe was remorselessly destroying its manhood while the United States sat protected by the Atlantic Ocean. This feeling of safety through distance began to unravel in February 1917.

On 1 February 1917, the German Kaiser ordered unrestricted submarine warfare in order to apply pressure

on the Entente powers. President Woodrow Wilson severed diplomatic relations. Ill will was compounded when Great Britain provided the United States a 17 January 1917 telegram from Germany to Mexico advocating Mexico join Germany in attacking America if America's neutrality ended.⁴ On 16 March 1917, two American ships, the City of Memphis and the Illinois, were sunk by German U-boats. The United States declared war on Germany 6 April 1917.⁵ America's entry into the war came none too soon for the Allies. That same month mutiny broke out in the French army after heavy losses in the Nivelle Offensive.⁶ The United States mobilized and dispatched an American Expeditionary Force (AEF) to France under the command of General John J. Pershing.

The US entry into the war by no means brought an immediate end to the conflict. American soldiers needed training and experience. New weapons were still to be employed. The first large-scale use of tanks in an attack occurred at Cambrai 20 November 1917. British tanks achieved a 10,000 yard penetration. Unfortunately, the penetration was not exploited and German counterattacks regained most of the lost ground.⁷

The arrival of fresh American troops posed a significant problem for Germany. Operation Michael was born to strike the Cambrai to Saint Quentin area of the front near the juncture of the French and British armies. Be-

tween November 1917 and March 1918, Germany secretly massed troops and material.⁹ By March 1918, six US divisions were in France with three deployed in quiet sectors. US casualties to date were 1,722 with only 162 deaths from battle action.⁷ Germany planned a great offensive before massive numbers of American troops could be employed. Michael began 21 March with 6,100 German guns pounding the British lines.¹⁰ Germany continued to attack and advance step by step until June when Entente forces were able to halt the advance. US troops continued to arrive in France throughout this time. On 18 July 1918, French and US forces counterattacked the German salient at the Marne River.¹¹ The Allies had checked Germany's supreme effort.

Eastern Front

Russia surprised Germany with the speed of its mobilization and invaded East Prussia 17 August 1914. Initial Russian success ended when German forces concentrated against General Alexander Samsonov's Second Army at Tannenberg while using a single cavalry division to slow the Russian First Army attacking to the north. Germany destroyed the Second Army, taking 120,000 Russians prisoner. Austrian troops to the south also succeeded in forcing back the Russian forces.¹² Offensives and counter-

offensives continued with massive numbers of casualties mounting on both sides. Russia's lack of success compounded domestic problems that had begun before the war.

Russia's creation of a large industrial capacity produced weapons and ammunition but also caused severe economic and social strain. Modernization of industry required a large urban society, but Russian farms produced insufficient food to support a large urban population. Poor military administration, inadequate rations, and huge losses in the war caused the soldiers to lose faith in the Tsar's ability to rule.¹³ Peasants banded together in a cooperative effort to try to obtain economic help for each other.¹⁴ By March 1917, the Russian people could take no more.

Food riots erupted in Petrograd (now Leningrad) 8 March 1917. The riots evolved into revolution by 12 March. Even the Tsar's Imperial Guard revolted.¹⁵ People were killed in the streets. Roving bands murdered police officers and demanded military officers surrender their swords or die.¹⁶ Chaos reigned. The Tsar realized he could no longer reign and abdicated 15 March in favor of his brother, Michael, who never assumed the crown. A Provisional Government was formed by the Duma, or Russian Parliament.¹⁷

The revolution was initially welcomed by President Wilson. He thought the Russian people would be released

from the bonds of despotism and that the war could then more easily be portrayed as a struggle of democracy against militarism. It was widely believed that the Tsar's corrupt regime had crippled the fighting spirit of the Russian soldiers, so a democratic government would help the Eastern Front. The leaders of the Provisional Government portrayed themselves to their Entente allies as a stable, middle-class group devoted to a continued war effort.¹⁸ The US ambassador to Russia, David R. Francis, welcomed the Tsar's fall as a chance for democratic reforms to be implemented in Russia.¹⁹

After the revolution, socialist and non-socialist elements had to share governmental power. The non-socialists possessed the political and administrative skills needed to run the government. But the socialists had the organized manpower resource -- "soviets" composed of industrial workers and soldiers.²⁰ Events would doom this initial cooperation.

The Provisional Government was recognized by the United States on 22 March, which provided the Russians strong moral encouragement and eased the US decision to join the war effort against Germany and her allies. The United States would not be allied with an absolutist monarchy.²¹ Germany initially treated the new Russian government well in an attempt to make peace. Nicholai Lenin's request to Germany to be allowed to cross from Switzer-

land through Germany to Russia was granted so he could fulfill his promise to overthrow the Provisional Government and make peace. Lenin reached Petrograd 16 April. The Provisional Government did not interfere with his arrival because of the mistaken belief that his cooperation with Germany would injure his reputation. Another Bolshevik leader, Leon Trotsky, was allowed to travel to Petrograd from his temporary home in New York. He arrived 17 May 1917.²²

Alexander Kerensky, a Social Revolutionary, was initially Minister of Justice, later the Minister of War, and finally Prime Minister of the Provisional Government.²³ His continued support for the Allied war effort led to the Russian Army's 45 division attack toward Lemberg in Galicia on 5 July 1917. The soldiers advanced over twenty miles before stopping. They were just too tired to continue. German forces counterattacked and regained the lost ground. Later in July, the Russian Fourth Army attacked in the Carpathians on a sixty mile front but also failed. Both sides settled into a passive defense.²⁴ Throughout these months, support of the war was contested by the Provisional Government and the revolutionary groups desiring to end the war. The All-Russian Convention of Delegates from Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies adopted a resolution on 25 June 1917 which blamed the war on "the imperialistic tendencies of the ruling classes of all countries." A

separate peace between Russia and Germany was not advocated. Instead, the convention called for an "international socialist conference to reestablish the international solidarity of the working class" as a means of forcing the peace process on all belligerents.²⁵

When Kerensky's offensive failed, the Bolsheviks attempted to overthrow the Provisional Government but failed. Lenin fled to Finland to avoid imprisonment. Kerensky then tried to make peace with all parties as a means to preserve the Russian government.²⁶ The pitiful condition of the Russian Army was evident to any who cared to look. An estimated 120,000 troops roamed the Petrograd streets refusing to go to the front in July 1917.²⁷

When Raymond Robins, Chief of the American Red Cross Mission to Russia, visited a Russian unit near Stalna in October 1917, he recorded in his diary "The war is dead in the heart of the Russian soldier." Shortly after this visit, Mr. Robins had a revealing discussion with British General Alfred Knox concerning the Bolsheviks. On 2 November, in the Hotel Europe in Petrograd, Knox revealed his feelings toward the Bolsheviks when he said, "I'll tell you what we do with such people. We shoot them." This attitude would later cause great problems for the AEF in Siberia. Robins' reply revealed a very astute perception of reality in Russia. He said, "You do if you catch them. But you will have to do some catching. General, I am not

a military man. But you are not up against a military situation. You are up against a folks' situation."²⁹ Ambassador Francis proposed to the US Secretary of State on 6 November 1917, that two or more US divisions be sent to aid Russian forces. He proposed interjecting them through Sweden or Vladivostok and felt the moral impact of such a move would be more valuable than material assistance.²⁷

Unfortunately for Kerensky, the Bolsheviks had no intention of allowing non-Bolsheviks to rule. In early November 1917, the Congress of Soviets met in Petrograd with Bolshevik delegates nationwide. This convention decided that the Provisional Government did not represent their interests. Lenin ordered a revolt against the government.³⁰ Soldiers from the Petrograd soviet surrounded the Winter Palace housing the Provisional Government on the night of 7 November.³¹ The Bolshevik crew of the cruiser Aurora fired in support of the revolt. Kerensky had no choice but to step down and flee for his life.³²

On 8 November, Lenin called for an international conference to end the war and warned Russian allies that Russia might stop fighting.³³ On 21 November, Trotsky notified the Allied diplomatic missions that the Bolsheviks were in power.³⁴ The Allies were not pleased. The United States refused to recognize the Bolshevik

government.³⁵ There was genuine concern that Lenin would carry out his threat to sue for peace alone. Ambassador Francis felt that Russia's agreements with her allies allowed Russia to conclude a separate peace with Germany if forced to do so due to internal revolution.³⁶

On 23 November 1917, Trotsky began publication of secret treaties between Russia and the Allies concerning territorial divisions. The Allies did not consent before Trotsky acted.³⁷ The secret treaties were negotiated between Great Britain, France, and Russia beginning in March 1915. These agreements divided Thrace, Turkey, Syria, and other Middle Eastern areas into possessions, "zones of interest," and "federations" of Russia, France, and Great Britain. Palestine was to be internationalized.³⁸

The Bolshevik coup did not end the power conflict in Russia. Various groups of non-socialists and monarchists arose to dispute Lenin's right to rule. These groups, referred to as White Russians, were more palatable to the Entente nations since they were not determined to change the social order of the world. While this opposition continued to solidify, Lenin proceeded to negotiate peace with the Germans. A Russian-German armistice was implemented 17 December.³⁹ Negotiations culminated in the Brest-Litovsk Treaty 3 March 1918.⁴⁰

The Allies were in a difficult situation. The virtual stalemate on the Western Front in no way assured

victory. Russia's leaving the war removed an ally with great potential power and greatly eased Germany's task because Germany no longer had to fight in two directions simultaneously. Reestablishing the second front was one way to keep pressure on the Central Powers. That and many other factors led the Allies to intervene militarily in Russia.

Chapter 2 Notes

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Chapter 3. Reasons for Intervention

Reasons

Several reasons existed for the Allies to intervene in Russia. A key point to be remembered is that the Allies did not agree on why intervention was necessary. In fact, agencies within the US government did not agree on the objectives of the operation. This lack of consensus led to confusion and animosity among the Allied forces in Russia. British, French, American, Canadian, and other elements landed at Murmansk in northern Russia; French units landed at Odessa¹; and British, French, American, Chinese, Japanese, and other forces moved into Siberia. Siberia is, of course, the focus here though many factors affecting Allied actions in Siberia also affected operations in the other areas.

The influence of Bolshevism was feared by many. This new order challenged the old. It was a threat to stability. It preached State, not private, ownership. It relied on Karl Marx's "Communist Manifesto" as an ideological base. Marx argued for the abolition of inheritance rights, the centralization of communications and transportation in the State's hands, a heavy progressive or graduated income tax, and the abolition of private land property.² Such aims did not endear Bolsheviks to the capitalistic Allies.

After the November revolution, many Americans continued to view the Russian people as being "'with us'" in the war effort. It was felt that the Bolshevik rise to power was due to German influence.³ If this was true, the Red tide could be stopped and reversed in order to save the world from its evils. Failure to eliminate Bolshevism in Russia was feared to lead to its spread all over Europe. There was particular concern that Bolshevism would spread to the Central Powers nations should they be defeated.⁴ Great Britain was concerned that Bolshevism would spread to India and threaten the Empire.⁵ Later actions would see Britain and France intervene in Siberia as a way to attack Bolshevism.⁶ However, this was not an objective of the US government even though selected Americans, such as Ambassador Francis,⁷ did advocate such a mission.

The peace moves by Lenin's government relieved Germany from fighting a two-front war in Europe. Resources could now be concentrated on the Western Allies. Naturally, this caused the Western Allies great concern. They had hoped a strong, democratic government supporting the war would be formed after the revolution.⁸ With Kerensky's downfall it did not appear this would happen, unless the Allies forced it to happen.

There were additional aspects of the German problem. Some feared Germany would be able to take advantage of

Russia's weak condition and establish supremacy over it.⁹ Another concern prompting the north Russian intervention was the fear that Germany might be able to establish submarine bases at Murmansk and Archangel.¹⁰

The Allies had provided large quantities of military supplies to the Tsar's government to support its participation in the war. Without a strong, pro-Allied government, these supplies would not be used to help defeat the Central Powers. In fact, there was concern the Bolsheviks might allow the Germans to seize the supplies and use them against the Allies.¹¹ Foreign supplied materials in Vladivostok included rubber, cotton, harvesting machinery, barbed wire, ammunition, lathes, aircraft parts,¹² 37,000 railway truck wheels, steel rails, field guns, automobiles, shoes, copper and lead ingots, and a submarine.¹³ What was to happen to this wealth? The lack of stability in Russia forced the Allies to consider protecting their investments. Russian debt to Allied nations totaled in the billions of roubles. Russian owed Great Britain 7.5 billion and France 5.5 billion.¹⁴ On 16 May 1917, the United States had extended \$100,000,000 credit to Russia. By 6 July 1917, \$35,000,000 in loans were made.¹⁵ These totals rose to \$325,000,000 credit with \$187,729,750 actually loaned by January 1918.¹⁶ The Allies adopted a "no fight, no loans" approach to coerce the Provisional Government to support the war effort. This policy

hastened the fall of Kerensky's government because the Russian people were tired of fighting.¹⁷ Bolshevik peace promises brought them much support. In addition to the credits noted above, other loans were made to Russia. On 8 August 1919, the Russian Provisional Government still owed the United States \$406,092 for war materials sold earlier. Food provided through the American Relief Association totaled \$4,465,465.07. Several private loans totaled another \$96,000,000. Russia owed over \$302,000,000 to the United States.¹⁸

In addition to being able to remove troops from Eastern Front positions to shift to the West, another potential source of enemy manpower existed -- prisoners of war (POW). Article 8 of the Brest-Litovsk treaty called for the repatriation of POWs.¹⁹ Estimates went as high as two million POWs being held by Russia.²⁰ Such numbers could not be ignored and did much to alarm the Allies. Such a large number of reinforcements, if fit for duty in time, could have negated the addition of the United States to the Allied cause.

As mentioned previously, military and non-military supplies had been furnished to Russia. Additionally, international business enterprises had factories and supervisory personnel in Russia. The Singer Sewing Machine Company had three factories in the country. The International Harvester Company had factories in Russia and

many other nations. International business operations were crucial to International Harvester as evidenced by one estimate that forty percent of its business was the result of foreign sales.²¹ In addition to Singer and International Harvester, J.M. Coates (producing thread) and Westinghouse had factories in Russia.²² Since Russia was a member of the Allied coalition, diplomatic relations existed between those nations. This resulted in many foreigners being in Russia in support of diplomatic activities. Such people had to be protected and were another reason the Allies considered intervention.

The Trans-Siberian Railroad linked European Russia to Siberia (see Figure 1). Its economic importance was unsurpassed as it provided a means of crossing several thousand miles of inhospitable country much more quickly than by road. However, in many places it was only a single track which restricted two-way traffic. Extensive use of sidings prevailed in order to allow trains to pass one another.²³ The railroad also served as a key means for refugees to escape war or persecution. Two such trains carrying Serbians from Odessa were seen in Harbin, Manchuria during the 1918-1919 winter. The trains carried 1,057 people. These refugees lived in boxcars and coaches, with standing room only in many, for seven months.²⁴

The line left Russian soil east of China and entered Manchuria. Passage through Manchuria was originally

sought to save construction and freight costs because it was a shorter route to Vladivostok. Additionally, it provided Russia an opportunity to dominate Manchuria and Korea without overt military action. China agreed to the pact settling the issue in 1896 as a means of paying back Russia for forcing Japan to abandon the Liaotung Peninsula containing the year round ports of Port Arthur and Talienwan. Russia had joined forces with Germany and France to accomplish this after Japan had obtained the land by defeating China in 1894. The European nations feared Japan's competition as they were attempting to expand their power in the Pacific area. This section of the line was technically known as the Chinese Eastern Railway. In order to disguise the actual Russian government domination of the line, China granted the railway concession to the Russo-Chinese Bank, a private business created by Russia's Finance Minister and supported by French bankers. The Russo-Chinese Bank then transferred the concession to the Chinese Eastern Railway Company whose shares were principally owned by the Russian Treasury.²⁸

In February 1903, the Chinese Eastern Railway was opened. European Russia was then connected to the Pacific Ocean by railroad except at Lake Baikal. Ferries were used to cross the lake until the 162 mile line around the southern rim of the lake was completed. After Russia lost its

war with Japan in 1905, an alternate route to the one through Manchuria was needed. Consequently, a rail line was built on Russian territory north of the Amur River and the Manchuria border. When the bridge at Khabarovsk was completed in 1916, the Amur line was opened.²⁶ Even though the Amur line was open, the Chinese Eastern line continued to be used more than the Amur since the Chinese Eastern was the least expensive and shortest.²⁷

The Siberian population depended on the railroad for commerce.²⁸ Yet, the railroad was not functioning smoothly. The Provisional Government asked for American assistance. John F. Stevens with five railway experts was sent to Vladivostok in May 1917. He concluded American aid was required because the Trans-Siberian Railroad was incapable of distributing the supplies needed to support the people there. Russia agreed to the offer in August 1917. Stevens' plan called for twelve units of American railway personnel to be formed with superintendents, dispatchers, trainmasters, travelling engineers, mechanics, and telephone experts. Ten of these fourteen-men units would operate the railway between Vladivostok and Omsk. Two would control the line between Moscow and Petrograd. Therefore, on 18 November 1917, COL George H. Emerson with 350 railway personnel sailed from San Francisco for Vladivostok on the US Army Transport (USAT) Thomas. Due to the revolution, the Thomas did not land at Vladivostok

when it arrived 14 December 1917. Instead, it sailed to Nagasaki, Japan. The Thomas could not wait out the civil disturbances by anchoring in the Vladivostok harbor for fear of being iced in. Mr. Stevens then went to Harbin, Manchuria, to confer with the Chinese Eastern officials to ascertain if he could put his men to work there. Permission was granted so the Russian Railway Service Corps began its movement to Harbin on 27 February 1918.²⁹ The Railway Service Corps used Harbin as its headquarters.³⁰

The criticality of the Trans-Siberian Railroad made it a key component in any decision to intervene. Its control would be paramount in supporting any operations in Siberia. The existence of the Railway Service Corps with its mission to supervise the operations of the rail line supported a decision to intervene.

Japan posed a significant problem for the other Allies in Siberia. Though ostensibly allied with Great Britain, France, and the United States against Germany, all were competitors for trade and influence in Asia. Great Britain was established in Hong Kong and the Yangtse River valley. France controlled parts of southern China. Japan controlled Formosa and Korea. Russia had its railroad concession in Manchuria. Germany controlled parts of China's Shantung Province and Mongolia. The United States under its Open Door Policy was dedicated to equal trade opportunities for all in Asia.³¹ Regardless of

the sides chosen in World War I, competition in Asia among all these nations existed.

The results of the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War established Japan as a first-rate power in the Pacific. This power forced the US to look on Japan as a trade rival. World War I provided Japan an opportunity to seize Germany's possessions in the area and expand into China.³² The 1917 revolution gave Japan a chance to grab the Sakhalin Islands as a potential oil resource. The mainland also possessed attractive coal and timber resources.³³ In addition to the raw material needs discussed, Japan needed territory for its excess population. One author has suggested that the Japanese military wanted more people to put in uniform.³⁴ Mainland Asia could provide such a resource. The US Army Chief of Staff, General Peyton C. March, was convinced Japan wanted land after he was a military attache and observer in Manchuria with the Japanese Army during the Russo-Japanese War.³⁵

The Bolshevik revolution provided Japan the opportunity to place forces in Siberia and Manchuria against little organized resistance. This then made possible a direct attack into China if Japan chose to do so.³⁶ England feared Japan would assume leadership of the "dark races" and cause problems in India.³⁷ The United States feared that giving Japan a free hand would mean recognition of Japan's supremacy in the Far East and force the

abandonment of future trade and business in the area.³⁸ On the other hand, Japan did not want to intervene unless the US did also. Japan did not want to dissipate its forces while allowing the US to conserve its.³⁹

Another reason for the United States and its allies to intervene was to support the Czechoslovakian Legion. Czechoslovakian deserters from the Austro-Hungarian army were formed into units under Russian officers beginning in 1914. Word of these units spread through Austria-Hungary's units prompting more desertions. The Czechoslovakians felt little loyalty to Austria-Hungary and wanted their own country.⁴⁰ The Allies supported the aims of many nationalities under the domination of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a way to cause problems in the Empire's army.⁴¹ Besides the Czech units formed in Russia, several were also organized in France beginning in 1914 and later in Italy.⁴² Volunteers included steelworkers of slavic descent from the United States.⁴³

When the Tsar abdicated, the Czech units continued to support the war effort as part of Russian General Brusiloff's army. They took part in the unsuccessful July 1917 offensive discussed earlier and formed the rearguard for the retreating XI army. When Kerensky's government failed, the Czech legion was an army corps of approximately 40,000 soldiers after successful recruiting efforts in POW camps and Russian munition factories.⁴⁴

Declaration of a Czechslovakian nation in January 1918, with the decision by the Czechs that they would continue to fight Austria-Hungary, laid the groundwork for future conflict with the Bolsheviks.⁴⁵ As a result of this, Lenin was faced with the prospect of having a force on Russian soil that was determined to continue a war he hoped to end. The Czech Legion declared its neutrality toward all political groups in Russia on 3 March 1918 and started moving toward Vladivostok for subsequent transfer to the Western Front. As the Legion departed the general area of Kiev, it was forced to hold off advancing German units. German and Czech units battled for railway stations near Bachmach as the Czechs attempted to entrain. After losing approximately 100 dead and 200 wounded while inflicting losses three times that on the Germans, the Czechs defeated the Germans and began their long journey to the East.⁴⁶

On 26 March, the Bolshevik government agreed to allow the Czechs to cross Russia providing all weapons except one rifle for each ten men were surrendered. By this time, the Legion had grown to approximately 45,000 and required 65 trains to move eastward. On 5 May, the two lead infantry regiments under the command of the Legion's Chief of Staff, General Milo K. Dietrich, reached Vladivostok. The remainder were scattered over 4,500 miles of railroad as far west as the Volga River due to minor bickerings with

numerous Bolshevik officials, railway system inefficiency, and a lack of locomotives.⁴⁷

The peace with the Bolsheviks was only temporary. On 14 May 1918, at Cheliabinsk in the Ural foothills, an incident occurred that dramatically altered the situation. A German POW train entered the station and stopped. The station was filled with Czechs moving eastward, repatriating German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners moving westward, and Bolshevik officials and guards. As the POW train stopped, this mixture of people mingled around it. Conversations broke out among many small groups. Suddenly, shouts exploded and Czechs charged a German car. Using a piece of metal, a POW had hit and killed a passing Czech soldier. There was wild pandemonium as the Czechs dragged the suspect out of the train and beat him to death. Bolshevik guards moved into the melee to restore order. The Bolsheviks carried off Czechs and POWs for questioning. The POW train pulled out but the Czechs refused to leave without their countrymen.⁴⁸

The matter could have been settled at this point. A delegation of Czechs was sent to the police station to ascertain when their comrades would be released. The Bolsheviks jailed the delegation. As one can imagine, a cohesive group of well-disciplined soldiers was not prepared to accept such injustice even though they were only lightly armed. The Czechs stormed the police station and freed

their fellow soldiers. Word of this spread all along the Trans-Siberian railroad so that free passage could no longer be expected. Lenin's government ordered that all Czech movement be stopped. The Czechs, of course, were not willing to abide by Lenin's orders and continued eastward fighting their way through Bolshevik ambushes and repairing destroyed track. Czechs fought with rifles, clubs, and stones seizing additional arms as they marched eastward.⁴⁹

Allied governments realized the Czech Legion was a potent force. This was a force that could be used to bring stability to Russia and assist Allied intervention. On 22 June, France informed the Legion that it was the advanced guard for a massive Allied intervention. The Czechs were told to hold the Volga River. They accepted the order.⁵⁰

On 29 June, open fighting broke out between Dietrich's Czechs and the Reds in Vladivostok. The Reds lost and a White Russian government was installed. On 29 July, Lenin declared a state of war existed between Soviet Russia and the Allies.⁵¹ By the end of August, the Czech Legion controlled the Trans-Siberian Railroad from the Volga River to Vladivostok. They established friendly governments in the cities along the railway.⁵² In September and October 1918, the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan recognized the Czechoslovakian National Council as the government of a co-belligerent nation fighting the Central Powers with its army in Russia an Allied army.⁵³

The Decision

On 29 November 1917, the Inter-Allied Conference began with its subordinate Supreme War Council meeting 1 December in order to coordinate the war effort. The Allies were not sure they would win and hoped to consolidate their power so as to be able to defeat the Central Powers. There was also concern that Bolshevik disclosures of secret territorial annexation agreements would solidify the opposition making victory more difficult.⁸⁴

The factors discussed previously weighed heavily on President Wilson's mind. Yet the Russian problem was only one segment of the World War I effort. America's Allies wanted one million men in 100 divisions for the Western Front. They also wanted to use American soldiers to replace their units' losses. War raged in France, Italy, and the Middle East. A few thousand men being sent to Russia was insignificant in comparison. But the Allies wanted to sent troops to Russia and President Wilson wanted to comply and be a good ally. His refusal to cooperate on previous issues resulted in Wilson's desire to prove he was a good ally by acceding to demands to intervene.⁸⁵ General Tasker H. Bliss, US Military Representative to the Supreme War Council, forwarded a letter to US Army Chief of Staff Peyton C. March on 20 February 1918 that discussed British desires for intervention in Siberia. Japan-

ese occupation of the railroad between Vladivostok and Harbin was favored by the British. General Bliss warned that it might be difficult to get Japan out of Siberia once allowed in. He was concerned that Russia might try to play off Japan and Germany against each other. General Bliss pointed out that Great Britain and France were convinced that intervention was the only way to consolidate Russian feelings favorable to the Allies. He also stated that there was no military advantage to be accrued by seizing the Trans-Siberian Railroad unless westward movement was planned. As a final note, General Bliss recommended the United States stay out of Siberia.⁶⁶

However, Secretary of State Robert Lansing and the State Department officers involved were vehemently anti-Bolshevik even though they initially hoped to avoid US military intervention. Lansing feared the Bolsheviks and refused to allow American diplomats in Russia to enter into formal or informal relations with the Soviet government.⁶⁷ Continued Allied diplomatic pressure with subsequent support from the State Department pushed President Wilson toward a position favoring intervention. The Brest-Litovsk Treaty in March 1918 showed that the Bolsheviks would not join the Allies in defeating the Central Powers.

Intervention in Siberia by Allied military forces began in April 1918. Several armed men wearing Russian

uniforms entered a Japanese shop in Vladivostok on 4 April. When the Japanese shopkeeper refused to give them the money they demanded, the Russians killed him and two other Japanese in the store. Japanese warships (in the harbor since January) landed 500 men to protect Japanese lives and property. Fifty British soldiers were landed afterwards to guard British subjects and property. The Bolsheviks were taken by surprise and did not resist. The United States government did not know the Japanese were going to commit troops prior to the actual landing.²⁸ Extensive operations were not mounted pending continued diplomatic wrangling. US Marines from the USS Brooklyn landed in Vladivostok on 29 June 1918 to protect the American consulate and participate in Allied patrolling of the city.²⁹

On 24 June 1918, General March again counseled President Wilson not to commit troops to Siberia. General March argued that occupying the Trans-Siberian Railroad by the 10,000 to 15,000 Allied soldiers suggested by the President in a 17 June letter was pointless. Such a small number would not divert German strength from the Western Front. Occupying Russia proper might accomplish that task because the minerals, oil, and grain in the Ukraine were coveted by Germany. He emphasized the war would be won or lost on the Western Front so resources should be husbanded for that effort. March pointed out that there was insufficient shipping tonnage available to supply a force in

Siberia. Living off the land would take valuable resources from the Siberian population. Allowing Japan to intervene in Siberia would consolidate Russian opinion against the Allies.⁴⁰

President Wilson was confronted with a difficult situation. His primary concern was the Western Front, but his allies and certain members of the government felt an intervention in Russia was necessary. Japan had initially indicated it did not plan to land troops then changed its mind and did so. Secretary of State Lansing encouraged intervention. Generals March and Bliss discouraged the idea. The British and French encouraged President Wilson to intervene to preclude a German seizure of Siberia. Japan feared German submarine bases on the eastern Siberia coastline. However, all these parties were concerned that a Japanese intervention would cause a racial backlash in Russia. The incident or idea that tipped the scales toward a decision to intervene is unclear. Historians have debated the issue for years and will continue to do so. As discussed previously, there were many factors influencing this decision. These factors or a subset of them resulted in President Wilson's decision to intervene. The fact that the decision was made is clear. The AEF landed.⁴¹

Initially President Wilson agreed with General March, but Allied pressure finally convinced him intervention was

necessary. Therefore, March selected the 27th and 31st Infantry Regiments in the Philippine Islands as the core of the expeditionary force. This precluded diverting units previously slated for the Western Front to intervene in Siberia. On 6 July, President Wilson told Secretary of State Lansing, Secretary of War Baker, Secretary of the Navy Daniels, and General March that the United States would intervene in Siberia. Seven thousand troops from the United States and Japan each were to be used. General March felt that trying to limit the number of Japanese troops was futile.⁴² The "Aide Memoire" in Appendix B was the result. Five US Army Transports were dedicated to be used to transport the Czechslovakians from Vladivostok when needed. Sufficient Russian rifles were available in the US to equip 13,000 Czechs with one million rounds of ammunition on hand. Two months would be required to move the equipment to Vladivostok.⁴³

The Department of State issued a press release 5 August to explain the decision to intervene. Reopening the Eastern Front was explicitly not a reason for intervening because such action would not aid Russia. Supporting this type of operation would use up valuable resources needed by the Russian people. Intervention was needed, however, to help the Czechslovakian forces under attack from Austrian and German prisoners as well as steadying any self-governing actions undertaken by the Russians. The announce-

ment stated that the United States, France, and Great Britain would land troops near Murmansk and Archangel in northern Russia with the United States and Japan landing troops in Siberia. Non-interference in Russia's internal politics was promised. In addition to armed forces, the United States hoped to send a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labor advisors, Red Cross workers, and representatives from the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA).⁴⁴

Numerous reasons influenced the Allied decision to intervene. Great Britain and France were openly anti-Bolshevik. Japan sought raw materials and land for population expansion. The United States wanted to help the Russian people find democracy, save the Czech Legion, and protect military and non-military supplies. Unfortunately, different reasons motivated each country. This precluded a coordinated operation from taking place since each Allied commander had to follow the dictates of his country regardless of the impact on the other Allied forces. No single commander for all Allied units in Siberia was appointed to conduct the intervention.

Chapter 3 Notes

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Chapter 4. Status of Military Forces

As 1918 drew to a close, numerous anti-Bolshevik groups vied for power and Allied support in Siberia. Western and central Russia were largely dominated by the Bolsheviks, but Siberia offered hope. There was even a chance that Siberia might become an independent nation.¹

A Siberian nation was not a new idea. Agitation for nationhood had occurred periodically for years. The vast distances and pioneer spirit of the settlers had fostered an independent attitude. Greater civil liberties were granted by being so far from the seat of power. There were few landlords which reduced landlord-peasant tensions that existed elsewhere. Yet there was a certain amount of social and political conflict between the privileged and underprivileged.²

Siberian revolutionaries were preparing for a revolt before the November 1917 revolution. A conference of revolutionary organizations was held in August 1917. An All-Siberian Congress was convened in October of 1917. It organized an Extraordinary Siberian Regional Congress to meet in December to set up an autonomous Siberian government. This Congress met and established a Provisional Regional Council empowered to organize a Siberian Regional Duma. Even though this body was revolutionary, it did not fully support the Bolsheviks.³

The Siberian Regional Duma was to meet at Tomsk 1 February 1918. But the Bolsheviks seized the city and arrested several members of the Duma and the Regional Council. A Social-Revolutionary named Derber convened a secret meeting of twenty of the one hundred and fifty Duma delegates. This group elected a Provisional Siberian Government. Fear of reprisals prompted the government ministers to quietly make their way to Harbin, Manchuria, to establish their government.⁴

Derber's Provisional Siberian Government conflicted with another group already in Harbin. General Dmitri L. Horvath, Chinese Eastern Railway Director, was regarded by the Far Eastern Committee as its candidate for head of a future All-Russian Government. Negotiations with the Allies were in progress, though formation of a government had been delayed so an army could be raised. Horvath's group invited Admiral Alexander Kolchak, who was living in Japan, to come to Siberia and raise an Army.⁵ He did so.

Other power bases in the region included the Cossack groups. Ataman Grigori Semenov organized a Cossack band that initially operated out of Manchuria. He was a Russian officer from 1908 until the revolution. Semenov raised an irregular army that is estimated to have reached a strength of 60,000. He officially recognized Admiral Kolchak as his leader but did not always obey Kolchak's orders. Throughout the intervention, his loyalty was to

Japan and himself. Japan supported Semenov with supplies and cooperated with Semenov in troop deployments. Semenov was well known for his brutal tactics characterized by unnecessary killing and property destruction.⁶

Ivan Kalmikov, Ataman of the Ussuri Cossacks, was another Cossack leader active in Siberia. He, too, received support from the Japanese. Kalmikov's depredations were even worse than those of Semenov. He murdered and plundered at will, recognizing no authority except Semenov and the Japanese. Kalmikov not only ordered murder and robbery, but he personally committed these crimes. Civilians and his soldiers were brutally treated. This forced many would-be supporters into Bolshevik hands.⁷

After the Czech Legion seized Samara on 8 June 1918, seventy Social-Revolutionaries formed another government there. This group had been part of the Russian Constituent Assembly abolished by the Bolsheviks 29 January 1918. Viktor Chernov was president. The Samara Government, also known as the Komuch, raised a People's Army and cooperated with the Czechs in several military operations. The capture of Kazan is one example of such cooperation. General Galkin headed the People's Army which increased in size to some 31,000 soldiers.⁸

A right-wing Social-Revolutionary group formed another government in Omsk with P.V. Vologodsky as president. This army grew from a few hundred men to 200,000.

After the People's Army was defeated in the Fall of 1918, the Omsk military forces were the principal anti-Bolshevik units operating. The Omsk government hoped for a short period of Siberian autonomy followed by a united Russia free of the Bolsheviks.⁹

A group of former members of the Tomsk government established another government. This one was formed at Novonikolayevsk on the Ob River in July 1918. This group's policies were more moderate than Derber's and strove for elimination of Bolshevism, universal suffrage, and state control of economic activities. It was supported by its Siberian Volunteer Army.¹⁰

Several smaller governments were also formed. These included one at Nizhneudinsk, the Ural Government at Ekaterinburg, the Kirghiz Government in Turkestan, the Bashkir Government, a Turko-Tartar Government, and other, smaller regional bodies.¹¹ The point of this listing is to illustrate the confusing political situation that existed in Siberia. The Bolsheviks were unable to immediately defeat such widespread opposition. However, the opposition was not united. This benefited the Soviets because it provided them time to gather strength and defeat the White elements piecemeal rather than collectively.

The Allies were not happy with the lack of solidarity in the White camp. They had difficulty ascertaining who to support -- who could win. As a means to consolidate

anti-Bolshevik power, the Allies encouraged the Samara and Omsk governments to join together. Conferences at Chelyabinsk in July and August 1918 failed to bring the sides together. Red advances forced the next conference to be moved to Ufa on 8 September 1918. A compromise was eventually reached so that on 23 September, a five-man Directory would rule until a quorum of the Constituent Assembly could be gathered. This meeting had to occur before 1 January 1919. Private negotiations resulted in Derber's Provisional Siberian Government surrendering its claim to authority. Horvath relinquished power as well and was named Vice Regent of the Siberian Government. Admiral Kolchak was the Minister of War.¹²

Omsk became the seat of the new Siberian Government in October, but conflict between the many factions did not cease. This internal conflict precluded effective government and led to Admiral Kolchak's assumption of dictatorial powers on 18 November 1918.¹³ Admiral Kolchak felt he was obligated to carry on the war against Germany and support the Allies as a member of the Russian government. He also told the Allies he felt the civil war was a continuation of the war in Europe.¹⁴

In December 1918, Kolchak had three semi-independent armies under his command: The Southern Army under General I.A. Dutov, a mostly Cossack force, the Western Army under General M.V. Khandzhin, and the Northern Army under the

Czech General Gaida.¹⁵ In order to obtain sufficient troops, Kolchak drafted fifteen year-old boys and older young men to fight in his army.¹⁶ Kolchak lost popular support due to his cooperation with the murderous Cossack bands.¹⁷ So many of his troops deserted with British supplied equipment that the Bolsheviks sent a telegram to General Knox, the British chief representative in Siberia, thanking Knox for the supplies.¹⁸

After the 11 November armistice, President Wilson and British Prime Minister Lloyd George hoped to have all parties in the Russian civil war attend the Peace Conference in Paris. France opposed inviting the Bolsheviks because of concern over propaganda and domestic agitation. Eventually, the Allies agreed to meet with the Whites and Reds on the Prinkipo Islands in the Sea of Marmora near Constantinople. The Soviets accepted the proposal and offered the following concessions in exchange for peace:

1. Soviet recognition of Russia's debts. Raw materials would be used for payment.
2. Mining, forest, and other concessions to the Allies.
3. Discussion of territorial settlements.
4. Agreement to not interfere in the internal affairs of the Allies.¹⁹

The White Russians refused the Prinkipo Proposal. They were not prepared to meet with the Bolsheviks. This peace effort drove the Whites toward the Japanese for support.²⁰

In February 1919, with the Prinkipo Proposal killed, the White Russian diplomats pressured the Allies to recognize Kolchak's government. Great Britain favored recognition but the United States did not. Even though not prepared to officially recognize the Omsk government, the United States continued to support the Allied efforts to operate the Trans-Siberian Railroad.²¹ Kolchak did not promise election of a constituent assembly by universal suffrage with a peasant land ownership program to placate Allied demands until June 1919. This refusal resulted in the United States not recognizing Kolchak's government. By then it was too late. His military forces were on the defensive with the Bolsheviks steadily gaining ground.²²

Great Britain had limited resources to support intervention in Siberia. Supporting forces on the Western Front as well as in the Middle East, Africa, and northern Russia was a terrific manpower drain. Britain could not intervene alone.²³

In November 1917, Britain's 25th Battalion, Middlesex Regiment in Hong Kong was ordered to Vladivostok, but the orders were cancelled before the battalion moved out. In June 1918, the battalion was again alerted. It departed in July and landed at Vladivostok 3 August.²⁴ The 25th Battalion was composed of men classified as "B1" -- men having already seen service. The battalion was so structured because additional combat action was not expected.²⁵

On the night of 5 August, one-half of the battalion was sent to the Ussuri River front to assist the Japanese and White Russian forces. This detachment was composed of 500 infantrymen and a forty-three man, four Maxim machine-gun section. The men were required to march four miles to the train station. Marching was a difficult task. By the end of the four miles, the battalion commander was carrying four rifles. Garrison life had not prepared the battalion for the physical strain of combat. The lack of tents, mosquito nets, and transport added to the 25th's woes.²⁶

A lack of artillery support was compensated for, courtesy of the Royal Navy. Commodore Payne of the HMS Suffolk in anchor at Vladivostok outfitted two armored trains by removing weapons from the Suffolk. The trains were each fitted with two twelve-pounder naval guns and two machineguns.²⁷ The dependence on the Trans-Siberian Railroad made armored trains essential. All forces used them as will be seen in later paragraphs.

As discussed earlier, the Japanese landed troops as early as April 1918. Eventually, they poured thousands of troops into Siberia. President Wilson's desire to utilize a small intervention force was disregarded. Japanese soldiers occupied villages and actively fought the Bolsheviks. Allied concerns regarding Japanese intentions were well-founded. The Western Allies hoped to retain an ally

(Russia) to keep pressure on Germany. A strong, democratic Russian government was, therefore important. However, Japan wanted disunity in Russia so it could more easily exploit the resources and markets in Siberia.²⁸ Estimates of the number of Japanese troops vary from as little as 60,000²⁹ to as high as 75,000.³⁰

By the time the Allies intervened with large numbers of troops in Siberia, the Czechs controlled the railroad and were battling Bolshevik forces. Wherever the Czechs were located, they established democratic governments and control of local economic activities. The Czechs retained control as long as military necessity or the supply of the army required it.³¹

Troops from several other Allied nations were also present in Siberia. Estimates vary depending on the source. The list below is categorized by source and country.

<u>Nationality</u>	<u>Coates</u> ³²	<u>Stewart</u> ³³
Italian	2,000	1,400
French	760	1,076
Polish	12,000	--
Serbian	4,000	--
Rumanian	4,000	--
Canadian	4,000	--

Chinese troops were also deployed. China took advantage of the confusion and disarmed the Russian troops in Manchuria.³⁴ The revolution provided China the opportunity to assert dominion over her territory. The Canadian detachment arrived in Vladivostok 26 October 1918. Italy's "Black Battalion of Death" arrived 25 October 1918.³⁵

A problem that would face the Allies throughout the intervention was the absence of unity of command. No central command that was accepted by all parties was ever established. France sent General Janin to Siberia to act as the commander of all Allied and Russian units.³⁴ Great Britain sent General Knox to Siberia to organize Russia's army. When Janin and Knox met, they decided to divide Siberia into Eastern and Western sections. Janin was to control Western Siberia. Knox was to control Eastern Siberia. The other Allies were not consulted.³⁵ General Otani, the commander of all Japanese units, distributed a message to Allied elements 18 August 1918 in which he assumed command of all Allied forces. He claimed that the Allies had designated him the commander.³⁶ America's General Graves had received no such instructions so did not abide by the order.³⁷ This lack of consensus was a distinct advantage for the Bolsheviks. The Allies forces cooperated but were not bound to follow the orders of a central command.

The Red Army initially attempted to function without formal ranks. The breakdown of discipline and control forced ranks to be reinstated. Red Army characteristics that were advantages over the Allies included its soldiers who were enthusiastic because they were fighting for a new social order. The Bolsheviks were also fighting on interior lines³⁸— their support structure came from within

the country. The Allies had to bring their supplies from their homelands. Little Allied support came from Siberia.

In order to protect their ideology, the Bolsheviks established the Cheka, the Extraordinary Commission to Fight Counter-Revolution and Sabotage. The Cheka's mission was basically organized terror as a means of protecting the revolution. Arrests and executions were widespread.⁴¹

The Red Army was organized along normal military lines in the summer of 1918. Previously sanctioned "soldier's committees" were abolished. The Bolsheviks decreed military service compulsory. Officers from the Tsar's army were invited to join but trusted Bolsheviks were assigned to watch them. Another control technique was to threaten family punishment.⁴²

It is difficult to establish precisely the strength of Bolshevik forces. Red Army divisions as well as small partisan bands operated throughout the area. When the Bolsheviks attacked the Czechs along the Volga in September 1918, the Red Army was estimated to have numbered 331,000. This number grew to 1,000,000 by the end of the year.⁴³ The Japanese estimated 40,000 Reds separated the Allies from the Czechs at Irkutsk in September 1918.⁴⁴

The Bolsheviks were forced to use a variety of weapons. Old hunting rifles to include elephant and tiger guns were widespread in the small partisan units. Hand

grenades were made from tin cans filled with such things as dynamite, stones, and bolts.⁴⁰

Allied relations with Lenin's government continued to be poor. Differences between communism and the Western capitalistic systems ensured no common ground could be found. Soviet repudiation of all foreign loans in a decree by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee 3 February 1918 continued the downward spiral of relations.⁴¹

As the decision to intervene was made, the situation in Siberia was chaotic. No central authority existed. Pro and anti-Bolshevik forces roamed the area. No central Allied command structure to conduct and coordinate the intervention existed. The "Aide Memoire" outlined MG Graves' missions. He was to help the Czechs attempting to leave Siberia for Europe, guard military stores, and to steady Russian attempts at self-government and self-defense. The first two missions were relatively specific compared to the last mission. This third mission would prove to be virtually impossible to accomplish. There were too many factions vying for power. The US government never selected one specific faction, group, or person to support wholeheartedly. MG Graves' only alternative was to try to remain neutral.

Chapter 4 Notes

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5. Ibid., p. 132.
6. Ibid., pp. 141-143.
7. Ibid., pp. 140-141.
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43. Goldhurst, The Midnight War, pp. 114-115.

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Chapter 5. Area of Operations

Siberia was a land of vast extremes. In Omsk, the temperature ranged from -48°F in the winter to 104°F in summer,¹ with an average summer temperature of 65°F . Other example average summer temperatures follow: Khabarovsk 67°F , Vladivostok 66°F , and Irkutsk 62°F .² Summer also brought constant warfare with mosquitoes.³

The table below provides selected mean, minimum, and maximum temperatures for Siberian and Manchurian cities.⁴

	Temperature ($^{\circ}\text{F}$)				Minimum	Maximum
	January Mean	April Mean	July Mean	October Mean		
Vladivostok	5	39	66	49	-34	99
Harbin	-2	42	72	40	-39	--
Chita	-18	32	66	29	-46	97
Irkutsk	-5	35	65	33	-43	104
Tomsk	-3	30	66	33	-46	95

Mean rain and snow precipitation are summarized below.⁵

	Mean Precipitation (inches*)				
	January	April	July	October	Annual
Vladivostok	0.0	1.2	2.0	1.6	14.8
Irkutsk	1.0	0.7	3.0	1.0	16.4
Tomsk	0.5	0.4	2.6	1.3	15.3

(*ten inches of snow equals approximately one inch of rain)

Winter generally began in late October. Wind was a serious problem in October and November because of the

cold and snowstorms. However, the temperature was lowest in December through February, which was also usually characterized by no wind. This could lull the unsuspecting individual into a false feeling of security and quickly result in frostbitten extremities.⁶ Spring started in late April, though frost and snow occurred as late as May. June usually had warm days and cold nights. July and August comprised summer with fall beginning in September.⁷

Spring thaws turned frozen dirt streets into mud. Garbage thrown out in winter and frozen would thaw and stink in the summer. Planks were used as impromptu sidewalks. Mud would quickly dry leaving deep furrows in roads and streets.⁸ Winter brought storms which could kill outside sentries because, if they moved, they would get lost and freeze to death. Fine snow would freeze in cakes on eyes and cheeks.⁹ The cold would sometimes even make the guardhouse look good as a way to avoid outside duty.¹⁰ The ground would freeze so deep that the AEF soldiers used holes dug in the ground as refrigerators in the summer.¹¹

Sea transportation in and out of Vladivostok was restricted by the extreme winter cold that froze the harbor annually from mid-December until early April. Ice breakers could usually keep the harbor open, however. Winter cold made water a problem when for weeks at a time water would only be available for cooking and drinking. Water was

not a significant problem in the summer, though few public water works existed. All water, whether from wells or melted snow, had to be chlorinated before use.¹²

Temperature ranges in the Suchan mine valley northeast of Vladivostok where an Allied guard force operated to protect the coal mines were from -34°F in the winter to 99°F in the summer. The mean January temperature was 5°F. The mean August temperature was 69°F. Mean annual precipitation was about fifteen inches, with zero in January and approximately four in August.¹³

Natural resources abounded in Siberia. Many types of furs were trapped, including sable, sea otter, otter, beaver, mink, muskrat, squirrel, fox, skunk, woodchuck, marmot, badger, gnut, and rabbit. Vast forests provided wood for building and heating. Coal was also available but the widespread use of wood for heating decreased the use of coal. Minerals included platinum, asbestos, manganese, gold, chrome, iron, silver, zinc, copper, and salt.¹⁴

Southern Siberia boasted huge agricultural lands. Crops included wheat, corn, oats, barley, and buckwheat. Beets were treated like weeds since there were no sugar refineries.¹⁵ The endless grainfields, grazing lands, and forests meant a person could travel for hours without seeing another human being.¹⁶

Vladivostok's harbor was important because it was deep enough for use by any ships sailing the Pacific. The

harbor's narrow mouth was protected from the open sea by protrusions of land and islands.¹⁷

Much of Siberia could be described as rolling prairie land similar to the western United States.¹⁸ However, Siberia was composed of many types of terrain (see Figure 1). Low mountains and hills characterized the terrain from Vladivostok to Harbin (483 miles). Traveling west after Harbin, the terrain changed drastically as the Chinese Eastern Railroad crossed the Gobi Desert for 270 miles to the Khingan Mountains. The rail line crossed the mountains at 3,155 feet. Once across the mountains, the terrain consisted of rolling grasslands to the Siberia-Manchuria border (1,064 miles from Vladivostok). The land remained semi-arid until Chita, an additional 300 miles.¹⁹

The area from the Siberia-Manchuria border at Manchuria Station to Lake Baikal was called the Trans-Baikal Plateau. From Chita to Irkutsk, the region was hilly with steeper mountains and forests. The Trans-Siberian Railroad reached Lake Baikal at Verkhne-Udinsk. The lake was 400 miles long and eighteen to fifty-six miles wide. Large forests grew around the lake. Irkutsk was roughly 2,800 miles from Vladivostok.²⁰

Wind was an important consideration when crossing Lake Baikal. Strong southwest winds in August could cause seven foot waves that were a threat to small boats. Northeasterly winds were common in May and June. In much

of June and July, little wind blew. During such periods of quiet, seaweed would cover the lake surface.²¹

Winter freezing of the lake normally began in November, but ice rarely covered the lake before late December or early January. The ice would be three and one-half feet thick in the center of the lake and more near shore. For about three months each winter, the ice was strong enough to support a train. Spring, of course, ended use of the lake as a railway.²²

Train ferries were the most important boats traveling on the lake. There were two such ferries. Both connected the city of Baikal with the eastern shore. One ran to Misovaya. The other ran to Pereyemnaya.²³

Several ferry boats traveled the lake. The Baikal, an icebreaker, was 290 feet long and fifty-seven feet wide. It could hold twenty-five rail freight cars on its three tracks. Staterooms accommodated 150 passengers. The other icebreaker was the Angara. It was 195 feet long and thirty-four feet wide. It was normally used for ferrying passengers. At least thirteen other boats and twenty-five barges of various sizes serviced the lake traffic.²⁴

Continuing westward, the land remained hilly and mountainous with much timber to Krasnoyarsk (672 miles from Irkutsk). Beyond there, Siberia became a great plain with larger settlements than in the eastern section. Large wheat fields were found near Novo Nikolayevst.

The most densely-settled part of Siberia was between Novo Nikolayevst and Omsk (3,706 miles from Vladivostok). The plain continued to Cheliabinsk and Ekaterinburg on the eastern edge of the Ural Mountains. Ekaterinburg was 4,264 miles from Vladivostok -- about the same distance from New York to San Francisco.²⁵

If the route around Manchuria was taken (the Amur Line), the distance to Ekaterinburg was 4,824 miles. North from Vladivostok near the Ussuri River was characterized by rolling hills and wooded areas. The same terrain was found westward along the Amur River. In the summer, the valleys crossed along the Amur were marshy and generally impassable.²⁶

The Amur was the only river in southern Siberia that flowed into the Pacific Ocean. Part of it was navigable by river steamers. The Ussuri River joined the Amur at Khabarovsk. The Sungar River flowed north from Harbin to the Amur and was navigable by river boats. Other navigable rivers included the Irtysh, Angora, Yenesei, and Obi Rivers which flowed north to the Arctic Ocean.²⁷

Wagon roads, except on the plain, were few and in poor condition. American vehicles and carts had difficulty using the roads due to the width of ruts in them. Russian carts were generally of a more narrow tread than American vehicles and cut ruts that were difficult for American vehicles to use.²⁸

Mud was one of the biggest problems when trying to use roads in Siberia. The worst time to travel by road was the middle of April to the middle of May. Melting snow turned roads into seas of mud. When roads became impassable due to deep ruts or mud, wagons would simply make a new track running parallel to the old.²⁹

Drifting snow was a winter problem, especially east of Irkutsk. Drifts up to twenty feet deep were common. Regions where the wind blew away most of the snow leaving only a thin coating were interspersed with deep drifts. Road movement was often impossible.³⁰

Rivers were common throughout Siberia. In the summer, they provided excellent transportation arteries. In the winter, when frozen, they again provided excellent routes. However, between mid-November to mid-December or early January, the rivers were in the process of freezing and made poor roads. The mid-April to mid-May thaw also made the rivers impassable.³¹

The Suchan valley northeast of Vladivostok lies between two spurs of the Sikhota Alin (or Coast Range). The valley is roughly sixty miles long and sixteen miles wide. Few people populated the fertile area where crops included wheat, rye, and vegetables. Livestock included dairy and beef cattle, hogs, and chickens. Peasants occupied small villages tilling small, outlying strips of land. Villages were generally small with one or two parallel roads and

possibly one crossing lane. Fencing generally closed off the roads so cattle could be herded into the protected area at night.³²

Log houses with enclosed courtyards were the norm. Larger villages sometimes had a community steam bath house. Peasants in smaller villages were forced to bathe in streams -- usually only in the summer. This lack of sanitation facilities resulted in vermin-ridden housing. Bed bugs and lice were common. Disease was a significant problem.³³

On a "special" train, a trip from Vladivostok to Omsk could take nineteen days. Using a "regular" train could result in a thirty-day journey. Few locomotives were operational. The various armies in Siberia commandeered the better railway coaches. Transportation costs significantly increased the cost of goods. For example, a pack of twenty cigarettes cost three cents in Manchuria Station but eighty cents in Cheliabinsk. Sheepskin coats sold for seven dollars in Harbin and thirty-five dollars at Irkutsk. Salt, tea, and rice were luxuries.³⁴

However, some goods produced in Siberia were inexpensive. Roast goose sold for eighteen or twenty cents per pound. Butter was available at prices ranging from nineteen to twenty-five cents per pound.³⁵

Economic conditions varied throughout the region. Grain and meat were plentiful between Vladivostok and

Manchuria Station. Near Lake Baikal, however, starvation was widespread. Traveling westward from Irkutsk, butter, meat, bread, and fish were readily available. Throughout Siberia, household furnishings and clothing were scarce.³⁶

Siberian cities had at least one market place -- a large square filled with small stands where purchases of various goods could be made. Most finished products were second-hand and displayed on wooden tables or the ground. These markets, or bazaars, served as social as well as business centers. Peasants used the bazaar as forums to discuss such topics as the war, politics, and food prices.³⁷

The revolution and civil war resulted in millions of refugees. Currency included a variety of paper bills and postage stamps. Coins were not in circulation. Paper notes included those issued by the Tsar, Kerensky's government, the Omsk government, and the Bolsheviks.³⁸

As mentioned earlier, travel by train was a challenge but also a necessity. Box cars with standing room only and a stove in the center of the car for heat were standard. People would stand in line for eighteen to twenty hours waiting to purchase a ticket. Russian trainmen used whips to control passengers. On the other hand, "special" trains were composed of true passenger cars and dedicated to a specific agency, such as the American Red Cross, or army. No timetables existed. Trains ran when the tracks

were clear. Intra-city transportation consisted of droshkies (four-wheeled, open, one-seat carriages pulled by Siberian ponies) and sleighs.³⁷

Supporting an expeditionary force in Siberia required using the railroad lines for transportation. Additionally a caravan route linked Kalgan, China to Verkhne-Udinsk. The caravan route was long and difficult to negotiate. It was only useful in a severe emergency. The significant point to note is that all the routes converge in the Lake Baikal area. The main line of the Trans-Siberian railroad provided the link to western Russia.⁴⁰

The main rail line passed through the valley of the Angara River which flowed out of Lake Baikal between Verkhne-Udinsk and Irkutsk. There was no route to support a military expedition in Siberia north or south of this valley. A wagon road and a rail line ran around the southern end of the lake. The rail line passed through many tunnels and over many bridges. A few determined men could have easily interdicted the railroad in this area. A 1918 War Department monograph considered this area between Verkhne-Udinsk and Irkutsk the "most critical point between the Pacific Ocean and the German frontier."⁴¹

Anyone can see that Siberia was a difficult place to live. The climate had a wide range of temperature. Natural resources were plentiful. However, the civil war had destroyed the economic livelihood of the people.

Simple necessities such as food and clothing were difficult to find. Poverty and filth were rampant. Disease was widespread. Transportation was slow and dangerous due to roving armies. No one group controlled the region. Violence was ever present. Peasants were abused by anyone more powerful than they. Into this confused morass marched the United States Army. The American Expeditionary Force deployed to Siberia with the best of intentions -- to help the Russian people find democracy and protect America's Czech allies. These good intentions were not universally well received as subsequent pages will show.

Chapter 5 Notes

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17. Baker, "A Study of the Supply of the 31st Infantry," p. 2.

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35. Ibid., p. 47.

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39. Ibid., pp. 59-60.

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41. Ibid., p. 4.

Chapter 6. American Expeditionary Force

Even before MG Graves was notified of his selection as the AEF Siberia commander, the War Department Staff was planning the structure of the forces to be at his disposal. A 6 July 1918 memorandum to the Army Chief of Staff recommended the use of the 27th and 31st Infantry Regiments in the Philippine Islands as the core of the AEF. As both were understrength for a combat mission, the recommendation included supplementing the regiments with additional soldiers after they arrived at Vladivostok.¹

Plans included a nine-day voyage from the Philippines to Vladivostok aboard US Army transport ships. Additional augmentation included a field hospital, ambulance support, engineers, and communications support. The plan called for dispatching the two regiments in early August to arrive at Vladivostok around 20 August. Two groups of 3000 men each would be sent from the US Pacific coast as reinforcements. One group would sail in early August and arrive at Vladivostok near the end of August. The second would sail from the US once transports were available. The War Department expected to complete troop deployments to bring the AEF to full strength by mid-October.²

Winter clothing and the additional weapons and equipment to outfit the AEF were expected to be available whenever necessary for shipment from the US. One shipload of

supplies was projected to provide seven months' sustenance. Fresh beef was available at Tsing Tau, China, which was already supplying US troops in the Philippines. Should ice blockage of the Vladivostok harbor become a problem, three other ports were available with rail lines to Vladivostok through Mukden, China. The ports were Fusan, Korea, Chinwangta, China, and Darien, Manchuria. Rail lines connected all three through Mukden to Harbin and then Vladivostok. Even though the railway was not in superb condition, the railroad reconstruction being undertaken was expected to keep the line open.³

Another significant event occurred on 6 July. The Allied forces in Vladivostok issued a proclamation telling the citizens of Vladivostok that the Allies were instituting "all necessary measures" to safeguard the city and Allied forces from "external as well as internal danger." The city government would still be allowed to administer local civil affairs. But the Allies promised to take military and police action as necessary to protect the city from "Austro-German prisoners, spies, and emissaries." Admiral A.M. Knight, Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet of the United States, as well as Japanese, British, French, Chinese, and Czechoslovak representatives signed the proclamation.⁴

These plans were followed by messages to the Philippines and Camp Fremont, CA, to make the AEF a reality.

The War Department cabled the Commanding General, Philippine Division on 3 August 1918 to send the 27th and 31st Infantry Regiments to Vladivostok on the first available US Army transports (USAT). A field hospital, ambulance company, and telegraph company were to accompany the regiments. USATs Warren, Merritt, and Crook were designated for use. The telegram named Graves as the AEF commander and stated 5,000 men would be sent from San Francisco to Vladivostok to complete the regiments' authorized strengths.⁵

MG Graves was also cabled 3 August and informed of the instructions to the Philippine Division. The War Department instructed MG Graves to select 5,000 men from the 8th Division at Camp Fremont for service with the AEF. Additional instructions included taking his "Chief of Staff, Assistant Chief of Staff, necessary intelligence officers, and such members of his division staff" as he deemed necessary. The War Department told MG Graves he could coordinate directly with the Commanding General, Philippine Division regarding assignment of staff officers to support the AEF from the Philippines.⁶

Subsequent to the above-noted telegrams, the War Department told the 8th Division to provide thirty-nine first lieutenants and twenty-four second lieutenants for the AEF. Additional officer vacancies in the 27th and 31st Regiments were to be filled by appointing enlisted men from the regiments as second lieutenants.⁷

Pursuant to orders, the 27th Infantry under the command of COL Henry D. Styer sailed from the Philippines 7 August 1918, aboard the USATs Crook, Warren, and Merritt.⁹ The 31st Infantry under COL Frederic H. Sargent sailed from the Philippines on 12 August 1918 aboard the USAT Sherman for Vladivostok.⁷

On 14 August 1918, MG Graves with the first of his California-based troops left Camp Fremont on two trains for the transport dock at Fort Mason, San Francisco.¹⁰ This group left the same day on the USAT Thomas. LTC O.P. Robinson accompanied MG Graves as Chief of Staff with MAJ R.L. Eichelberger as Assistant Chief of Staff. The US battleship Oregon and the US gunboat Vicksburg accompanied this element.¹¹

A recapitulation of the AEF forces enroute by 14 August is given below:¹²

<u>Element</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Men</u>
USATs <u>Crook</u> , <u>Warren</u> , and <u>Merritt</u> sailing 7 August	53	1537
USAT <u>Sherman</u> sailing 12 August	45	1379
USAT <u>Thomas</u> sailing 14 August	<u>47</u>	<u>1889</u>
Total	145	4805

On 15 August, the Warren and Crook arrived at Vladivostok. The Merritt docked the next day.¹³ Unfortunately, when the first troops arrived, they did not know what they

were supposed to do. Rumors included such missions as establishing a new Eastern Front, killing Bolsheviks, capturing escaped POWs, and helping the Czech Legion.¹⁴ This confusion was heightened when General K. Otani, the Japanese forces commander, informed COL Styer that the Allies had entrusted command of all Allies forces to him.¹⁵ COL Styer, having no orders to the contrary, and knowing he was allied with the Japanese, agreed to support General Otani until MG Graves arrived.

Meanwhile, the remainder of the AEF continued to sail for Vladivostok. The 31st Infantry arrived on 21 August.¹⁶ The Vicksburg left the Thomas and returned to San Francisco on 16 August.¹⁷ The Oregon left the Thomas on 17 August. Afterwards, the troops manned two Browning machineguns and two one-pounder cannons on deck for self protection.¹⁸ The Thomas, with MG Graves, docked at Vladivostok 2 September.¹⁹ Unbeknownst to MG Graves, while he was enroute the 27th Infantry conducted the AEF's first combat action as part of an Allied force under Japanese command attacking Bolsheviks. Before MG Graves could prevent it, his command violated the spirit of the "Aide Memoire" by taking sides in the civil war. Details of this operation will be provided in a later chapter.

Additional trips by the USATs supporting the AEF delivered the remainder of the forces to Siberia. On 14 September, the USATs Warren and Crook disembarked Ambu-

lance Company Number 4 and Field Hospital Number 4 from the Philippines. The Ambulance Company set up operations at Ulysses Bay. The field hospital established an evacuation point at Khabarovsk. A total of seven officers and 129 enlisted men were included in the two medical elements. The field hospital at Khabarovsk was upgraded to a 100 bed hospital 11 November, when the 27th Infantry's medical detachment combined with Field Hospital Number 4. A fifty-bed hospital was established at Spasskoe on 22 November by transferring personnel from Khabarovsk. Another 100-bed hospital had earlier been established by the 27th Infantry at the German POW camp at Krasnaya Retchka 8 November.²⁰

Replacements from Camp Fremont arrived at Vladivostok 29 September on USATs Sheridan and Logan with an additional 3,682 soldiers. This group included an evacuation hospital, a medical supply depot, an ordnance detachment, and dental and veterinary elements. These replacements were used to bring the two regiments up to full strength, form an AEF headquarters detachment, and organize a replacement battalion. The headquarters detachment contained one officer and sixty-four enlisted men. The replacement battalion consisted of six officers and 250 enlisted men.²¹ The table of organization and equipment called for each infantry regiment to have 3,805 men.²²

An Intelligence Section was formed from the officers and men arriving on the Sheridan as well as the earlier

groups. The recent arrivals from the Sheridan included sixteen members of the Military Intelligence Division, Washington. Four officers and fifty-one enlisted men had arrived earlier and were assigned because of their knowledge of Slavic languages, Japanese, or German. A detachment of one officer and eighteen enlisted men from the Corps of Engineers were assigned for mapping. Another group of eighteen enlisted men was assigned to the Intelligence Section from the Signal Corps for communications support. With the fifteen clerks assigned, this section totaled 123 soldiers.²³

This large number of personnel supported a code and cipher section, a map section, a censorship section, and a counter-espionage section. The Intelligence Section worked with the other Allied forces regarding telegraph and postal censorship. Passport control was also conducted in cooperation with the Allies but did not produce any important results. Little counter-espionage work was done beyond establishing a list of suspected agents. The engineer detachment was successful collecting and reproducing maps. The translators were of great value supporting AEF operations. They provided the means for AEF elements to converse with the local population and captured enemy soldiers. They also produced translated copies of local newspapers that provided valuable information about local events and opinions. As there was insufficient intelli-

gence work to keep such a large group busy, the size of the section was later reduced.²⁴

The Signal detachment accompanied the 27th Infantry from the Philippines to Vladivostok. The eighteen soldiers were from Company D, 53d Telegraph Battalion. The remainder of Company D, one first lieutenant and fifty-one enlisted men, arrived 18 September. Later reinforcements increased the number of enlisted men to eighty-one. Telephone communication in and around Vladivostok were established 19 September. The section established telegraph communication between Vladivostok and Khabarovsk 22 August and later with Chita. The Vladivostok telegraph office handled approximately 2,000 words daily.²⁵

On 4 November 1918, two officers and four enlisted men arrived as a Signal Corps photographic unit²⁶ During its first three months of operations, the photographers took 1,200 still negatives and 12,000 feet of motion picture film. Parades, foreign soldiers, and all aspects of AEF operations were photographed.²⁷

By January 1919, a substantial number of medical personnel had arrived in Vladivostok as member of the two infantry regiments, Ambulance Company Number 4, Field Hospital Number 4, Evacuation Hospital Number 17, and Medical Supply Depot Number 17. A total of seventy-six officers, twenty-seven nurses, and 629 enlisted men were assigned to operate the hospitals, ambulances, veterinary

facilities, dental clinics, and medical supply depot. Twelve animal-drawn ambulances and four motor ambulances were available with Ambulance Company Number 4 to supplement regimental ambulances. Two hospital trains, one made from six box cars and the other from four box cars, were used on the railways. One box car on each was used as a ward with a kitchen and another box car was devoted to supplies. Hospitals as of January 1919, are listed below.²⁸

<u>Location</u>	<u>Beds</u>
Base (Vladivostok)	431
Khabarousk	74
Spasskoe	50
Harbin	8
Razdolnoe	21
Suchan Mines	12

Disease would take a large toll of AEF soldiers. The most prevalent diseases were plague, typhus, typhoid fever, scarlet fever, relapsing fever, and malignant sore throat. Venereal disease was a particular problem and incapacitated many.²⁹

A Quartermaster detachment of eleven officers and ninety-one enlisted men supported the AEF initially.³⁰ Winter clothing had to be provided because some soldiers were shipped to Siberia without any.³¹ Sufficient winter clothing was soon provided to outfit the AEF.³² The

issued winter clothing was similar to that used in Alaska and included the following items:³³

three-quarter length sheep lined coat

fur cap

fur mittens

wool blouse

wool trousers

knit underwear

light wool underwear

O.D. wool shirts

lumberman's knit socks

shoe packs

parkas

Regular marching shoes were judged to have tops too short and soles too thin. The standard wrap puttees were not durable or waterproof. Issue gloves were also not durable in the harsh Siberian winters. Standard shelter tents were judged of no value in the winter. Exposed piping on the rolling kitchens froze in the cold and made this piece of equipment worthless.³⁴ MG Graves later reported the fur lined coat to be too short. He suggested any coat issued for use in Siberia extend at least four inches below the knee. He also noted the rolling kitchens and escort wagons were too heavy for use in Siberia.³⁵

Monthly shipments from San Francisco ensured that an approximately six-month supply of necessities could be

maintained except for milk and tomatoes. The mules and horses supplied from the Philippines were in good condition. Wood was bought in Siberia. Coal was available from Japan and San Francisco. Mineral oil for lamps and gasoline were purchased locally and from the Philippines. Forage available in Siberia was generally inferior to that available from the United States and the Philippines. Materials for construction and building repair were limited. Hay purchased locally for enlisted men and animal bedding was generally satisfactory.³⁶

Motor transportation assets included nineteen automobiles and trucks, twenty-five motorcycles and fourteen motorcycle side cars. Ten of the automobiles were procured locally and did not function well. These 1915 Mitchell seven-passenger touring cars apparently sat on the beach at Vladivostok two or three years before the AEF arrived. The Quartermaster detachment supervised construction and repair work, stevedore work, road building near Vladivostok, water distilling plants, bath facilities, a steam laundry, and a facility to repair shoes as well as to manufacture and repair uniforms. Russian workmen and POWs were used for laborers.³⁷

The Ordnance detachment initially consisted of one officer and two sergeants that arrived 2 September 1918. Six additional officers (later reduced to four) and seventy-eight enlisted men arrived 29 September. The infantry

regiments possessed a full authorization of weapons except trench mortars. Soldiers were armed with M1903 bolt action rifles. Additional small arms included machineguns and Browning Automatic Rifles (BAR). The infantry regiments were also equipped with 37mm guns.³⁸ No field artillery was assigned to the AEF even though 2.95 inch mountain guns and 3.2 inch guns with limbers and caissons were available in the Philippines.³⁹

After all requisitions of equipment were filled, the ordnance depot possessed an abundance of material. Over ten million rounds of .30 caliber ammunition and 350,000 rounds of .45 caliber ammunition were stockpiled. Spare weapons included sixteen heavy Browning Machineguns, forty-six Vickers machineguns, 370 automatic rifles, over 1,000 pistols, and over 7,000 rifles. The stocks exceeded the demand.⁴⁰

Machineguns and automatic rifles were issued to support AEF units and the machinegun school established at Churkin. The Model 1918 automatic rifles performed satisfactorily. The Model 1917 machineguns generally performed well but did experience an excessive number of bottom plate breakages while being fired at the machinegun school. No problems occurred with the Model 1915 machineguns. The 27th and 31st Infantry arrived with Model 1909 Benet Mercie machineguns which were replaced and returned to the Philippines. The regiments arrived at Vladivostok

without automatic rifles because none were available in the Philippines. Replacement and resupply ships from the United States provided the M1918s issued by the Ordnance detachment. Both regiments also arrived with obsolete 37mm Pompom Guns which were replaced with the new 37mm gun December 1918 to January 1919.⁴¹ As of 30 June 1919, gas masks were being held in reserve by the Ordnance depot.⁴²

The Model 1918 Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) had a selector switch for semiautomatic or automatic fire. Ammunition was provided by a magazine holding twenty or forty rounds. Its rate of fire was 500 rounds per minute. The weapon weighed fifteen pounds eight ounces empty. Theoretically, it could engage targets out to a range of 1,600 yards.⁴³ Best results were obtained using rates of fire of eighty to 100 rounds per minute standing and fifty to sixty shots per minute prone. The BAR used a three-man crew of gunner, first ammunition carrier (loader), and second ammunition carrier (scout).⁴⁴

The term "machinegun cart" was applied to three different carts: gun carts, ammunition carts, and spare gun carts. All were one-mule carts, but they differed by the number of ammunition racks, gun carrying cases, tripod supports, and a few minor characteristics. A special metal towing pole and emergency rope were provided so the carts could be towed by hand if necessary. Pioneer tools carried on the gun and ammunition carts included a

shovel, pick mattock, and broad hatchet. The only pioneer tool on the spare gun cart was the hatchet.⁴⁵

The gun cart carried a machinegun in a special box running the length of the cart. The water-cooled Browning Model 1917 and Vickers Model 1915 machineguns fit snugly inside the box with a special cover fitting around the water jacket. The ammunition rack held seven boxes.⁴⁶

The ammunition cart carried fourteen ammunition boxes and two tool chests. Each ammunition box contained 250 rounds in loaded belts. Two water boxes were also included. The spare gun cart carried two gun chests. Two tripods could be carried on the cart between the two gun chests. Each machinegun company received two spare gun carts to carry the company's four extra guns.⁴⁷

The Model 1916 37mm gun was mounted on a tripod but could be mounted on wheels. A light wheeled cart was provided as a limber and caisson for ammunition. One animal (such as a horse) would pull the gun and limber. Each weapon had an eight-man crew. Cast iron, armor piercing, and shrapnel shells were available with weights of 0.665, 0.720, and 0.770 kilograms, respectively. Maximum range was 2,400 meters with a 10.1 second time of flight. Each crew normally carried 144 shells on the cart.⁴⁸

American weapons generally performed well in Siberia. US rifle bullets could penetrate railroad rails where Bolshevik bullets could not.⁴⁹ The M1903 .30 caliber

rifle was considered to have a maximum effective range of 600 yards and a maximum rate of fire of ten aimed shots per minute.⁹⁰ The M1911 .45 caliber pistol earned quite a reputation. The "Amerikanski Colt" was even known to disperse crowds just by the mention of its name.⁹¹ The M1911 was officially listed as accurate to seventy-five yards.⁹² Fifty yards is a better estimate.

Machineguns and 37mm guns were transported by animal-drawn carts that proved to be a problem. Axle eyes and stay hooks frequently broke. Packs for both weapons were improvised from wood and canvas to relieve the need for the carts. The lack of field artillery was later to prove a difficulty when facing enemy forces equipped with guns on armored trains and field artillery.⁹³

Armored trains played an integral part of combat action throughout Siberia. Armaments on them varied. Machineguns and light cannons were preferred. Rifle firing ports were cut in the armor plating that lined the box cars and gondolas used. Sibley stoves were used to heat the box cars in winter.⁹⁴ Armored trains provided a protected base of fire or functioned as armored assault vehicles. The specific armaments on such trains as well as the tactics of their use will be described in later pages when various battles are discussed.

An Office of Judge Advocate was established 3 September 1918 with one officer, one clerk, and one sergeant-

major. The AEF was authorized to appoint General Courts-Martial as early as August when the 27th Infantry landed. It is impossible to assemble a large group of people such as the AEF and expect everyone to act properly. The first General Court-Martial was organized 14 September 1918 for an enlisted man's trial.³⁵ Other courts-martial were conducted as necessary. Punishments were not light. For example, one soldier that deserted to the Bolsheviks for a Russian girl in Khabarovsk turned himself in to the AEF in the spring of 1919. He was tired of being with the Reds. His General Court-Martial sentenced him to twenty years confinement for desertion in time of war.³⁶ The ease with which alcohol could be obtained in the local community fostered many of the courts-martial.³⁷

Several morale support agencies operated with the AEF in Siberia. The American Red Cross mission first arrived in Petrograd 7 August 1917. It ministered to all in need, even cooperating with the Bolsheviks when necessary to ensure the safe delivery of supplies.³⁸ Dr. Raymond Teusler, cousin of Mrs. Woodrow Wilson, headed the American Red Cross mission in Vladivostok.³⁹ To supplement military supplies, the Red Cross furnished the AEF soldiers with socks and other winter clothing.⁴⁰ Aid was furnished to the Russian people, White Russian soldiers, and Czechoslovakians as well as the AEF. The Red Cross ran relief trains carrying food, clothing, and

medicine to stations located along the railway. Three sanitary trains and one dental train also circulated through the area. One Red Cross anti-typhus train shuttled between Vladivostok and Perm bathing 105,000 people and disinfecting 1,000,000 articles of clothing.⁶¹ Red Cross support was not universally offered. Dr. Teusler was decidedly pro-Kolchak; he was even later accused of being the virtual surgeon-general of Kolchak's army. Little or no help was provided to the Reds.⁶²

The Allied leadership encouraged sports competition as a morale builder. Baseball and football fields and tennis courts were established. Crafts such as pottery, machine shop, and art were encouraged.⁶³ The Canadian forces hosted an Allied sports contest at the Hippodrome in Vladivostok. The 27th Infantry held a Wild-West Show in Khabarovsk.⁶⁴ Contests were also held to display soldier skills. One representative from each of the Allied forces was selected to compete in front of a board of staff officers. The competition judged military bearing and the ability to assemble and disassemble a rifle, pack, and associated equipment.⁶⁵

Alcohol was a problem; however, it was not the only one. Illegal drugs were also available. A Chinese cocaine peddler was caught in Spasskoe trying to sell his product to Americans. He was given to the local Chinese garrison who whipped him and banished him from the town.⁶⁶

The American Library Association shipped over 16,000 books to the AEF. Periodicals such as Atlantic Monthly, Scientific American, The Police Gazette, and many more were sent. Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) representatives and unit morale officers distributed these materials.⁶⁷ Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) representatives were also in Siberia working with the AEF.⁶⁸

The Knights of Columbus was also active in Siberia. Vaudeville acts, musical performances, and motion picture shows were provided free of charge to soldiers. The Knights of Columbus operated two cafes that served free meals to American troops. During one of the revolts that occurred in Vladivostok, Knights of Columbus representatives provided hot coffee and sandwiches to American guards, even though such actions involved personal risk.⁶⁹ Gifts such as cigarettes, tobacco, candy, crackers, cake, toothpaste, chocolate, wool mufflers, and mittens were distributed. The 1919 Christmas shipment even included 1,000 footballs.⁷⁰

One concern regarding such non-military agencies arose during the AEF's operations. The Red Cross, YMCA, Knights of Columbus, and Russian Railway Service Corps personnel all wore uniforms similar to the US Army. However, these individuals were not subject to Army regulations. Foreigners had difficulty differentiating between the groups. Improper action by certain civilians had a

negative impact on the Army's image with the Army having no way to correct the error. This problem was common enough for a few soldiers to use alleged lack of recognition as an excuse for not following an officer's orders.⁷¹

Military tactics selected differed to some degree for each situation encountered and the leader concerned. However, there were several tactics and techniques employed by the AEF, other Allied forces, and the Bolsheviks that are worthy of note here. Actions taken in specific operations will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

The use and type of fire support assets differed among the various combatants. The AEF had no artillery units assigned. The largest support weapon organic to its units was the M1916 37mm gun. However, the AEF may have been able to obtain some form of cannons for its armored trains. The source of these is unclear. But photographs of the AEF do occasionally show American soldiers on armored trains mounting artillery pieces.⁷² At the battle of Dukoveskoie in August 1918, British and Japanese forces faced Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks and Japanese had field artillery. The Bolsheviks and British had several armored trains as well.⁷³ Gunboats were used by the Japanese for river patrols.⁷⁴

The major tactical innovation that characterized combat in Siberia and differentiated it from the Western Front was the reliance on armored trains for fire support

and movement. Armaments on armored trains differed widely. Semenov's "The Destroyer" had ten machineguns, two one-pounder howitzers, and two three-inch guns mounted behind steel plate and eighteen inches of concrete.⁷⁵ At least one Czech armored train car contained eight water-cooled machineguns mounted in an open-top car. The machineguns, four to a side, were mounted behind a protective barrier. The gunners stood in a chest-deep well running the length of the car.⁷⁶ British soldiers faced a six-inch Bolshevik gun on an armored train in the Ussuri River area.⁷⁷ One of Kalmikov's trains consisted of one first-class coach, two second-class coaches, twelve box-cars for third and fourth-class passengers and an armored car. Two soldiers rode on the outside of the engine in front of the smokestack.⁷⁸ These soldiers must have only done this in warm weather. The often frigid winter temperatures would have precluded survival if such a technique was used year-round.

In March 1919, Semenov had four armored trains. Each train consisted of one or two armored cars, one or two platform cars mounting guns and howitzers, and one or two other cars for personnel and supplies. Three of the trains' armored cars were made of concrete. One train's armored cars were steel plated. Kalmikov had two similar trains. Semenov and Kalmikov often used one train preceding and one following their headquarters trains during movement.⁷⁹

The White Russian forces used many armored trains. One train constructed at the Vladivostok Naval Arsenal had a gondola car whose steel sides were reinforced with five inches of concrete. It had 7/8 inch steel plate for a roof. A 4.7 inch naval gun was mounted in the front of the gondola. An ammunition magazine was in the rear of the car. Steel doors 5/8 inch thick protected the magazine.⁸⁰ Loopholes for machineguns were also cut in the sides of some armored cars.⁸¹

The importance of the rail line made its interdiction a key objective. Bolsheviks would destroy small bridges, chop down telegraph poles, cut telegraph lines, remove spikes from the rails on curves, and invert rails then spike them down as ways to interfere with rail operations. American soldiers were often involved in repairing such damage. It was difficult to catch the Bolsheviks in their destructive acts. Trains provided the most rapid means of moving from one point to another along the railway, but the noise and smoke rendered surprise impossible.⁸²

Another Bolshevik technique was to use deceptive communications to set up an ambush. The Bolsheviks would splice into a telephone line and, posing as railway officials, tell American railway station guards to stop a White Russian train. After setting up the ambush on the train route, the Bolsheviks would tell the Americans the line was open and to release the train. When the train

reached the chosen site, the trap would be sprung. This coupled with anti-American propaganda by the Japanese caused some White Russians to believe the AEF was pro-Bolshevik.⁸³

Japanese tactics included brutal suppression of opposition. No mercy was given. Even when faced with American soldiers pleading that they stop, the Japanese continued. One incident like this involved five Russians (alleged Bolsheviks) who were required to dig their own graves. A Japanese officer then cut off the heads of the three men and two boys. Americans and villagers watched but could not prevent the execution. The following day the villagers dug up and re-buried the bodies. Such brutality solidified opposition and resulted in Japanese prisoners suffering a similar fate at Bolshevik hands. Bolsheviks would exchange American POWs but kill Cossacks and Japanese.⁸⁴

Bolsheviks were also brutal. In December 1918, at Kansk, Bolsheviks killed a schoolmistress. Then they poured cold water over her naked husband and made him run through the snow until he froze to death.⁸⁵

The Reds used disguises to trick Americans. They would imitate friendly peasants as a way to lure AEF soldiers into relaxing. Then the Bolsheviks would seize any carelessly placed weapons, start shooting, and run away. Americans became suspicious of everyone. Americans

in isolated guard stations were regularly attacked.⁸⁶ Constant vigilance was necessary to protect the American positions.

Undoubtedly, the clash between the different cultures bred some of the animosity, confusion, and brutality that characterized 1918-1920 Siberia. For example, American soldiers captured three Chinese bandits from Kraefski and gave them individual messkits, forks, spoons, and knives to use to eat. But the Chinese did not understand what to do. A soldier with experience in China made three pairs of chopsticks and dumped all the food into one pot. The Chinese happily surrounded the pot and ate the food.⁸⁷

AEF soldiers also used their imaginations to deceive the enemy. A "fighting turret" was a raised platform built on four poles as a tower for better observation and fire used at railroad guard stations. A hedge of branches nailed to boards or a lumber palisade would be constructed to provide concealment and/or cover on the platform.⁸⁸

When building a fighting turret at Kraefski, the American soldiers decided machineguns and field artillery were necessary but none were available. Not to be discouraged, the Americans spread a rumor that machineguns and artillery would soon be emplaced. An elaborate scheme was hatched. The soldiers installed and operated fake weather vanes and instruments. Great commotion accompanied raising ropes, chains, and boards at the tower.

Eventually, fake gun tubes could be seen. The soldiers claimed to have six machineguns and two light field guns in the turret. Pre-emplaced hand grenades and powder charges were used to demonstrate the artillery firing for the local population. Five BARs simulated the machineguns. The local population was thoroughly convinced by the ruse.⁸⁷

Americans also developed innovative ways to convince POWs to cooperate. For a time, E Company, 27th Infantry, guarded the POW camp at Krasnaya Reskaya (also known as the Red River POW camp). One winter, several of the Austro-Hungarian officers threatened to mutiny. The leaders of the group were worked outside the camp for seventy-two hours without food or shelter. When allowed to then reenter the camp, the POWs were convinced a mutiny was inappropriate.⁸⁸

The AEF's operations in Siberia were largely characterized by small units engaging a fleeting enemy. There were no large-scale battles as seen on the Western Front. Boredom was a problem; so were confusion and uncertainty. Additional details of AEF actions will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

The different reasons prompting each country to intervene in Siberia naturally affected the military forces deployed. Japanese and Cossack brutality exacerbated the problem. Allied forces wanted MG Graves to take sides in the civil war, but he steadfastly refused. MG

Graves was determined to abide by his orders. Open warfare was threatened between the Allies.

Combat between the Allies accidentally occurred in Sviyagino in June 1919. Japanese forces unexpectedly moved into the town. AEF and Japanese elements divided the town into sectors for each to guard. On 25 June, Japanese and American patrols blundered into each other when a Japanese patrol wandered into the American sector. The Japanese wounded one American officer. An old Russian peasant woman was wounded by a stray bullet. The Americans killed one Japanese soldier and wounded two.⁷¹ The continuous lack of unity of command and lack of coordination certainly contributed to this incident.

Relations with Cossack forces steadily deteriorated throughout the AEF's time in Siberia. Ataman Kalmikov eventually boasted he would drive the AEF out of Siberia. His soldiers abused civilians who were friendly to the Americans. For example, several of Kalmikov's men seized three Russian girls walking with American soldiers at the Shmakovka railway station, beat the girls with ramrods, and tossed them off the train at Kraefski -- without stopping. This and other such actions prompted a 12 September 1919 message from AEF Headquarters in Vladivostok warning of potential armed conflict with the Cossacks. The AEF units were ordered to destroy any organized actions against American forces.⁷²

A Japanese unit showed its displeasure with the AEF in an interesting manner one day at Ussuri. While passing through town they dumped a dead horse at the camp of Company D, 27th Infantry with no explanation given.⁷³ A dead horse is not only an unpleasant sight and unsanitary, it is difficult to remove.

Such negative aspects of American-Allied relations did not exist everywhere. As an example, an American soldier contracted anthrax in Khabarovsk reportedly after being shaved by a Chinese or Korean barber. American medical facilities at the time were inadequate. Three Japanese doctors responded to the plea for help and saved the soldier's life.⁷⁴ In general, however, relations between the Allied forces were not satisfactory. The discord that characterized the Siberian intervention doomed any attempt to help the Siberian people establish self-government. The Allies could not agree on a proper course of action -- whom to aid and whom to oppose. Therefore, the support provided by the Allies was fragmented and uncoordinated.

Chapter 6 Notes

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27. Ibid., Reel 11, Report by Signal Corps Photographic Unit attached to AEF Siberia, Vladivostok, 7 February 1919.
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31. Wilson D. Keenan, personal letter, 20 January 1986.
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33. Baker, "A Study of the Supply of the 31st Infantry," p. 7.
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Chapter 7. Initial Operations: 15 August - 10 October 1918

27th Infantry - The Ussuri and Amur Campaigns

Upon arrival in Vladivostok, the 27th Infantry immediately went to work. As the senior American Army officer present, COL Henry D. Styer commanded the expeditionary force until MG Graves arrived on 2 September. LTC Charles H. Morrow commanded the regiment. The 27th's transports arrived on 15 and 16 August, but the troops initially remained aboard ship. On 18 August, Companies F and G under the command of MAJ Earle G. Buck disembarked and assumed railway station guard positions from Vladivostok (inclusive) to Nikolsk (exclusive) replacing the Czechoslovakian troops. The regimental colors disembarked 19 August and were paraded through Vladivostok in front of the senior Allied officers present: General Otani, Imperial Japanese Army; Admiral Knight, US Navy; General Dietrich, Czech Legion; and COL Styer, AEF commander. On 20 August, the remainder of the regiment moved ashore.¹

Early activities included establishing a temporary camp near Vladivostok and unloading the transports in the harbor. No laborers were available so the regiment's soldiers were pressed into service to unload the AEF's supplies. Other soldiers were busy cleaning and repairing railroad yard buildings for use as barracks.²

The first AEF unit to come under hostile fire was an element of F Company on the evening of 19 August. The guard detachment at Razdolnoe received word that Chinese bandits were looting a village near them. 1LT George F. Herrick selected forty men and responded to the call for help. At approximately midnight, a small group of bandits was discovered by a flank patrol. The Americans fired five rounds per man at the bandits, hoping to determine the size of the bandit force by the amount of return fire. The Chinese fired an estimated six shots and left the area. No trace of the bandits was found. The first AEF casualty occurred in this brief fight. Private Stephen Duhart was wounded in the head by a bullet that glanced off a rail.³

Since the Czech and Cossack forces fighting in the Ussuri area were having little success against the Bolsheviks, General Otani decided to mount an expedition to that area. On 24 August, the 27th Infantry began moving from Vladivostok to Sviyagino (see Figure 2) to operate in conjunction with the Japanese 12th Division, commanded by General S. Oi. The movement to Sviyagino was completed 27 August.⁴ The regiment's effective strength was forty-nine officers, 1,375 enlisted men, eighty-six horses, 152 mules, and twenty-seven vehicles (including three ambulances).⁵ Before the operations began, COL Styer directed that the railroad be used to transport the regiment

from Vladivostok to the front and evacuate casualties to Vladivostok. He directed that messages affecting operations be sent to him at the front and that administrative and supply matters be conducted by the Base and Line of Communications commander in Vladivostok. To facilitate message traffic, COL Styer ordered that a telegraph line using poles along the railroad be run from Vladivostok to Sviyagino as the forces progressed.⁶

The regiment was used by the Japanese as a reserve. Sviyagino was an important village because its railway station served approximately twenty villages. Sviyagino's principal industry was a sawmill.⁷ As the Japanese and Americans moved into the Ussuri area, the British 25th Battalion, Middlesex Regiment and the French Tonquin Battalion moved out.⁸

On 30 August, the 27th Infantry departed Sviyagino with orders to move through Runovka and Uspenka to the Nikolsk monastery. This operation involved the regiment covering the right flank of the Allied forces moving toward Khabarovsk. The regiment also had to repair nine railroad bridges that had been destroyed by Bolsheviks retreating from the 25 August battle at Kraefski. Supply and hospital trains were to follow the 27th once repairs were completed.⁹

By the end of the first day's march, the regiment reached Nikotofka, a distance of thirteen miles. Runovka,

an additional fourteen miles away, was reached 31 August. Swamps and marshes interfered with the second day's march. Roads were in a poor state. The soldiers continually put logs and brush covered with hay in the road to keep wagons from becoming bogged in the mud.¹⁰

Between 1 and 4 September, the 27th Infantry marched from Ruonovka through Uspenka, Ordejefka and Tikmanova to Ussuri. The regiment arrived at Ussuri at 1530 on the 4th. Ussuri was approximately sixty miles from Sviyagino. General Oi complimented the regiment on its support.¹¹

The Japanese notified the 27th on 7 September that Japanese cavalry and Kalmikov's Cossacks had reached Khabarovsk. The 27th sent E Company to Khabarovsk to take part in the Allied formal occupation parade in the city on 10 September.¹² The remainder of the regiment left Ussuri on 14 September and arrived at Khabarovsk 16 September.¹³

While the major elements of the regiment were closing out the Ussuri campaign and moving into winter quarters, two companies continued to pursue the Bolsheviks. MAJ William C. Miller and a reinforced E Company left Khabarovsk on 11 September with two Japanese companies to capture Blagovestchensk in the Amur River valley. This group was the advance guard of the Japanese forces under the command of MG Ymada charged with capturing the town.¹⁴

The pursuit was initially by train, but burned bridges and blocked tunnels delayed the advance. Foot

marches were necessary. The cold took a heavy toll on the dismounted soldiers. The Japanese soldiers were particularly affected by the difficult conditions. During one twenty-five mile march, Japanese troops were so exhausted, the Japanese commander ordered E Company to pass through his stragglers. E Company reached the end of this particular march, the village of Bureya on the Bureya River southeast of Blagovestchensk, an hour ahead of the Japanese. The Americans continued the pursuit, reaching Ushuman on 20 September. There, C Company and eighty-three E Company recruits joined MAJ Miller on 27 September. This last group had left Khabarovsk on 16 September.¹⁵ General Otani was very pleased with the support he received from the 27th Infantry during the attack to Blagovestchensk. The Japanese sent letters to MG Graves and COL Styer thanking them for their assistance.¹⁶

On 22 September, MG Ymada ordered an American detachment to Zeya on the Tega River to intercept enemy gunboats. 1LT E.D. Doryland with forty men traveled to Uhlmine Station by train. From there, the detachment marched northeastward to Kachbrin arriving three days later. Four boatloads of Japanese soldiers and two Japanese gunboats passed up the river clearing it before Doryland arrived. Doryland camped that night on the river bank. The next day, Japanese boats from Zeya passed by Doryland's position and reported the river clear. On 27

September, Doryland's detachment began its march back to Uhlmine Station. The fifty miles were marched in thirteen and one-half hours over muddy roads in a snowstorm.¹⁷

General Ymada ordered C Company to Alexeyevsk on 28 September. However, on 7 October C Company joined Major Miller with E Company to return to Khabarovsk. They reached Khabarovsk 10 October.¹⁸

The 27th Infantry's combat operations were undertaken in poor weather. Two snowstorms and many periods of rain made the 1,100 mile campaign very difficult -- especially considering the men were dressed in khaki, not winter uniforms.¹⁹ The regiment showed it could move quickly when required to do so. However, a true test of its combat skills did not occur. Between 24 August and 16 September, the 27th suffered no casualties.²⁰ Obviously, the campaign was physically tiring but not "combat" in the same sense as that on the Western Front or even the northern Russian Allied intervention. For example, within fifteen days of arriving at Archangel in northern Russia, the American forces had sixty-nine dead.²¹ Americans received a very different reception in Siberia. Japanese casualties during the drive to Khabarovsk included only seventy-seven killed.²²

31st Infantry - Garrison and the Suchan Mines

After arriving at Vladivostok 21 August 1918, the 31st Infantry Regiment established a garrison camp east of the city.²³ The 31st Infantry arrived without its organic field transportation so was not available for field service immediately. A later ship brought the transportation assets.²⁴ This tent camp in Gornastaya Valley served as the regiment's main base with detachments being sent out to guard various points along the railway. In September, the base camp was moved from Gornastaya Valley to brick barracks in the edge of Vladivostok that the Russians had built after fighting the Japanese in the area in 1904-1905.²⁵

Other than posting guard elements at various places in the area, little significant activity occurred between August and October. The regiment took its first casualties 29 August at Ugolnaya twenty-five miles north of Vladivostok.²⁶ In September, M Company moved to the Suchan Mine area as part of the Allied Mine Guard under LTC S.C. Loring. F and G Companies moved to Spasskoe under MAJ F.B. Alderdice's command. CPT Francis G. Bishop with L Company occupied Razdolnoe.²⁷ The mines in the Suchan Valley centered around the village of Suchan provided coal. Bolsheviks took control of the mines in September 1917. Before that, the mines were run by the Russian

Minister of Industry. After Bolshevik seizure, production dropped from 2,160,000 pounds daily to 720,000 pounds daily. The Allies decided to assume control of the mines in order to ensure a steady supply of coal.²⁸

LTC Loring's Allied Mine Guard for the Suchan Mines (see Figure 3) consisted of M Company (250 men), a Japanese company, a Chinese company, and a White Russian detachment. This force departed Vladivostok 10 September. The AEF Chief of Staff, LTC O.P. Robinson, accompanied the group to report the political situation to MG Graves. Though expected, armed resistance was not encountered when the guard force arrived at Kanguaz, the Ugolnaya spur terminal, on the morning of 11 September.²⁹

It is fortunate the mine guard did not immediately enter combat. The conglomeration of cultures and national goals of such a force with Americans, Japanese, Chinese and Cossacks (about twenty -- reduced from an earlier request for a company) was certainly not a cohesive force. M Company had not trained as a team either. When the company was alerted for duty on 6 September, it consisted of only 104 personnel. By its departure from Vladivostok at 0655, 10 September, it had grown to 250 soldiers. This increase was accomplished by absorbing officers and enlisted men that had just arrived in Siberia from America.³⁰

LTC Robinson had the mine guard assemble several inhabitants of Kanguaz so that he could tell them why the

guard force was there. The local people seemed satisfied so an American Sergeant with ten men was left at Kanguaz to guard the telegraph station. The guard force then divided into four sections for subsequent rail movement through the mountains over a narrow gauge line. The forty-eight "versts" (one verst = .67 miles) to Suchan were traveled by a combination of marching and rail. Guard details were left along the route as shown below.

Tigrovia - an American sergeant with ten men

Tahi - a Japanese sergeant with ten men

Fanza - an American officer with three squads,
two Chinese officers with forty men,
and a Japanese sergeant with twenty-
seven men.³¹

The remainder of the troops arrived at Suchan at 1915, 12 September. Since the guard force met no resistance, they used the local town hall for quarters. The former mine manager, Mr. Egeroff, who had been removed by the Bolsheviks was again placed in charge of mining operations by the Allied Mine Guard. The Japanese established a guard post at Mine No. 2 with the Americans at Mine No. 1. Most of the miners welcomed the return of Mr. Egeroff to the mines. The local militia surrendered eight rifles at Mine No. 1, fifty-two at Mine No. 2, and seventeen at Fanza.³²

LTC Robinson spent a great deal of time explaining the guard force's mission to the local population. He

strove to ensure the people understood that the Allies had no selfish plans but hoped to help them. To get his message across, LTC Robinson issued the following proclamation.

TO THE CITIZENS OF THE SUCHAN MINE DISTRICT

I. The Allied Nations have come to Russia to help the Russian citizens and help win the war against Germany. In the prosecution of this Mission they have found it necessary to operate the mines temporarily, in order to increase the production of coal, thus making possible the distribution of supplies from one section to another, to keep the Russian people from starving and Russian women and children warm this winter. To increase the production of the Mines, the Allies wanted to get the man who was best acquainted with the mines, and have therefore prevailed upon Mr. Egroff to assume the management of the Mines during the temporary occupancy by the Allies. Mr. Egroff's orders for the operations of the Mines will be obeyed.

II. In view of the fact that troops are now here to protect the people against the Khunkhuzi there is no need for the citizens to have public rifles in their possession. In order to prevent misunderstandings due to differences in language, it is requested that all owners of private rifles present themselves to Mr. Egroff, who will issue a permit authorizing the owner to carry the rifle. This permit will then be presented to the Japanese and American commanders to be written in Japanese and English, in order that it may be shown to the guards.

III. Peaceable citizens do not keep machine-guns in their houses, as those weapons are only used in war. Therefore, any machine-gun in the vicinity should be turned in, and any one having any information of such should immediately report that fact.

IV. The Local government will continue to function.³³

At roughly the same time LTC Robinson made the proclamation above, General Otani issued a proclamation to the Russian people. General Otani's 6 September announcement follows.

TO THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE - LOYAL TO THEIR FATHERLAND

The Operations of the Allied Armies on Russian territory have as their sole object the liberation of the friendly Czecho-Slovak troops from the power of forces organized from Austro-German prisoners, and at the same time to give assistance to Russia, now suffering indescribable calamities under a misguided Administration.

The Allies have, therefore, for their only enemy, the forces of Austro-German prisoners, and have no hostile intention, whatever, against the Russian people.

Having already concentrated sufficient forces, we are now advancing and pursuing the enemy without relaxation. We firmly believe that the day will soon come, when we shall be able to deliver Russia from the treacherous hands of the enemy, by annihilating the Austro-German prisoners. But in their retreat, these troops have destroyed all the means of communication. The destruction of the railroad makes the supplying of the neighboring vicinity with materials especially difficult and further delays the bringing of relief to the Russian people by the Allies.

Russian people who love your Country! Facilitate the operations of our Armies and render no assistance to the forces of Austro-German prisoners. Remember their purpose and make every effort to restore your country.³⁴

LTC Robinson departed the Suchan Mines 15 September. He reported that no serious trouble was expected unless Mr. Egeroff's desire for reprisals against people who previously caused him trouble provoked it.³⁵

After LTC Robinson's departure, concealed weapons continued to be the object of searches and confiscation. However, a good deal of judgement had to be used in this task. Hunting was a major activity in the region. Weapons obviously of primary use for hunting and not war were

returned to their owners. This policy of searching for firearms did occasionally lead to excessive action. When the troops in Fanza searched private citizens' homes under the pretext of looking for weapons, LTC Robinson cautioned the Japanese commander against abusing the Russian people.³⁶ The Americans and Russians had no problems other than a few threats and drunken fights. Japanese-Russian relations were not as cordial due to the abusive actions of some of the Japanese toward the Russians. However, relations overall were friendly until February 1919.³⁷

AEF Headquarters: Arrival

After arriving at Vladivostok 2 September, MG Graves met with Admiral Austin M. Knight, senior US Navy representative in the harbor with the USS Brooklyn³⁸, and General Otani. MG Graves was initially impressed with General Otani, and felt he was an excellent choice by the Japanese. MG Graves described General Otani as "of kindly character, of temperate habits" and "manifestly fair and considerate" in his actions concerning the many Allied elements in Siberia.³⁹

When General Otani informed MG Graves that he was the commander of all Allied forces, MG Graves explained that the AEF had no orders to that effect. MG Graves also told General Otani that his orders forbade him from plac-

ing American troops under the command of Allied officers. However, MG Graves desired to cooperate in any way possible. At that time MG Graves felt that the American and Japanese governments had the same goals in Siberia. He only insisted that he be informed where US troops were being transferred and what their missions were. MG Graves also informed COL Styer of the AEF's employment limitations.⁴⁰

These limitations on AEF actions were crucial. At this time, MG Graves apparently thought he and the Japanese were in Siberia for the same reason even though he had been warned by the War Department (in a 9 August telegram) before he departed San Francisco that this was not the case. This warning pointed out that Japanese forces were striving to fragment power in Siberia rather than to assist the Russian people in establishing a strong government.⁴¹ MG Graves' initial optimistic appraisal of Japanese intentions resulted in continued anti-Bolshevik operations by the 27th Infantry with the Japanese. He did not recall the 27th Infantry from its Ussuri campaign. In fact, when General Otani asked MG Graves if he could continue to utilize the 27th Infantry once it was in Khabarovsk, MG Graves granted the request. MG Graves' reply stated "I am very glad to have all of it or any part of it as you may desire, continue the advance with General Oi."⁴²

There is no apparent reason for MG Graves ignoring the War Department warning. He may have been only trying

to be polite to the Japanese. He may have felt the threat of Central Powers POWs so severe that joint operations were necessary. The situation was confused. No White Russian government that could truly claim to rule Siberia existed. The threat (whether Central Powers or Bolshevik) was not well defined. US troops were already in the field on an operation. Demanding their return might have added more confusion since the 27th Infantry would have then questioned what it was doing. This could have resulted in a loss of confidence in the regiment's officers. Regardless of the reason, MG Graves allowed American soldiers to remain under Japanese operational control after he arrived. MG Graves would not do this again. Allied commanders did not again command US troops.

Several administrative actions also demanded immediate attention. Quarters, transportation and sanitation facilities had to be arranged to support the American, British, French, Czech, Chinese, Italian, Japanese, Serbian, Polish, and Russian forces in Vladivostok. The influx of soldiers and refugees swelled the city's population to over three times its normal size. Differences in culture and regulations also caused problems. Japanese, Chinese, Italian, and Russian officers thought nothing of putting 300 to 500 soldiers in a barracks Americans would use to house only 150 soldiers.⁴³

In order to coordinate Allied actions, General Otani organized several committees in cooperation with the other Allied commanders. The committees are listed below with a short explanation of their missions.

<u>Committee</u>	<u>Mission</u>
Materials Committee	Supervise the care and disposition of war materials in the area.
Barracks and Quarters Committee	Supervise housing the Allied soldiers.
Finance Committee	Coordinate common expenses.
Prisoners of War Committee	Coordinate the care and safeguarding of POWs.
Purchasing Committee	Coordinate purchases.
Inter-Allied Railway Committee	Arrange shipment and priorities for military supplies and troops.
Sanitary Committee	Ensure adequate sanitation measures were taken.
Tariff Committee	Coordinate a tariff schedule for rail movement of military personnel and supplies.
Committee on Martial Law	Coordinate martial law administration for Vladivostok. ⁴⁴

Allied commanders also met regularly (twice weekly initially, once per week later) to discuss common concerns. The committees did not have binding authority but the

Allied commanders normally followed their recommendations as long as national policies were not violated.⁴⁵

The Allied operations near Ussuri and along the Amur River indicated that initial Japanese estimates on enemy strength were incorrect. General Otani convinced the Allies prior to the Ussuri campaign that 15,000 armed enemy soldiers occupied the Ussuri area with 40,000 more separating the Czechs west of Irkutsk and the Allies around Vladivostok. The ease with which the Allies captured Khabarovsk indicated that massive numbers of enemy troops did not exist. Also, the Czechs were in virtual complete control of the rail line between Irkutsk and Vladivostok by the time the AEF was in country. Certainly, 40,000 hostile soldiers did not separate the Czechs from their "savior," the Allies. A few Central Powers POWs had joined the Bolsheviks but a huge, organized enemy army did not exist.⁴⁶

Two other significant events occurred during this time. MG Graves congratulated the Czechs on the recognition of their Czech-Slovak National Council as a belligerent government.⁴⁷ Also, Graves recognized that problems could arise between Japanese and American forces. German propaganda to cause such ill will was a particular concern. On 18 September, he issued a memorandum to all AEF officers telling them not to discuss Japanese actions or policy. Any Russians complaining about Japanese conduct were to be told to contact the Japanese headquarters.⁴⁸

This initial period was relatively quiet. Even the 27th Infantry's actions were not true combat. This lack of action was due to the confused situation in Siberia and the AEF largely being concerned with establishing base facilities. Time would change this as future operations eventually drew the AEF into conflict with its allies and the Bolsheviks.

Chapter 7 Notes

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28. Rhoads, "A Study of the American Forces in the Suchan Mine Area," pp. 1-2.

29. Ibid., p. 2.

30. National Archives, M917, Reel 10, Packard, "AEF, 1918-1919," pp. 73-74.

31. Ibid., pp. 74-75; A slightly different listing of guard details was provided by MAJ Rhoads in his "A Study of the Operations and Supply of the American Forces in the Suchan Mine Area" listed above. MAJ Rhoads states one squad from M Company was left at Kanguaz, forty M Company soldiers were stationed at Tigrovia, a Chinese company was at Fanza, a Japanese company was a Mine No. 2, and the

American headquarters element with the remainder of M Company was at Mine No. 1.

32. National Archives, M917, Reel 10, Packard, "AEF, 1918-1919," p. 75.

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35. Ibid., pp. 77-78.

36. Ibid., p. 78.

37. Rhoads, "A Study of the American Forces in the Suchan Mine Area," p. 3.

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Chapter 8. Garrison Life: 11 October 1918 - 31 March 1919

The situation was relatively calm from October 1918 through March 1919. Few significant actions took place. MG Graves reported as early as 31 October that few troops were required in Siberia. In a letter to General Peyton March and the Army Adjutant General, MG Graves pointed out that the Japanese already had 60,000 soldiers stationed east of Lake Baikal. The presence of such a large number of soldiers was a source of discontent for the Russian people. Graves also noted the difficulty he had dealing with Russians allegedly friendly to the Allies. He pointed out many Russian military officers claimed to have large followings in Siberia, but none were able to show proof of such strength. These various officers all requested funds and materiel in order to establish a stable government.¹

After the armistice in November, conditions at home affected the AEF more and more. Understandably, morale suffered when the soldiers in Siberia did not go home as the soldiers in France did. Eventually the Women's Auxiliary of the 27th Infantry demanded the return of the AEF. This led to President Wilson's decision to return drafted soldiers. New recruits were sent to Siberia as replacements.² On 4 January 1919, British soldiers at home on leave demonstrated against returning to France and going to Russia. The labor movements in Britain and

France opposed the intervention and threatened a general strike.³ This agitation, however, did not result in a quick withdrawal of Allied forces. In fact, some of the agitation may even have encouraged a continued intervention. Certainly the belief that labor unrest was a Bolshevik plot⁴ made some people believe the intervention was necessary.

27th Infantry - POWs and Garrison Life

The majority of the 27th Infantry spent the winter of 1918-1919 in Khabarovsk. However, one battalion occupied Spasshoe on the Vladivostok - Khabarovsk part of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. One company supervised a prison camp containing 2,000 POWs.⁵ On 4 November, E Company took over the POW camp at Krasnaya Rechks (or Red River). LTC Morrow was the camp commandant. CPT Larkins was the E Company commander. CPT Benjamin Curdette, Medical Corps, assisted by two enlisted men composed the medical staff. 2LT John James and Harry W. Killpack were the Adjutant and Supply Officer, respectively.⁶

Krasnaya Rechks was about sixteen versts southeast of Khabarovsk. The wagon road that serviced the camp was in poor condition and was difficult to negotiate in the winter. Consequently, the railroad was the major transportation link. The camp was located about one and one-half versts from the railroad station.⁷

The compound had been garrisoned by a railroad regiment of the Russian Army before being a POW camp. Brick one- and two-story buildings, frame warehouses, and stables were available. Even though sufficient buildings existed, including thirty-three warehouses, the poor state of repair and unsanitary environment made the camp a disreputable place. The camp had two compounds, each enclosed by a twelve-foot barbed wire fence and board fence. The space between the compounds was open and prisoners freely passed between them. Large open ditches ran all over the camp. Water and sewage systems did not exist. Four kitchens supplied meals. The prisoners ate their meals in the barracks. Construction of a bath house and hospital had begun but not completed. The one bath house that did exist was outside both compounds. No wash house or recreation building existed.^a

Approximately 1,550 of the 2,000 prisoners were officers. Various illnesses plagued 460 of the 2,000. Sick POWs continued to live with their comrades which served to spread disease. Lack of food was slowly starving the camp population. The Russian government paid the officers fifty to seventy-five roubles per month, depending on their rank, to provide an allowance to cover all expenses. The prisoners paid the prison officials sixty roubles per month for food. Danish and Swedish Red Cross

officials provided the POWs an additional ten roubles per month. Few POWs had sufficient winter clothing.⁹

Prison officials did not have an accurate accounting of the POWs. Four Russian Colonels were stationed at the camp, and all four claimed to be in command. A local contractor supplied meals for the guards and POWs but had not even installed a bakery.¹⁰

E Company immediately began to reorganize the camp. The ten senior war prisoners were called together and briefed on E Company's plans. The Americans promised construction of mess halls and better food, \$25 per month for officers below the rank of captain, and \$38 per month for captains and above. Clothing and food costs would be deducted from these amounts. Thirteen camp companies with one captain, one first lieutenant, and one second lieutenant were to be organized. The Americans guaranteed the construction of numerous facilities including a bath house; laundry; theater; hospital; electric light plant; water system for drinking, cooking, and bathing; tailor, shoe, carpenter, tin, and paint shops; and a club. Requirements for morning reports, sick reports, and duty rosters were set. Repair of buildings was also begun as well as construction of a railroad spur to the camp. The POWs were grateful and very happy to be under American supervision.¹¹

Tools were drawn from Russian warehouses near the railroad line. Prisoners provided the labor to construct

the facilities promised. Open fires on concrete floors were necessary until heating boilers could be repaired. Within a week of E Company taking over the camp, a bath house with barber and laundry was in operation. Mess halls were improved so POWs would not have to eat in their four to eight-man barracks cubicles. Hot and cold water was piped to the kitchens and mess halls. Tables and benches were made and buildings were painted. The board fence was torn down to provide building materials and a better view of the prison compound.¹²

Water and electric lighting systems were operational within a few weeks. Shops for tinsmiths, tailors, carpenters, blacksmiths, plumbers, shoemakers, and electricians were established. The club that was started had four reading rooms. The prison theater had box and balcony seats, an orchestra pit, dressing rooms and scenery. A school was opened, and the barracks were cleaned and painted. Two orchestras, one Austrian and one Hungarian, were organized with thirty-seven and forty-six pieces respectively. Two choirs were also started with forty and fifty members respectively. A telephone system to connect the various prison sections was established. A telegraph line connecting the camp to Khabarovsk and Vladivostok was also emplaced.¹³

Supply was a perpetual problem because of the poor economic state of all of Siberia. The winter climate

further complicated acquisition and transportation of supplies. Wood for heating and fresh vegetables were procured locally. Regardless of the hardships, the camp was never cold or hungry.¹⁴

As spring approached, flower gardens were prepared. Tennis courts, a football field, and a general sports field were outlined for use in good weather. Plants grown in hot houses were transplanted to the gardens when the weather permitted.¹⁵

Without a doubt, E Company performed splendidly. When the Americans took over the camp it was in a wretched state. Sanitation was non-existent. An influenza epidemic that incapacitated 1,800 POWs had just swept the camp. But under E Company's supervision, the camp was turned into a model facility. Word of the humanity practiced by the Americans spread all over Siberia. The goodwill felt by the Austro-Hungarian POWs toward the Americans manifested itself later when the 27th Infantry was stationed at Verkhne-Udinsk, 2,000 miles from Khabarovsk. There 1,000 Austro-Hungarian POWs under Ataman Semenov's care volunteered to fight for the 27th. They asked for no pay or clothing but only the chance to repay those who had helped their countrymen. The gratitude felt is best summarized by the words of LTC Ferdinand Reder, senior POW. His letter to the regimental commander concerning E Company's performance ended as given below.

After all those years, we felt raised to the dignity of manhood again, and we began to love the life to which we had been restored. And, now we have returned to our dear ones at home, we would like all the world to know that we owe our lives, our health and happiness, our power for good in this world, to the noble American Officers of the 27th Foot Regiment, to the great American nation.¹⁶

Spasskoe

The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry occupied Yefgenyefka in November 1918. This town was on the rail line about 200 miles north of Vladivostok. The American soldiers, however, confused Yefgenyefka with the actual village of Spasskoe about two miles from the railroad. "Spasskoe" was used to refer to both towns.¹⁷

The three groups of brick buildings in Spasskoe were divided between the American, Japanese, and Russian units occupying the town. F and G Companies of the 31st Infantry Regiment were in the town when the 27th Infantry's 1st Battalion arrived. The two 31st Infantry Companies were originally stationed in Spasskoe to relieve elements of the 27th Infantry guarding the railroad. This enabled the entire 27th Infantry to participate in the Ussuri campaign. The Russian garrison was by and large composed of officers attending aviation, engineer, and other schools in Spasskoe. American-Russian relations were cordial with frequent visits and parties through the late spring and summer of 1919.¹⁸

When the 1st Battalion arrived in the week after the World War I armistice, it found the Japanese battalion already in the town. Living conditions for the American soldiers were not good. The barracks were poorly ventilated, heated, and lighted. A kitchen was found on the end of each floor in the barracks. Latrines drained into open cesspools. Wood burning stoves provided heat. The town had narrow winding streets. Animals wandered loose. An open market place was used by the local citizens to exchange goods such as dried meats, salted fish, wild rabbit, pheasants, poultry, butter, eggs (wrapped in straw), stags, wild boar, and even a tiger.¹⁹

The Allied garrison was also reinforced by an unexpected unit. During the winter a Chinese company arrived and volunteered to help the Americans fight.²⁰ However, life remained uneventful until spring.

Khabarovsk

The 27th Infantry's 2d and 3d Battalions remained in Khabarovsk. Training was emphasized in order to better prepare the soldiers for their duties in Siberia. Initially, the situation was quiet, and the Americans were on cordial terms with Ataman Kalmikov's Cossacks in the city. However, Kalmikov's brutality changed this.²¹

Kalmikov began his rise to power in the spring of 1918 when the Ussuri Cossacks' 4th Council Meeting elected him Ataman. This group also passed a resolution authorizing him to seek a loan from the Allies so spring planting could begin. The Japanese provided the loan with a promise from the Cossacks to not join the Bolsheviks. Military equipment followed.²²

Kalmikov arrived in Khabarovsk by participating with the Japanese in the Ussuri campaign. His 800 Cossacks assisted the Japanese between July and September 1918. When the first Japanese entered Khabarovsk on 5-6 September, Kalmikov rode in with a Cossack detachment and established the city as a base of power. He then began his campaign of terror.²³

Arrests and executions of "well-to-do citizens" were common. Their property was seized. All this was done under the guise of fighting Bolshevism. Kalmikov succeeded in his tactics. The local population was terrified.²⁴

On 15 November, twenty women appealed to the 27th Infantry headquarters to save their husbands being held by Kalmikov for execution. The women again asked for help 16 and 17 November. When an American officer questioned the Cossacks, he was told that Cossack activities were not his concern. Two women went to the 27th Infantry headquarters on 18 November and reported that their husbands had been killed. The two then led several American officers to

eleven unburied bodies of men who had been shot. One of the dead had on no underwear and five no shoes. Reporting this incident and others to the Japanese did little to restrain Kalmikov. Cossacks burned the bodies at approximately 1645 18 November near the execution site.²⁵ The AEF's war diaries are filled with reports of Cossack atrocities. Personal accounts of the intervention are also. However, protests by MG Graves and other Americans consistently failed to deter Cossack brutality.

Kalmikov was also cruel to his troops. He formed a group of former Bolshevik soldiers called the "Model Hundred." Whips, fists, and the threat of execution were liberally used to instill discipline in the men. This system was again applied to a volunteer Cossack group in December 1918. This second group, however, rioted and mutinied when subjected to such abuse. The officers were arrested but Kalmikov's soldiers were not satisfied. Grievances reported to the 27th Infantry included enforced enlistment, whippings, unnecessary executions, poor food and clothing, no pay, cruel and drunk officers, and executions as well as mutilations of civilians.²⁶

On the night of 27-28 January 1919, around 700 of Kalmikov's men decided they could no longer serve him. They deserted. Approximately 300 hid in nearby towns. Thirty asked the Chinese garrison to protect them. The remaining mutineers, 398, marched as a group with

their equipment to the 27th Infantry's headquarters and surrendered. They brought four guns, three machineguns, and 350 animals. The Japanese estimated Kalmikov still had 400 Cossacks. The Americans estimated he had 250 men he could use, two six-inch guns, two three-inch guns, and four smaller guns.²⁷

The 27th Infantry decided to hold the mutineers as prisoners, informed the Japanese, and reported the incident to MG Graves in Vladivostok. He approved the Americans holding the mutineers and decided the regiment would not surrender the men to anyone to whom the prisoners objected.²⁸

The Japanese suggested a joint American-Japanese guard be placed over the deserters, but COL Styer, in command at Khabarovsk, refused. On 30 January, General Oi demanded in a memorandum for COL Styer why the Americans were interfering with Ataman Kalmikov disciplining his soldiers. MG Graves told COL Styer to refer the Japanese to him. COL Styer told MG Graves that releasing the deserters would result in their murder. MG Graves then told COL Styer to not release any of the prisoners without his permission.²⁹

In order to adequately safeguard the prisoners, the 27th Infantry escorted them to the Krasnaya-Rechks prison camp on 1 February. Additional desertions after the initial mutiny raised the total number of Cossacks under American protection to 442. The Cossacks were kept sepa-

rated from the Austro-Hungarian POWs until the release of the last of the Cossacks in March 1919.³⁰ COL Styer was particularly concerned about the welfare of the Cossacks if released because they had wounded a Cossack colonel during the mutiny. The officer subsequently died of his wounds.³¹

MG Graves maintained the position that COL Styer had "simply disarmed a band of men to prevent bloodshed." His policy was that the men should be released as they desired -- not as Kalmikov or anyone else desired. This policy of releasing the Cossacks individually or in small groups was successful. Only thirty-five Cossacks were still in American custody by 15 March.³²

Japanese and Cossack propaganda stirred up ill will between the Americans and the local population. This propaganda alleged the Americans instigated the mutiny. However, the Volna Special Cossack Assembly 12 February 1919 deposed Kalmikov as Ataman due to his cruel misconduct.³³

Continued Japanese anti-American propaganda and defense of Kalmikov prompted COL Styer to send a 25 March letter to General Oi, the Japanese commander in Khabarovsk. COL Styer stated that Kalmikov's troops were not considered Allied soldiers by the Americans. He protested the undisciplined, disorganized nature of Kalmikov's troops (he was not the Ataman but still exerted some control over his

former troops). COL Styer objected to the Japanese supporting Kalmikov but claiming no responsibility for their actions. A copy of the letter was sent by MG Graves to General Otani with a note supporting COL Styer and asking for Otani's assistance in controlling the Cossacks. General Otani continued to claim no responsibility for Kalmikov's band but agreed to assist the Americans by speaking to Kalmikov about Graves' and Styer's concerns. Once Kalmikov departed Khabarovsk, the situation calmed and Cossack statements attacking him appeared in local newspapers.³⁴

Another issue related to the mutiny was the equipment turned in to the Americans when the mutineers surrendered. The Japanese requested the equipment be given to them since Japan had originally provided it to the Cossacks. When the Japanese satisfactorily identified the material, COL Styer returned it to them 8 April 1919.³⁵

31st Infantry - Garrison and Mine Guard

Little activity occurred during this time in the 31st Infantry's area of responsibility. Replacements continued to arrive so that regimental strength increased from 1,952 on 31 October 1918, to 3,589 on 31 December. Patrolling was a constant activity.³⁶

By 31 January 1919, elements of the regiment were distributed as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
Headquarters Company	East of Vladivostok
Machine Gun Company	
Supply Company	
E Company	
H Company	
A Company	Gornastaya Valley
B Company	
C Company	Diomedes
D Company	
I Company	Churkin (with detachments at Pervaya Rechka and Russian Island)
K Company	Base and Line of Communications
F Company	Spasskoe
G Company	
L Company	Razdolnoe
M Company	Suchan
Legation Guard Detachment	Harbin ³⁷

January, February, and March 1919 were difficult months. The winter weather took a severe toll on the soldiers. Several 31st Infantry soldiers lost an arm or leg due to frostbite. However, in general, sufficient food, fuel, and warm clothing were available.³⁸

Company B moved to Harbin in February. The political and economic situation in Siberia was expected to bring guerilla warfare if not revolution in the spring. Partisans (presumably Bolsheviks) fired on southbound trains on 14 and 17 March.³⁹ On 23 March, H Company moved to Suchan to replace M Company as part of the mine guard. However, both companies remained there.⁴⁰

The Chinese company in the Allied Mine Guard moved to Tigrovia before winter. The Americans it replaced moved to Fanza. LTC L.L. Pendleton replaced LTC Loring 12 February as the commander of the mine guard. Trouble in the area began shortly thereafter.⁴¹

Bolshevik attempts to organize support in the Suchan area during the middle of February resulted in the Russian General Smirnoff, a Kolchak supporter, moving into the valley with 700 soldiers. He occupied Frolovka and Novitskaya in order to suppress Bolshevik agitation. Kolchak's attempt to draft local citizens in March caused great discontent. Many of the miners told to report for military service resisted the call. A large number quit the mines and left the area. Coal production fell. Two foremen were murdered. Two Japanese were also killed. The murderers mutilated the Japanese bodies.⁴²

Exempting the miners from the draft failed to stop the discontent. Peasants had begun to organize resistance. Those miners still working demanded a pay increase, and problems continued into the next phase of Allied operations.⁴³

This garrison period was relatively uneventful. No large-scale maneuvers took place. The American soldiers energetically carried out their assigned tasks. But trouble was brewing. As the AEF worked more and more with its allies, differences in goals and techniques (ie., tor-

ture vs humanity) arose. This laid the foundation for subsequent animosity among the Allied forces. Additionally, Bolshevik strength grew while White Russian forces remained fragmented. The continued conflict forced the Allies to devise a plan to safeguard the railroad for the benefit of their own forces and the region. This railway guard mission is discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 8 Notes

1. National Archives, M917, Reel 1, letter, MG Graves to The Commanding General and The Adjutant General, Vladivostok, 31 October 1918.
2. Channing, Siberia's Untouched Treasure, pp. 225-226.
3. Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace, pp. 12-13.
4. Brody, Steelworkers in America, p. 247.
5. CPT I.C. Nicholas, "A Critical Analysis of the AEF, Siberia, Including Relations with Other Allies" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff School, Individual Research Paper No. 80, 1932), p. 13.
6. Hunt, The History of the Twenty-Seventh Infantry, pp. 56-58; 27th Infantry, "History of the Twenty-Seventh US Infantry," pp. 15, 18.
7. 27th Infantry, "History of the Twenty-Seventh US Infantry," p. 13.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 14.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., p. 15.
13. Ibid., p. 16.
14. Ibid., p. 17.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., p. 18.
17. Hunt, The History of the Twenty-Seventh Infantry, p. 58.
18. Ibid.
19. Kindall, American Soldiers, pp. 20, 23, 25.
20. Ibid., p. 30.

21. 27th Infantry, "History of the Twenty-Seventh US Infantry," p. 19.
22. National Archives, M917, Reel 10, Packard, "AEF, 1918-1919," pp. 103-104.
23. Ibid., p. 104.
24. Ibid., p. 105.
25. Ibid. and Reel 4, AEF War Diary, 21 December 1918, report from Intelligence Officer at Khabarovsk to Intelligence Officer, AEF, Khabarovsk, 6 December 1918.
26. Ibid., p. 106.
27. Ibid., Reel 10, Packard, "AEF, 1918-1919," and multiple telegrams in AEF War Diary, 8 February 1919, p. 108.
28. Ibid., Reel 10, Packard, "AEF, 1918-1919," and Reel 4, AEF War Diary, 8 February 1919, letter from MG Graves to MG Inagaki, 30 January 1919, p. 109.
29. Ibid., pp. 110-111.
30. 27th Infantry, "History of the Twenty-Seventh US Infantry," pp. 16, 20.
31. National Archives, M917, Reel 10, Packard, "AEF, 1918-1919," p. 112 and Reel 4, AEF War Diary, 8 February 1919, telegram, Styer to Amex, 31 January 1919.
32. Ibid., Reel 10, Packard, "AEF, 1918-1919," p. 113.
33. Ibid., pp. 106, 113.
34. Ibid., report text and letters quoted in report, pp. 114-116.
35. Ibid., report text, pp. 117-118.
36. Paul, Regimental History, Thirty-First US Infantry, p. 16.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.

40. Baker, "A Study of the Supply of the 31st Infantry,"
p. 9.

41. Rhoads, "A Study of the Operations and Supply of the
American Forces in the Suchan Mine Area," p. 3.

42. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

43. Ibid., p. 4.

Chapter 9. Railway Guard: 1 April 1919 - 31 December 1919

The requirement for continuous railway operations as a means of transportation and communication made cooperation between the United States and the Allies essential. Conferences were held between the intervening nations' representatives to divide responsibility for operation of the railroad. Roland S. Morris, US Ambassador to Japan, represented American interests at these conferences. The representatives decided to form a "Special Inter-Allied Committee" to supervise the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railroads. Each power with military forces in Siberia had a representative on the committee. The chairman was a Russian.¹

Two special boards were also formed. The Technical Board was composed of railroad experts from the nations with military units in Siberia and was charged with technical and economic management. John F. Stevens, the US railway expert with the Russian Railway Service Corps, was elected the board president in early March 1919. The second board was the Military Transportation Board which coordinated military rail transportation.²

After much discussion among the various representatives, the commanders agreed 14 April to divide the rail line into sectors to be guarded by military forces. The sectors for each nation are given below (see Figure 4).

Intervening Forces

Sector

AEF

1. Vladivostok (inclusive) to Nikolsk-Ussuri (inclusive) with the Suchan Mine branch line - 144 miles.

2. Spasskoe-Udinsk (inclusive) to Ussuri (inclusive) - 70 miles.

3. Verkhne-Udinsk (inclusive) to Baikal City (inclusive) - 265 miles. This sector was later enlarged to include Verkhne-Udinsk to Mysovaya (inclusive) which added 102 miles to the length giving a total sector size of 316 miles.

Japanese

1. Nikolsk-Ussuri (inclusive) to Spasskoe (inclusive) - 61 miles.

2. Guberovo (exclusive) to Verkhne-Udinsk (exclusive) and from Manchuria Station (exclusive) to Karimskaya - 2,220 miles.

Chinese

1. Ussuri (exclusive) to Guberovo (inclusive) - 60 miles.

2. Nikolsk-Ussuri (exclusive) to Manchuria Station (inclusive). This included the Chanchun line - 1,165 miles.

Russians

1. Mysovaya to Baikal City.

Czechs

1. Baikal City to Omsk.³

On 14 April, MG Graves issued orders for AEF elements to assume their designated guard posts. On 21 April, he published a proclamation to the Russian people where he explained his views concerning the necessity for AEF soldiers to guard the railway. He pointed out that guarding the railway was in the best interests of the Russian people regardless of political affiliation. He also pointed out that the Allies as a group had decided that the guard mission was necessary. The AEF's purpose was to "protect the railroad and railway property and insure the operation of passenger and freight trains" in the AEF's sector "without obstruction or interruption." MG Graves promised to treat everyone equally regardless of "nationality, religion, or politics." He also stated "interference with traffic will not be tolerated." The lack of an anti-Bolshevik statement upset Kolchak supporters.⁴

The deployment of the AEF units resulted in combat between the Americans and the Bolsheviks. The White Russians and Allies principally controlled towns and villages. The railroad linked these power centers. The Bolsheviks occupied rural areas. Since the railroad supported the White Russians, the Bolsheviks felt they had to interdict it. American attempts to protect the railroad, whether to help the Russian people survive or to aid the Allies, forced the AEF into conflict with the Reds. Fighting and American casualties were inevitable.

27th Infantry: Bolshevik and Cossack Troubles

MG Graves' initial orders concerning the railway guard mission sent the 3d Battalion to Verkhne-Udinsk near Lake Baikal. A and B Companies had arrived there from Spasskoe in late March. By 15 May, the entire battalion was at Verkhne-Udinsk. In late May and early June, the 2d Battalion moved from Khabarovsk to the Spasskoe area. The two 31st Infantry companies that had been in Spasskoe left when the 2d Battalion concentrated there. In late May, C and D Companies moved out of Spasskoe to a small village to the north. E and F Companies followed C and D in June which left only H Company in Spasskoe.⁵

Kraefski

In June, two squads from C Company were guarding the Kraefski railroad station twelve miles north of Sviyagino. The Americans were surrounded by at least 100 Bolsheviks. The American sergeant in charge decided resistance was futile and allowed the Bolsheviks to remove the telephone equipment from the station. The leader of the Bolsheviks was alleged to be an American sergeant that deserted from Vladivostok.⁶

Repositioning of units to execute the railroad guard missions prescribed by MG Graves included a platoon from F

Company under 2LT Wilson A. Rich occupying Kraefski. Rich's platoon was reduced to three squads when a force was organized by MAJ Wallace to search out Bolsheviks that had been interfering with the railroad.⁷

At approximately midnight the night of 11-12 June, a woman tried to speak with a sentry but ran off before an interpreter could be found to explain what she was saying. LT Rich assumed the woman was trying to warn the detachment so he prepared for action. Due to a shortage of ammunition, he instructed his men to not shoot unless they could see at least one-half of an attacker's body. He had one Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) but the gunner had never fired it. This particular soldier was the only man besides LT Rich who knew how to operate the weapon.⁸

On the morning of 12 June, the 27th Infantry openly fought with Bolshevik forces for the first time. At 0330 that morning, a band of an estimated 110 to 185 Bolsheviks and Chinese bandits attacked Rich's detachment. The attackers exited a group of trees approximately 800 yards from the Americans and moved in a skirmish line through waist high grass toward the Americans. The Chinese bandits were on the left flank of the main attacking element.⁹

When 500-600 yards from the American position, the Bolsheviks stopped, knelt, and fired at the sheet metal warehouse where the Americans had slept. Fortunately, LT Rich had deployed his men in a shallow trench, so they

were protected from the initial firing. Rich did not return the shots.¹⁰

After firing, the Bolsheviks charged. Rich's force held their fire until the Bolsheviks were 200 yards from their position. The American barrage then stopped the Bolshevik charge. The Chinese managed to reach a log pile where they could have provided enfilade fire into the American position from 400 yards away. However, when the AEF soldiers shot two of the Chinese in the head, the Chinese decided to depart the battlefield.¹¹

A spirited firefight continued between the Americans and Bolsheviks. The Americans left the prepared trench because the tall grass hid the enemy troops. Box cars, an embankment, and shacks provided cover for LT Rich's men to continue the exchange. A cook accidentally left over 100 yards in front of the main position climbed onto a shed and opened fire on the Bolshevik right flank reportedly hitting nine enemy troops. The heavy fire of the BAR and other weapons forced the Bolsheviks to retreat after about thirty minutes.¹²

Casualties were relatively light. Two Americans were captured the night before the attack while on a reconnaissance patrol. After being held for twenty days, they were released in a prisoner exchange. While searching for wounded and dead Bolsheviks after the battle, one American sergeant was killed by a wounded Bolshevik. One American

was killed in the battle. Eleven enemy dead and two wounded were found by Rich's men in their search of the area.¹³

After the battle, the local citizens flocked to the area to see what had happened. Whether due to accident or skilled marksmanship, the two Chinese killed by head wounds impressed the civilians. A collection was taken from the soldiers to hire several Chinese to bury the enemy dead.¹⁴

Shmakovka

On 8 June, the railroad bridge at Shmakovka was burned by Bolshevik partisans. Two railroad officials were captured but released later.¹⁵ Telephone instruments were stolen from the railroad station.¹⁶

LT Fairfax Channing and twenty-five men of F Company were sent from Yevgenyevka to reestablish order. They traveled for three hours on a train engine and gondola coal car to reach Shmakovka. Periodic stops and questioning of local citizens enroute produced no useful information.¹⁷

Upon arriving at Shmakovka, LT Channing discovered the bridge had been destroyed by fire and dynamite - what did not burn had been blown up. The Americans put a gang of Korean laborers to work rebuilding the bridge, and they

questioned the local inhabitants. Later that night, another detachment of Americans arrived to check on Channing since there was no way for Channing to contact his superiors. The kidnapped railroad officials returned near midnight. LT Channing spent the remainder of the night questioning them. The following morning he returned to Yevgenyevka and made his report.¹⁸ The incident at Shmakovka was deemed justification for an attack. LTC Morrow issued instructions for an expedition to destroy the Bolsheviks that had been interfering with the railroad and telegraph communications. This force moved by train to Shmakovka shortly before dark and camped.¹⁹

Uspenka

Uspenka had been reported to be a Bolshevik headquarters and base of supply. Therefore, MAJ Wallace's first objective was to seize that town. To accomplish this mission, he had the provisional company discussed earlier that included part of LT Rich's platoon. The march was a difficult one. Wagons were used to carry supplies. The march routine included ten minute rests every hour. Rough roads, marshy ground, and swarming insects made the march an unpleasant task.²⁰

The night was spent in a monastery after the thirty-mile march. Hay served as mattresses. Reconnaissance the

next day disclosed a swamp separating the Americans from the Bolshevik stronghold. The Americans could find no passage through the swamp so the company used a road to detour around the swamp. At 1430 that afternoon (11 June 1919), several armed men were seen running across a field and up a hill in the distance. As the Americans advanced, they discovered thirty dummies to the right of their advance. The Bolshevik ruse failed to draw fire from the Americans. LT Channing led eight men forward as an advance guard. The Bolsheviks could be seen now as the American main body remained under cover while LT Channing continued to advance.²¹

When the advance guard was about 200 yards from the enemy, they saw several Bolsheviks preparing to engage them. LT Channing did not hesitate. He immediately charged the enemy. The furious Bolshevik fire drowned out the patrol's shots. The enemy fire halted the patrol except for LT Channing who did not stop until he was in the Bolshevik position. Meanwhile, the American main body advanced from its covered position to rescue the patrol and fight the Bolsheviks. The main body's attack forced the Bolsheviks to withdraw. The American main body found two of the advance guard wounded. Two enemy soldiers were killed with several wounded and captured.²²

Uspenka was still three miles away. The next day the Americans attacked. Bolshevik prisoners and civilians

provided the Americans with a rough layout of the defenses in the town. A friendly peasant drove a wagon to the bridge into town and stopped there as a distraction to the Bolshevik guards. Hourly signal rockets were fired as a diversion. Two squads of Americans charged into town down the main street. One squad attacked along each flank with two additional squads following the main attack as a reserve. The American automatic rifle fire routed the defenders. No Americans were wounded or killed. They captured four Russian wagons filled with supplies. The American force remained in the town to prevent the Bolsheviks from returning.²³

G Company with a machinegun detachment set out with a Japanese force to hunt Bolshevik partisans on the night of 17-18 July. This was the final AEF operation against the Bolsheviks in the Spasskoe area during the summer. The group operated east of Spasskoe but failed to engage any enemy elements. The company returned to Spasskoe after a few days. The machinegun detachment remained with the Japanese until 8 August.²⁴

Meanwhile, relations with the White Russian Cossacks went steadily down hill. Cossack armored trains roamed the rails. Railroad officials were terrorized. Cossacks tortured and executed civilians at a whim. Semenov's and Kalmikov's troops were subject to no authority other than their own. The Russian people were generally friendly

toward the Americans but could not understand why the AEF units protected the railroad and allowed the brutal Cossacks free passage. The Cossacks hated the Americans because they interfered with the Cossacks' raping and pillaging. This placed the AEF troops in a difficult position. On one hand they were trying to stop the Bolsheviks attacking Semenov's and Kalmikov's forces at the same time these Cossacks were obstructing American efforts to enforce justice.²⁵

Iman

One deserter from the AEF had gained the particular enmity of the Americans because he had led Bolsheviks in attacks on American positions. This man, known as "Karachun," had been a member of K Company, 31st Infantry. CPT Lindsey P. Johns of the 27th Infantry was told to capture Karachun. To do this he took CPL Benjamin Sperling of K Company, 31st Infantry as an interpreter and went to Iman. CPL Sperling knew Karachun before he deserted.²⁶

Iman contained a varied group of American allies (or supposed allies). Kalmikov and Kolchak had followers in the town. Japanese and Chinese troops also garrisoned Iman. On 31 August 1919, CPT Johns and CPL Sperling went to the Japanese and Chinese headquarters to obtain assist-

ance and were well received. At the Cossack headquarters they were treated cordially until they stated they hoped to use Cossack and Kolchak secret agents to trap Karachun. The Cossacks demanded written passports authorizing the Americans to travel in the Russian sector. When none could be produced, the Cossacks arrested CPT Johns and CPL Sperling. The Cossacks imprisoned both Americans, did not allow them to communicate, and demanded that the American government officially recognize Kalmikov.²⁷

CPT Johns managed to escape that night. He ran to the Chinese garrison and demanded a message be sent to his headquarters. Cossack soldiers recaptured him there. The Chinese did not send the message.²⁸

However, on his third night in captivity, CPT Johns escaped again. This time he had more luck with the Chinese garrison. They put him on a rail handcar with two Chinese soldiers as an escort. He reached the American sector at Ussuri and then hurried to Spasskoe to report the incident. However, a civilian had already reported the capture.²⁹

The 27th Infantry did not appreciate the conduct of the Cossacks and our Japanese allies. A rescue force of eight officers and 150 men was organized to assault Iman. The rescue force soldiers in Spasskoe boarded a train and moved through the American sector toward Iman picking up the remaining troops on the way. A Russian nicknamed

Casey Jones by the Americans because of his friendly attitude toward them was the train engineer. At 0300, the train charged into the Iman station.³⁰

When the train stopped, 158 determined Americans charged off the cars and raced through the town to set up positions covering any hostile movement. Within ten minutes, the Americans controlled Iman. The Americans fired three shots in the capture of the town. The first shot killed a Chinese peddler's horse. The peddler was wearing Cossack pants which prompted the shot. The Americans paid for the horse. The other two shots were accidentally fired by recruits. One almost shot himself in the chin when he dropped his rifle and it fired. Needless to say the Japanese and Cossacks were startled by the American assault. The Japanese garrison intervened between the Americans and Cossacks to prevent bloodshed. The Americans then discovered CPL Sperling had been taken to Khabarovsk by the Cossacks the night before. The American force took three Cossacks hostage and returned to Spasskoe. Two days later, the Cossacks returned CPL Sperling. Four Cossack officers had repeatedly whipped his face and back until he fainted. The situation remained tense between the AEF and Cossacks after this. AEF Headquarters issued a warning to all units to be alert for future hostile action.³¹

Except for guard detachments along the rail line, the regiment moved to Beresovka in September. Beresovka is

eight miles west of Verkhne-Udinsk. Preparations for winter began immediately.³² Concern over Cossack actions forced the regiment to concentrate at Spasskoe in October. When the situation calmed, E Company moved to Ussuri. H Company occupied Shmakovka. G Company occupied Sviyagina.³³

Rifles

The US government decided to support Kolchak's forces by supplying rifles in several shipments. One of these shipments included 45,000 rifles on a train guarded by forty-five men of the 31st Infantry under the command of 1LT Albert E. Ryan.³⁴ As the train entered the 27th Infantry sector, the operation ceased being routine.

LT Ryan left Vladivostok at 0100 14 October 1919. He had planned to leave the afternoon before but mechanical delays interfered. Mechanical problems, wrecked trains, and local hostility slowed his journey. Stops enroute provided the Americans opportunities to bathe and purchase food. On 19 October, the train reached Harbin. Ryan arrived at Manchuria Station 1900 22 October. When Ryan ordered a one-hour stop to purchase food at Olydiania 23 October, the Russian lieutenant on board with the guard force threatened to have Japanese or Russian troops arrest the Americans. Ryan ignored him and took a two and one-half hour rest.³⁵

At 0500 24 October, LT Ryan arrived at Chita and stopped in order to purchase beef. At 1000, the Russian lieutenant presented a telegram to LT Ryan that the Russian claimed to have just received from his headquarters. The telegram authorized the Russian to give 15,000 rifles to Semenov. Since LT Ryan's orders were to deliver the entire trainload to Kolchak's army, he refused to part with the 15,000 rifles unless orders from AEF Headquarters to do so arrived. Threats to take the rifles by force did not dissuade LT Ryan from his stance.³⁶

Furious telegram traffic between (now) COL Morrow, MG Graves, Semenov, Japanese, and Russian representatives confirmed LT Ryan's orders. COL Morrow, MG Graves, and even the Japanese supported LT Ryan's decision.³⁷

Ryan now prepared for a fight. He constructed fighting positions under the train cars and barricaded the track to prevent the theft of any cars. A Russian armored train pulled along side at 0245 25 October. A Russian company with four machineguns approached the station at 1000 but did not attack. At 1325 that afternoon, the Russian lieutenant returned to the station and told Ryan the matter was settled. Semenov agreed to allow the train to continue on its way.³⁸ Ryan refused to take down his barricades until the Russian armored train pulled away. By 1700, it had. At 2215 that evening LT Ryan finally left Chita. On 27 October, he transferred the rifles to Kol-

chak's forces at Irkutsk.³⁹ LT Ryan's determined obedience to orders was commendable. His refusal to cave in to illegal demands showed the Cossacks that the AEF would not be intimidated.

31st Infantry: Success and Disaster

The regiment generally spent this time trying to preserve law and order in its assigned area of operations. American forces took casualties but forced their attackers to pay an even higher price. Due to concerted action by the 31st Infantry and Allied units, the pattern of Bolshevik robbing, looting, and violence was decreased by 30 June 1919.⁴⁰

Novitskaya

Hostilities between the American mine guard force near Suchan and Bolshevik partisans occurred on 22 June 1919. An American lieutenant and four enlisted men were captured that day while fishing on the Suchan River south of Suchan. The Bolsheviks held the five men in Novitskaya. When the Bolsheviks refused to release the five prisoners, M Company (minus two platoons) attacked. COL G.H. Williams then in charge of the Allied Mine Guard accompanied M Company.⁴¹

Upon reaching Novitskaya, LT Ward, COL Williams' adjutant, and Private Craig of H Company rode into the town ahead of the main body. Bolshevik gunfire downed both. Craig died immediately. Ward died after being found by the advancing M Company.⁴²

M Company attacked Novitskaya and had two more men killed with two wounded. The five American prisoners were not found. The Bolsheviks moved them to Kazanka before M Company attacked. The Bolsheviks exchanged the five Americans for one of their leaders, named Samusenko, imprisoned earlier for stealing money at Vladivostok and being held at Suchan.⁴³

Partisans attacked the American camp at Suchan the night of 24 June. That same night other hostile activity occurred. Cable line power houses were damaged. Bridges and telephone lines were destroyed cutting communications between Suchan and Shkotovo.⁴⁴ But the worst incident occurred on 25 June at Romanovka.

Romanovka

A security detachment from A Company was guarding the railroad at Romanovka.⁴⁵ Two recently-arrived lieutenants were with the guard force. They camped in a small valley near the railroad one mile outside the town. This provided easy access to a water supply and put the guard

detachment near the bridge it had to guard. The force tapped a nearby telephone line for communications.⁴⁶

The Americans pitched their tents in a square and placed sentries on the surrounding hills. The camp was basically in a bowl. Night (24-25 June) passed quietly. However, a sentry left his post a few minutes after first light and began walking toward the camp. He had not been relieved. That was the opportunity the 300 Russians hiding near the camp wanted. They attacked.⁴⁷

The Americans never had a chance. Many were killed while they slept.⁴⁸ The struggle lasted several hours due to the courageous resistance of the survivors. 2LT Lawrence D. Butler rallied the survivors and refused to run. When a survivor escaped, the Bolsheviks withdrew.⁴⁹

CPL Louis Heinzman succeeded in flagging down a train which then backed down the track to the nearest guard force. This rescue force arrived at Romanovka four hours after the battle. They found nineteen dead with twenty-five wounded. Five of the wounded subsequently died. The dead Bolsheviks included the village cobbler who had sold milk to the same Americans he later was killing.⁵⁰

Suchan

Continued partisan activity concerned AEF Headquarters. Consequently, it ordered a provisional battalion be sent

from Shkotovo to Suchan to reinforce M Company. This provisional battalion was under the command of MAJ W.H. Joiner. Components of the battalion included C Company, D Company, one platoon from the Regimental Machine Gun Company, and three 37mm guns which arrived at Kanguaz 23 June.⁵¹

One C Company platoon was left at Kanguaz to guard surplus equipment and ammunition. The M Company squad already there remained under the control of the C Company platoon. The provisional battalion continued into the Suchan Valley and was attacked by partisans at Sitsa on 24 June. The battalion's fire kept the partisans at a safe distance. Sniping continued as the battalion moved toward Suchan 25-26 June, but no American casualties were incurred.⁵²

Supplying the mine guards was a continuous challenge. Meat and bread were shipped daily from Vladivostok for the various rail line detachments between Vladivostok and Suchan and for the mine guard. Canned corn beef and roast beef emergency rations were also issued. The M Company squad at Kanguaz was charged with transloading the supplies from the train from Vladivostok to the narrow gauge cars used to carry supplies to the mines.⁵³

Damage to cable car power houses caused a supply problem. This forced supplies hauled overland to traverse thirty miles of narrow, poorly constructed roads - an

inviting target for partisan attack. Destruction of the railroad bridges between Kanguaz and Shkotovo 26 June forced the mine guards to look to the sea for help.⁵⁴

America Bay was about twenty-six miles from Suchan. The supply route ran through Vladimiro-Alexandrovskaya and the Suchan Valley. In order to secure the route, the mine guard decided to clear the partisans from Novitskaya, Kazanka, and any positions to the south. However, partisans attacked Suchan 1 July. Outposts defeated the attack.⁵⁵

On 2 July, COL Williams with C Company (less guard detachments), a machinegun section, a 37mm gun section, and a Japanese company headed toward Novitskaya. H and D Companies defended Suchan. COL Williams attacked Novitskaya from the west and south. The Americans quickly captured the town and forty prisoners. The partisans fled to the north. C Company with wounded and prisoners returned to Suchan. The remainder of COL Williams' force moved toward Kazanka.⁵⁶

C and D Companies, the other machinegun section, and the remaining 37mm guns left Suchan for Kazanka on 3 July. The two forces joined and attacked Kazanka. American casualties were one dead and two wounded. Partisan survivors fled north. Meanwhile, H Company defeated another attack on Suchan.⁵⁷

L and M Companies, a machinegun platoon, three 37mm guns, and a Japanese Company under MAJ Joiner's command

left Suchan for America Bay on 5 July. Small groups of partisans harrassed the force as it marched. Partisan fire wounded six Americans near Piryatina. Patrols, machinegun fire, and 37mm gun fire prevented two subsequent ambushes. During the afternoon, Vladimiro-Alexandrovskaya was taken with little difficulty.⁵⁸

The US cruiser Albany, two Russian ships and a British ship arrived in America Bay with supplies on 6 July. A landing force of 100 G Company and 100 Russian soldiers accompanied the ships. The supplies were stockpiled at Vladimiro-Alexandrovskaya. One section from M Company remained there to guard the supplies that could not be loaded in wagons for the return trip. On 9 July, the mine guard force began its return march to Suchan. A small partisan force was driven off by the advance guard as the Americans reached Piryatina. H Company marched to Vladimiro-Alexandrovskaya on 10 July to escort the remaining sixty wagon loads of supplies to Suchan. No fighting occurred.⁵⁹

During the latter part of July, approximately 1,400 Japanese troops entered the Suchan valley area. They had no contact with partisan forces until they were joined by Russian troops from Nikolsk. The American hospital at Suchan treated the wounded.⁶⁰

The situation calmed sufficiently by 23 July for the American units from the Shkotovo area to return there. On

24 July, this group left Suchan and entered Fanza. It arrived at Kanguaz 25 July. C Company remained at Kanguaz. D Company, the machinegun platoon, and the 37mm guns boarded a train for Shkotovo that day. The M Company squad at Kanguaz marched to Suchan 26 July. Other AEF elements in Kanguaz returned to their parent units.⁶¹

The period 25 July to 7 August was very quiet. Patrols kept a watch on the area. To lessen morale problems, the YMCA provided entertainment. Overseas deployment after the World War I armistice was beginning to hurt morale. The YMCA provided movies. The Americans improved their rations by trading excess syrup, canned beef, and bacon rations for eggs and vegetables. Platoons were reorganized and assigned tasks as units. These measures improved morale.⁶²

A partisan ultimatum to COL Williams sparked the next combat action. A local citizen told COL Williams on 6 August that the partisan band in the area forbade the Americans to bring any additional beef cattle to Suchan. This ultimatum displeased COL Williams. Therefore, he detailed CPT O.R. Rhoads to take a force to destroy the partisans. CPT Rhoads selected 2d Platoon, H Company for the task.⁶³

LT Leslie commanded the 2d Platoon. Since he had only thirty-six fit soldiers, M Company provided a few reinforcements. LT Resing of M Company was detailed as a

guide. The total force was composed of three officers and approximately forty enlisted men.⁴⁴

On the evening of 7 August, CPT Rhoads led his force from Suchan to the Novo Litovskaya valley. The platoon rested until daylight then passed through the valley seeking information on the partisans. Rhoads stopped at Novo Litovskaya in the late afternoon to purchase eggs. He had discovered no information concerning the partisans. Just after Rhoads left the village to march toward the Eastern Bay beach, a local citizen confidentially told him the partisans were ten miles away on the Novo Litovskaya River where it emptied into Eastern Bay. Rhoads continued in that direction until his point element sighted the partisans.⁴⁵

The partisans were on a flat piece of ground about fifty yards wide along the river edge close to the river mouth. The river broadened here so it resembled a bay. Its mouth closed to a small size where the river met the Eastern Bay. The actual river mouth was about three feet deep and fifteen feet wide. The partisans were between a log hut and the water's edge. CPT Rhoads' force was about 500 yards from the river mouth when it spotted the partisans.⁴⁶

The Americans were able to deploy without alerting the partisans. Rhoads sent one automatic rifle team to cover the left flank and two such teams to cover the right

flank. One squad was detailed as a reserve. The remainder of the force moved one squad at a time to within twenty feet of the river bank which was fifty yards from the water line.⁴⁷ These maneuvers surrounded the partisans. The Americans had three directions cut off with the river behind the partisans.

Rhoads, through his interpreter, called on the Bolsheviks to surrender. They answered with rifle fire and attempted to escape or take cover. Some ran for the log cabin. Some jumped in the river to swim away. Others tried to run around the American flanks. A few partisans slipped between the American platoon and right flank automatic rifle teams but were later killed or captured. The battle started at 1800 and lasted ten minutes. Of the thirty partisans, six were captured (two severely wounded), seventeen were killed, five drowned or were killed in the river, and two escaped. No Americans were injured. The platoon returned to Suchan 11 August.⁴⁸

Rhoads' force rested in Vladimiro-Alexandrovskaya on 10 August while enroute to Suchan. Relations with the Japanese detachment there were not good. The M Company detachment was still in the town to act as a point of contact for supply operations through America Bay. The Japanese signal officer told the American sergeant in charge of the detachment that he had to pay for all messages with money or food. The sergeant refused. CPT

Rhoads was treated discourteously by the detachment commander. The provocations were so severe, one of the 2d Platoon's squads wanted to kill several Japanese soldiers. They had tried to injure CPT Rhoads.⁶⁹

After returning to Suchan, CPT Rhoads was again alerted to prepare an expedition to attack the partisans. However, before he could set out, AEF Headquarters directed that all Americans leave the Suchan mine area. On 14 August, AEF Headquarters ordered the Americans to meet the USAT Merritt in America Bay on 18 August.⁷⁰

The 1st Platoon, H Company departed Suchan the morning of 15 August, using wagons gathered from the area. The last Americans, except for a burial detail guard (a platoon from H Company), left at 0600 17 August. In all, five wagon trains moved the Americans. Rough weather prevented the Merritt from unloading the burial detail on board until 18 August even though it arrived 16 August. Unfortunately, the platoon left at Suchan had exhumed and then reburied the American dead when the burial detail failed to arrive. When this H Company platoon reached the bay, an M Company platoon was sent back to Suchan with the burial detail to exhume the bodies again. This group brought the bodies to America Bay.⁷¹

The Merritt completed loading on 19 August and sailed at 2130 that evening. It arrived at Vladivostok at 1000 20 August. American participation in the Allied Mine

Guard was finished. However, other operations were conducted in the Suchan area.⁷²

In August and September, Russian engineers completed repairs to the railroad and asked for protection. The 31st Infantry element in the Shkotovo sector was ordered to extend its sector to include the Suchan area. C Company moved to Fanza and Sitza. I Company occupied Kanguaz, Tigrovia, and Tahe. The troops carried supplies and ammunition to last an estimated three months. H Company (composed of only 100 soldiers) reinforced the Fanza garrison 5 December. Thirty of these soldiers occupied Baritznaya. Forty occupied Kishmish.⁷³

The sector was quiet from 8 August until 10 December. Partisan bands occupied Kazanka and Frolovka. On 10, 24, 25, and 31 December, elements of these bands attacked C Company detachments at Sitza and near Fanza, but no Americans were wounded.⁷⁴

Outposts and patrols were used to protect the detachments from surprise. Patrolling was active just before daylight. Partisan contact, when made, often occurred at that time. Small detachments usually occupied a building that had a squad room and a kitchen with a breastwork constructed around the building for defense. Drills were established so everyone knew how to quickly exit the building(s) and occupy fighting positions.⁷⁵ The situa-

tion remained virtually unchanged until the next phase of the expedition to Siberia.

Shkotovo

Attacks on passenger trains in the vicinity of Ugolnaya became a source of concern in April. Small Bolshevik bands would fire at passenger trains moving at night. This resulted in the 31st Infantry establishing a sector headquarters at Shkotovo. E Company occupied the town 24 April and actively patrolled the area.⁷⁶

Partisan activity continued to increase into May. Consequently, A, C, D, and I Companies were organized into a provisional battalion 18 May, with its headquarters at Shkotovo. A 37mm gun platoon and a machinegun platoon were also assigned. Guard detachments were spread along the railroad line to secure the area.⁷⁷

Companies operated north of Shkotovo 21-25 May, fighting several minor engagements. Casualties were few, but the Bolsheviks were pushed away from the rail line. Reconnaissance patrols continued after this time to monitor any resurgence of partisan activity.⁷⁸

Partisan activity did in fact resume. This activity was centered on the Ugolnaya-Suchan railroad between Shkotovo and Kanguaz. The AEF had to reinforce and shift assets to counter this increased activity. The machine-

gun platoon in Shkotovo was moved to Kanguaz in early June but later recalled. Another machinegun platoon was moved from Vladivostok to Shkotovo 25 June. This platoon soon moved to Romanovka. The late June transfer of assets from Shkotovo to Suchan was discussed in the previous section.⁷⁹ Operations through the remainder of the summer consisted of continued patrolling and skirmishing with partisan elements. K Company, consisting of about 100 men, temporarily withdrew from the sector to go to Tethue on board the British cruiser Carlisle. B Company (175 men) was withdrawn from the Harbin delegation and went to Olga aboard the USS New Orleans. Russian troops aided both forces which landed 31 July. No resistance was encountered. The partisans reported in the two areas were not there.⁸⁰

In September, the Shkotovo sector forces were arrayed as given below.

<u>Element</u>	<u>Location</u>
Provisional Battalion Headquarters with signal, medical, and quartermaster detachments	Shkotovo
A Company	Shkotovo
C Company	Kanguaz
D Company	Shkotovo
E Company	Romanovka
K Company	Ugolnaya
I Company	Novo Nezhino ⁸¹

All companies had approximately 250 men. With the summer operations completed, the units were in camps. Except for Shkotovo, the camps were located on dominating ground outside the towns garrisoned. Trenches with dirt berms four to five feet tall surrounded the camps which were strong defensively but not adequate for winter housing.⁸²

The situation in Shkotovo was different because the Americans there occupied brick, former Russian army buildings. Kokchak and AEF units were housed in these buildings.⁸³

The sector was quiet until mid October. Cold weather forced AEF units to reposition to better quarters. Tents were inadequate. K Company moved to Razdolnoe. One D Company platoon replaced K Company at Ugolnaya. Box cars were taken off their wheels and used as quarters. Soldiers piled dirt around the box cars for added protection. One E Company platoon stayed at Romanovka occupying two adjoining houses. The soldiers constructed a six to seven foot earth wall around the houses. One I Company platoon stayed at Novo Nezhino fortifying two houses in the same manner as those at Romanovka. The rest of I Company moved to Shkotovo.⁸⁴ As winter approached, the Shkotovo sector was expanded to include the Suchan area as discussed earlier.

During October and November, many drafted men returned to the United States. Inadequately trained re-

placements arriving at Shkotovo required a great deal of training and were a burden to the command there.⁸⁵

As December approached, the partisan bands grew in size. Their recruiting efforts were very successful and bred confidence in their ability to attack the Americans. Lack of distinctive uniforms made distinguishing them from local citizens virtually impossible.⁸⁶ On 4 December, H Company under CPT Rhoads' command moved from Vladivostok to Shkotovo to reinforce the garrison. MAJ Thomas Arms, commanding the provisional battalion, then sent H Company to Fanza to reinforce C Company .⁸⁷

Christmas 1919 was not a quiet one for the Americans in Shkotovo. At approximately 0100 28 December, Americans heard several shots in the Russian barracks. Thinking it was a typical drunken brawl, no one worried. However, at 0200, the Russian garrison commander arrived at the American headquarters and was very excited. At least one-half of the 800 man Russian garrison had deserted. Four or five Russian officers had been murdered.⁸⁸

The American garrison, about 400 strong, was alerted. The American headquarters dispatched elements to secure the town and guard supply stores. The deserting soldiers apparently fled to join the Bolsheviks. Kolchak's government was about to lose control.⁸⁹ His capital, Omsk, had fallen to the Reds 15 November.⁹⁰

The mutiny destroyed the Russian garrison. The officers moved all their families into one building and took turns walking guard around it. Requests for American soldiers to act as guards were denied by AEF Headquarters in Vladivostok. However, an American squad took up a position inside the building to maintain liason with the Russian garrison.⁷¹ No major changes occurred until early January.

Vladivostok and Harbin

The headquarters of the regiment remained at Vladivostok throughout this period. During January 1919, the Harbin Legation Guard was increased in size to include seventy men. On 26 May, G Company left Spasskoe after relief by the 27th Infantry. G Company moved to Vladivostok and replaced K Company as the base guard company. K Company moved to Ugolnaya.⁷² In October, COL Fred W. Bugbee replaced COL Sargent as the regiment commander.⁷³

Vladivostok was relatively quiet until 16 November. The disintegration of Kolchak's government led the Czech General Gaida to believe he could successfully revolt against Kolchak and establish his own government in Vladivostok. The revolt failed.⁷⁴ Cossacks loyal to Kolchak shot down Gaida's supporters in the streets. The Czech Legion remained neutral. M Company, 31st Infantry cleared

everyone out of the railroad yard and stood guard. Gaida's men were surrounded by his opponents. Japanese and American troops guarded the city outside the ring of White Russians surrounding Gaida. He had no chance. His men surrendered. Many were executed. Several found protection by surrendering at AEF Headquarters.⁷⁵ Gaida promised to leave Siberia within three days.⁷⁶

The railway guard mission was characterized by small unit actions and brought the AEF into direct conflict with the Bolsheviks since the railroad was the link between White Russian urban power centers. However, the AEF did not actively attempt to fight the Bolsheviks except as required to keep the railway open. The AEF's policy to remain neutral and treat everyone in a humane way resulted in conflict between the AEF and its allies. This discord among allies continued throughout the intervention until the AEF departed Siberia. The final stage of America's Siberian intervention follows.

Chapter 9 Notes

1. National Archives, M917, Reel 10, Graves, "Operations to 30 June 1919," pp. 13-14.
2. Ibid., p. 14.
3. Ibid., pp. 15-17.
4. Ibid., pp. 15-18.
5. 27th Infantry, "History of the Twenty-Seventh US Infantry," p. 21.
6. Kindall, American Soldiers, pp. 75-77.
7. Ibid., p. 77; 27th Infantry, "History of the Twenty-Seventh US Infantry," p. 21.
8. Ibid., p. 79; Ibid.
9. Ibid.; Ibid.
10. Kindall, American Soldiers, p. 79.
11. Ibid., p. 80.
12. Ibid., p. 81; Hunt, The History of the Twenty-Seventh Infantry, p. 66; 27th Infantry, "History of the Twenty-Seventh US Infantry," p. 21.
13. Hunt, The History of the Twenty-Seventh Infantry, pp. 67-68; 27th Infantry, "History of the Twenty-Seventh US Infantry," p. 21.
14. Kindall, American Soldiers, p. 82; Hunt, The History of the Twenty-Seventh Infantry, p. 68.
15. Channing, Siberia's Untouched Treasure, pp. 169, 171.
16. Hunt, The History of the Twenty-Seventh Infantry, p. 68.
17. Ibid., pp. 68-69; Channing, Siberia's Untouched Treasure, pp. 169, 172.
18. Hunt, The History of the Twenty-Seventh Infantry, p. 69.
19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., p. 70; Channing, Siberia's Untouched Treasure, pp. 175-177; Kindall, American Soldiers, p. 95.
21. Ibid.; Channing, Siberia's Untouched Treasure, pp. 180-181, 188.
22. Ibid., p. 71; Ibid., pp. 180-185.
23. Ibid.; Ibid., pp. 190-195.
24. Ibid.; 27th Infantry, "History of the Twenty-Seventh US Infantry," p. 21.
25. Hunt, The History of the Twenty-Seventh Infantry, pp. 72-73.
26. Ibid., p. 73; 27th Infantry, "History of the Twenty-Seventh US Infantry," p. 22.
27. Ibid.; Ibid.
28. Hunt, The History of the Twenty-Seventh Infantry, p. 73.
29. Ibid., p. 74; Kindall, American Soldiers, pp. 203-204.
30. Ibid.; Ibid., p. 204.
31. Ibid.; Ibid., p. 205; Channing, Siberia's Untouched Treasure, pp. 250-254; 27th Infantry, "History of the Twenty-Seventh US Infantry," p. 22.
32. Hunt, The History of the Twenty-Seventh Infantry, p. 74.
33. Ibid., p. 75; Stewart's The White Armies of Russia (pp. 276-277) records that the Allied Supreme Council agreed in May 1919 to provide Kolchak munitions, supplies, and food. The Supreme Council demanded a freely elected assembly, no revival of a privileged class, an independent Poland, an independent Finland, the Peace Conference assist the settling of boundary disputes, acceptance of liability for the Russian national debt, and that Russia would join the Peace Conference in exchange for their support. Kolchak's 4 June reply was accepted 12 June. Kolchak's government received de facto recognition from the United States and the Allies through this agreement but the United States remained opposed to official recognition.
34. Ibid.

35. National Archives, M917, Reel 1, report, 1LT Albert E. Ryan, Headquarters, 31st Infantry Regiment, 16 November 1919, pp. 1-2.
36. Ibid., p. 2.
37. Ibid., report, Headquarters, 27th Infantry Regiment, 3 November 1919.
38. Ibid., report, Ryan, p. 3.
39. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
40. Paul, Regimental History, Thirty-First US Infantry, pp. 19-20.
41. MAJ O.R. Rhoads, "A Study of the Operations and Supply of the American Forces in the Suchan Mine Area," p. 5.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
44. Ibid., p. 6; National Archives, M917, Reel 3, report, Headquarters Allied Mine Guard, AEFS, Suchan, 10 July 1919, p. 3.
45. Estimates vary on the number of men in the detachment: Channing, Siberia's Untouched Treasure, p. 213 - approximately 100; Maddox, The Unknown War with Russia, p. 101-75; Rhoads, "A Study of the Operations and Supply of the American Forces in the Suchan Mine Area," p. 6 - platoon.
46. Channing, Siberia's Untouched Treasure, pp. 211-212.
47. Ibid., p. 213.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., pp. 214-215; Paul, Regimental History, Thirty-First US Infantry, p. 20.
50. Maddox, The Unknown War with Russia, p. 102.
51. Rhoads, "A Study of the Operations and Supply of the American Forces in the Suchan Mine Area," p. 6.
52. Ibid.

53. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
54. Ibid., pp. 7-8.
55. Ibid., p. 8.
56. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
57. Ibid., p. 9.
58. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
59. Ibid., p. 10.
60. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
61. Ibid., p. 11.
62. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
63. Ibid., p. 12.
64. Ibid., p. 28.
65. Ibid., pp. 28-29.
66. Ibid., pp. 29-30.
67. Ibid., p. 30.
68. Ibid., pp. 30-34.
69. Ibid., pp. 12-13.
70. Ibid., p. 13.
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77. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

78. Ibid., p. 3.
79. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
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81. MAJ Thomas S. Arms, "Siberian Expedition -- The Shkotovo Sector, 31st Infantry, from September 1919 until the withdrawal of the Expedition" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff School, Individual Research Paper No. 84, 1931), p. 3.
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83. Ibid.
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85. Ibid., p. 8.
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90. Kindall, American Soldiers, p. 237.
91. Arms, "Siberian Expedition -- The Shkotovo Sector," pp. 14-15.
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93. Paul, Regimental History, Thirty-First US Infantry, p. 27.
94. Ibid.
95. Goldhurst, The Midnight War, pp. 216-219.
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Chapter 10. The End: 1 January - 1 April 1920

Pressure to bring the AEF home continued to build in Congress and from the soldiers' families. World War I ended in November 1918. Russia was coming no closer to democracy through the AEF's presence. The situation in Washington was also not encouraging. President Wilson's participation in the Paris Peace Conference after the war was a terrible strain. His battle against opponents of the League of Nations Covenant added to the burden. The strain resulted in President Wilson suffering a stroke 2 October 1919. Even though now physically and mentally unfit, he refused to relinquish his office. His unwillingness to compromise with political opponents regarding the League of Nations Covenant doomed its ratification. The political leadership of the nation was embroiled in a bitter struggle to win the 1920 elections.¹ The nation was tired of conflict overseas.

The War Department sent a message to MG Graves on 31 December 1919 telling him to prepare to leave. MG Graves then issued orders to his units to begin concentrating and moving to Vladivostok.² While AEF Headquarters was making its plans, the guard detachments continued operations. The White Russian situation continued to deteriorate. On 15 January 1920, the Czech 6th Regiment that had been escorting Kolchak eastward was confronted by a Bolshevik demand to

turn over Kolchak or the Bolshevik's would attack. Kolchak had no support. The Czech's handed over Kolchak in Glaskov to the Bolsheviks so they could continue toward Vladivostok. On 7 February 1920, the Bolsheviks executed Kolchak in Irkutsk, the same town where he was married.³

27th Infantry: Poor Allied Relations and Withdrawal

A large Bolshevik force was reported to be in Mukheeno about twelve miles from Verkhne-Udinsk on 3 January 1920. To prevent an attack on Verkhne-Udinsk, LTC Alvin C. Gillam led a 250-man force to attack the village. American scouts were fired upon when they neared Mukheeno but the Reds quickly sent a message to LTC Gillam stating that they would not resist his entry into the town.⁴

LTC Gillam met the Bolsheviks and discussed their different intents. The Bolsheviks stated they were friendly toward the Americans. Their objective was to fight the White Russian General Levitsky's forces in the area. This White Russian unit was committing atrocities throughout the vicinity. After the Bolsheviks promised not to interfere with the American forces, LTC Gillam and his troops returned to Verkhne-Udinsk 5 January.⁵

A serious incident occurred a few days later and illustrated the poor state of relations between the AEF and the Cossacks. An M Company platoon under the command

of 2LT Paul W. Kendall was stationed at Posolkaya about ninety versts from Verkhne-Udinsk. The local stationmaster was not friendly to the American guard force.⁶

Semenov's armored train, "The Destroyer," pulled into the station at 0045 10 January. After taking on wood and water⁷ and the stationmaster conferring with the crew⁸, the train moved up the track to a position alongside boxcars used by Kendall's platoon as quarters. The Destroyer and the soldiers on board were armed with one three-inch Japanese field gun, one one pounder cannon, four machineguns, sixty rifles, and a large supply of hand grenades. Cossack General Bogomolitz, six officers, and sixty-six enlisted men were on the train.⁹

At 0100, "The Destroyer" opened fire. Forty feet separated the Cossack and American cars. The Americans leaped from their cars and returned the fire. Fortunately, the Cossack aim was not good. While the two forces blazed away at each other, American Sergeant Carl Robbins climbed onto "The Destroyer's" engine. Even though severely wounded, he was able to throw a hand grenade into the engine cab. The Cossack fire killed the young American, but the hand grenade severely damaged the armored train.¹⁰

"The Destroyer" moved about fifty yards down the track after a few minutes and stopped. The mutual exchange continued. "The Destroyer" again moved -- this time about

100 yards. Firing continued. At 0145, the train left the station moving toward Selenga.¹¹

As "The Destroyer" moved away from the American cars, LT Kendall's force did not retreat. The Americans maneuvered along both sides of the track keeping up a steady rate of fire against the Cossacks. After the train cleared the station and moved out of range, the Americans ceased firing. Robbins' grenade forced "The Destroyer" to stop at Temlue, twelve versts away. General Bogomolitz then telephoned LT Kendall and asked if the Cossacks could return and surrender.¹²

Meanwhile LT Kendall had called the American detachment at Selenga and notified them of the firefight. The commander there loaded a part of his force on a train and started toward Posolkaya. This force soon reached Temlue and received Bogomolitz's surrender. Five Cossacks had been killed. One was wounded. American casualties were two killed and one wounded.¹³ The captives were handed over to Semenov after he promised they would stand trial.¹⁴

Companies stationed in the Spasskoe and Ussuri areas left for Vladivostok in six echelons. The first echelon left Ussuri 8 January. The sixth left Spasskoe on 13 January. Only finding rail cars slowed the departure.¹⁵

Loading details worked day and night in Vladivostok in very cold weather to put these units aboard ship. By 14 January, all Spasskoe-Ussuri sector troops were in

Vladivostok. All were on the USAT Great Northern by 16 January. On 17 January, the 2d Battalion, C Company, D Company, Headquarters Detachment, Machinegun Detachment, and a Supply Company Detachment sailed for Manila. The ship arrived at Manila 26 January after a three day lay-over in Nagasaki, Japan. The troops occupied Camp Thomas H. Barry in the Manila port area.¹⁶

The troops in the Lake Baikal area moved to Vladivostok in eight echelons. American and British Red Cross workers accompanied them. On 16 January, the first echelon left Verkhne-Udinsk with the last leaving 29 January. The echelons arrived between 1 and 25 February. This was a difficult move because of the distance involved and the violent conditions throughout Siberia. The American echelons contained extra cars with wood supplies. Troops carried ninety days rations and forage.¹⁷

On 10 March, the remaining 27th Infantry units departed Vladivostok on the USAT Thomas. They arrived in Manila 17 March and moved into Camp Barry with the earlier arrivals.¹⁸ The 27th Infantry took a Russian bear to the Philippines as a mascot. When the bear became too large for the soldiers to handle, they donated it to the Municipal Zoo in Manila.¹⁹

31st Infantry: Revolution and Withdrawal

The 31st Infantry units in the Shkotovo area received orders to move to Vladivostok 3 January 1920. H Company moved to Shkotovo 5 January. All troops left Kanguaz 7 January. The last two companies moving from Kanguaz to Shkotovo had difficulty using the railroad. Bolsheviks destroyed two railroad bridges between Romanovka and Novo Nezhino. The Americans were forced to "requisition" over 100 local wagons on sleds to move. Twelve miles of track were destroyed. The troops in the area were all concentrated at Shkotovo by 10 January.²⁰

Engines to move the entire body of troops were then difficult to find. Only one engine near Ugolnaya was eventually obtained. Russian railroad officials protested its seizure but a four-man guard detail guaranteed its security. The Americans used the engine for seven days. By 18 January, all troops from the Shkotovo sector moved to Vladivostok.²¹

The Razdolnoe sector units (D, F, K, and M Companies) were the rear guard for the 27th Infantry units evacuating Verkhne-Udinsk. Prior to the evacuation, little violence had occurred in this area. However, the departure of American troops brought on an increase in Bolshevik activity.²²

Kolchak's troops deserted to the Reds as his regime collapsed. Japanese forces continued to battle Bolshevik elements and remained allied to the White Russian forces. The Americans continued to strive to remain neutral.²³

Revolution continued to wrack Siberia during the closing months of the AEF's intervention. A, C, I, and L Companies continued to patrol Vladivostok to maintain order. Between 25 January and 3 February, a coalition of Social Democrats, Social Revolutionists, and Bolsheviks overthrew Kolchak's supporters in the Amur area. On 31 January, 3,100 troops of this new government occupied Vladivostok. This group was opposed to continued Allied intervention.²⁴

Between 15 February and 1 April, the 31st Infantry departed Siberia on the Crook, Dix, South Bend, and Great Northern transport ships. The 2d Provisional Battalion consisting of A, C, E, H, and I Companies departed first and arrived at Manila 5 March. Each echelon stayed at Camp Barry temporarily before moving to Fort McKinley. Regimental Headquarters reached Manila 6 April. F, K, L, and M Companies with the AEF staff arrived at Manila 8 April aboard the Great Northern. The entire regiment was assembled at Fort William McKinley 17 April. MG Graves became the Fort McKinley commander.²⁵

America's Siberian intervention was at an end.

Chapter 10 Notes

1. Robert H. Ferrell, Woodrow Wilson and World War I 1917-1921 (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1985), pp. 156-170.
2. National Archives, M917, Reel 10, Graves, "Operations 1 July 1919 to 31 March 1920," p. 2.
3. Varneck, The Testimony of Kolchak, p. 338; Channing, Siberia's Untouched Treasure, p. 270; Goldhurst, The Midnight War, pp. 228-230.
4. Hunt, The History of the Twenty-Seventh Infantry, p. 75.
5. Ibid., p. 76.
6. 27th Infantry, "History of the Twenty-Seventh US Infantry," p. 24.
7. National Archives, M917, Reel 10, Graves, "Operations 1 July 1919 to 31 March 1920," p. 5.
8. 27th Infantry, "History of the Twenty-Seventh US Infantry," p. 24.
9. National Archives, M917, Reel 10, Graves, "Operations 1 July 1919 to 31 March 1920," p. 5.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Leipold, "America's Siberian Expedition," p. 11.
15. 27th Infantry, "History of the Twenty-Seventh US Infantry," p. 24.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Channing, Siberia's Untouched Treasure, p. 306.

20. Arms, "Siberian Expedition -- The Shkotovo Sector,"
p. 15.

21. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

22. Faul, Regimental History Thirty-First US Infantry,
p. 30.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid , p. 31.

25. Ibid., pp. 33-35.

Chapter 11. Conclusions

The AEF - Initial Comments

America's participation in the Siberian intervention formally ended with the withdrawal of US troops. But, what happened? Did we accomplish our mission? Certainly, the American soldiers performed well. The AEF units succeeded on the battlefield in many small unit actions. Large unit operations were not conducted because the defeat of a sophisticated, armed foe was not the AEF's mission. President Wilson sent the AEF to Siberia to help the Russian people achieve democracy, assist the Czech Legion, and protect US investment (military and non-military). However, the confused situation in Siberia and the lack of specific, military goals made "success" difficult to achieve. The lack of a coordinated Allied plan and a single Allied commander increased the confusion and complicated the AEF's tasks.

The 27th Infantry's Ussuri campaign was a violation of the "Aide Memoire." The fault for this breach lies with the War Department, however, not the AEF. COL Stryer was in command before MG Graves arrived but had received no instructions regarding what he was to do. His only instructions were that MG Graves would provide guidance upon his arrival. Consequently, when General Otani asked

for assistance COL Styer provided it. The US was allied with Japan. The other Allied units in Siberia were already cooperating with the Japanese. Why should COL Styer not have agreed? Army officers are trained to be decisive and show initiative. The Japanese claimed Central Powers POWs were a threat in the area and had to be defeated. The Central Powers were the enemy. COL Styer did what any good officer would do; he attacked. Fortunately, the American role in the campaign was very limited. After MG Graves arrived, the AEF would not again take part in a large, cooperative venture with the Japanese.

The Americans gained the upper hand in the majority of their battles. Romanovka was the one major example where the AEF lost. However, even there the AEF did not quit the battlefield. The troops succeeded in fighting off the attackers, though suffering severe losses.

Bolshevik combat with the Americans consisted largely of guerilla operations. The Bolshevik partisans were poorly equipped. They lacked automatic weapons and artillery when facing the AEF (as noted previously, the British did face Bolshevik artillery). The AEF used patrolling to secure itself and its facilities. Patrols to the flanks of moving columns were particularly useful in protecting American units from ambushes and snipers. Individual Bolshevik snipers were often effective due to their pre-civil war occupation -- hunting. The partisan

troops were in good physical condition and had high morale. However, poor leadership inhibited their effectiveness. The rough nature of the terrain precluded large scale American attacks. The partisans often slipped away to fight another day.¹ American small unit tactics consistently succeeded. US casualties were light. Patrolling kept the rail line open. Possibly the infantry regiments' previous experience in the Philippines helped. Certainly, the situations were similar in that operations consisted of guarding fixed sites with patrolling around these sites to protect them. Research conducted to support this thesis did not provide a definite linkage between the Philippines and Siberia, but some sort of relationship seems plausible.

Guarding the railroad also required special equipment not normally found in an American infantry regiment. MG Graves suggested in his final report that gasoline powered rail motor carts for patrols and armored trains for reinforcing fires and troops be provided for future rail line guard missions.²

Another AEF problem that caused MG Graves concern was desertion. Apparently, some number of Russian civilians in the United States enlisted in the Army for service in Siberia. MG Graves contended many did this with the sole purpose in mind of obtaining free passage to Siberia. Once "home," they deserted the AEF. Graves recommended

that future expeditionary forces exclude natives of the land where the expeditionary force would serve.³

Actions by the AEF in Siberia were much different than the AEF in north Russia. There US troops cooperated with Allied forces and attacked the Bolsheviks. Dreams of linking up with the Czech Legion to reestablish the Eastern Front coupled with an intense hatred of the Bolsheviks spurred these attacks. The American commander, a colonel, bowed to British demands and allowed his troops to be commanded by non-Americans. How much of this was due to the senior American in north Russia being a colonel versus a major general in Siberia or some other reason is unknown and not the subject of this study. The point made here is that the conduct of the two interventions was drastically different.⁴

Relations with "Allies"

The relations between the AEF and its allies were not consistent. Initially, all the allied commanders seemed determined to cooperate. Yet, as time progressed, differences damaged this initial goodwill. MG Graves was determined to remain neutral in the war even though the other Allies and the US State Department wanted to destroy the Bolsheviks. Graves' steadfast loyalty to his orders was commendable. However, it poisoned efforts to achieve

Allied unity. The barbarous actions of the Japanese and Cossacks appalled the Americans. When provided the opportunity, American soldiers interfered with Japanese and Cossack brutality which resulted in Japanese and Cossack resentment toward the AEF. MG Graves and his men were morally and legally correct in protesting the wanton murder and destruction carried out by the Japanese and Cossack forces. However, being "right" resulted in the AEF having poor relations with its allies.

Kolchak's popular support decreased as time progressed. When he first came to power, Kolchak promised to establish a representative government and convene a constituent assembly. However, he failed to carry out this promise. Unfulfilled promises and the cruel actions of some of his followers (such as Semenov) caused the Russian people to turn against him.³

Attempts by MG Graves to stop Cossack atrocities may have improved the AEF's image in the eyes of the Russian civilians but it did not stop such actions. The Japanese promised to talk to Kalmikov when Graves protested his actions in Khabarovsk. All this did was force Kalmikov to be more secretive and send people out of Khabarovsk before killing them.⁴

Semenov and Kalmikov were not the only Cossacks committing atrocities. General Ivanoff-Rinoff sent troops throughout Siberia to maim and torture. At the village of

Grodiefka, nine old men were tortured and killed because the village's young men would not respond to Kolchak's mobilization order. The nine men were tortured for two and one-half to three hours before being executed. One man survived the ordeal because the Cossacks thought he was dead. A daughter of one victim reported the incident to MG Graves who sent an American officer to investigate. The officer reported the story was true. Inspection of the torture chamber disclosed that the men had been hung by the neck and beaten severely. Blood was splattered all over the room. While the victims were hanging in the room, the Cossacks poured boiling water over their heads. Additional tortures included pencils driven up the nose, cigarette burns, and fingernails pulled out.⁷

Kolchak's representatives in Vladivostok protested Graves' investigation regarding such atrocities. When MG Graves refused to stop investigating brutality, Kolchak's regional government officials stopped cooperating with the AEF. The majority of the Siberian people looked up to the United States as an example of a truly representative form of government. But many of Kolchak's supporters (the nobility, large businesses, members of the Tsar's government, and the wealthy) were opposed to representative government. They were prepared to help the AEF only if support to the Russian people was funneled through them. American refusal to do so and refusal to commit troops

against any faction in the country bred great resentment from Kolchak's government and the privileged elements of society.⁸ White Russian disunity precluded their massing sufficient forces to successfully combat the Bolsheviks.

After the World War I armistice, Kolchak's government and the Japanese conducted a propaganda campaign against the Americans. The intent was to portray the AEF as a Bolshevik supporter in order to force the AEF to fight the Bolsheviks to prove the report untrue. When this failed, the propaganda campaign was used as a way to force the AEF to leave Siberia. One theory was that if MG Graves attempted to censor the anti-American press, he would be recalled to the United States, given the US penchant for freedom of the press. Complaints directly to Kolchak's subordinates, such as General Rozanoff in Vladivostok, were to no avail. However, when MG Graves reported to the US State Department representative in Omsk that he intended to close down a paper in Vladivostok, the propaganda campaign in Vladivostok stopped. Between the overthrow of General Rozanoff 31 January 1920 and the departure of the AEF, the tone of the in Vladivostok press shifted to a pro-American position.⁹

The AEF also experienced problems with the British in Siberia. General Knox arrived in Siberia intending to raise an army and reestablish an Eastern Front. His government promised him arms and equipment for 100,000

men. This goal brought the British and Americans into direct conflict. The "Aide Memoire" specified that the United States would not divert any of its military forces from the Western Front as long as the situation there was critical.¹⁰

General Knox caused concern in other ways as well. On 3 October 1918, he announced that the British government claimed most of the supplies at Vladivostok. Therefore, he would be in charge of distributing all military supplies. Russians could distribute all non-military supplies. All the Allies objected to General Knox's position. But the British refused to consent to the formation of a board with representatives from each of the Allies to govern distribution of the military stores. The Allies never developed a coherent plan to distribute supplies.¹¹

The British government was an ardent Kolchak supporter. Winston Churchill announced in the House of Commons that the Kolchak government had been formed "by the British for its own purposes." General Knox stayed in Omsk much of the time and tried to show that he was the source of Kolchak's power. This may have backfired in the end, however. Many Siberians resented Kolchak's domination by a foreign power. Knox disagreed with the AEF neutral position. He even suggested to Mr. Caldwell, the American Consul, that MG Graves be relieved.¹²

The British support of Kolchak and anti-American attitude apparently resulted largely due to General Knox's opinions. After his departure (December 1919 or January 1920), the British representatives in Siberia criticized Kolchak's regime and previous British policies.¹³

General Knox tried to convince all the Allied commanders to place their troops under General Otani's command to no avail. When the railway guard mission was being discussed, Knox supported the proposal that the French General Janin command all troops east of Lake Baikal with General Otani commanding those west of the lake. Had this proposal been accepted by the Americans, the Japanese could have ordered the American guard forces east of Lake Baikal to cease their neutral stance.¹⁴

Fortunately for MG Graves, the Canadians, Chinese, Italians, and Czechs supported him against the attempts to end his neutrality. General Elmsley, the Canadian commander, opposed the cruel treatment of the Russian people and repeatedly stood by MG Graves when under attack by the other allies. COL Tessier, the senior French representative, supported the British attempts to end American neutrality.¹⁵

The Czechs were very friendly to the AEF initially. However, those fighting in the Urals resented the failure of the AEF to join them in establishing a new Eastern Front. This resentment stemmed from broken promises.

American Consul General Poole at Moscow sent a message to American Consul Williams at Samara to tell the Czechs that the Allies supported their holding positions in western Russian (18 June 1918). Dr. Teusler, head of the American Red Cross in Siberia, told General Gaida, then in command of the Czechs, to maintain his position in the Urals. American troops would come to his relief regardless of what other American officials might tell him (23 November 1918). US Ambassador to Japan Morris had just told General Gaida that the AEF would not go west of Irkutsk.¹⁶

The Czechs in the eastern part of Siberia harbored no resentment toward the Americans. They understood the American position better. Once the Czechs had been helped by the United States to leave Siberia, all were very pro-American.¹⁷

The Italian troops in Siberia remained in Krasnoyarsk most of the time. Their commander was very critical of Kolchak's officers. The Italians wanted justice for the Russian people and felt Kolchak's supporters were not supplying it. The Chinese played a subordinate role in the intervention. They did not take an active role in debating actions in the country.¹⁸

The Japanese announced their goals in Siberia to be the same as those of the United States -- non-interference. But Japanese support of the Cossacks was a violation of this

neutral pledge. The excuse most often given was that support to the Cossacks was necessary to "maintain order." The Japanese supplied money and equipment to the Cossacks and attempted to discredit the United States through propaganda.¹⁹

The attacks on the AEF by the White Russian leaders eventually enhanced the AEF's image among the common people. They understood the AEF's intentions. This goodwill was further enhanced when the US was the first Allied power to announce it would withdraw its military forces. Most Russians favored the withdrawal of all the Allied units.²⁰

Japanese actions indicated from the beginning that non-interference was not really Japan's policy. The Ussuri campaign was allegedly organized to defeat Austro-Hungarian POWs. However, the Japanese actually fought Bolsheviks. There was no large POW threat. Japan sought to dominate Siberia for its resources and available land. Economics was key, not helping the Russian people. Japanese troops cooperated with Cossack troops many times in brutal suppression of the Russian people. An American investigation in the Baikal region indicated Semenov killed 40,000 people. One report to Mr. Morris, Ambassador to Japan, by an American Railway Service Corps LT McDonald proved Semenov's Cossacks stopped a train loaded with 350 men, women, and children and machinegunned them.²¹

Japanese collusion with Kolchak's forces was again evidenced when revolutionaries overthrew General Rozanoff in Vladivostok 31 January 1920. The Japanese attempted to stop the revolutionaries' approach to the city by blocking the railway line from Nikolsk. But the revolutionaries arrived from a different direction and reached Rozanoff's house before the Japanese could interfere. A Japanese general arrived before any shooting and told the revolutionaries to leave because the Allies had decided they would allow no fighting in Vladivostok. However, LTC Eichelberger of the AEF was there and corrected the Japanese officer. The agreement was that Allied troops would only interfere with the revolution to prevent "murder, robbery, and looting." With that, an artillery piece fired one shot at Rozanoff's house. He fled to General Oi's house and eventually left on a Japanese ship for Japan.²²

The Japanese, however, did not accept this new government. The Japanese continued to threaten action because the revolutionaries allegedly failed to maintain order, arrested innocent people, and were unfriendly to the Japanese. The Japanese gradually seized the city building by building, street by street until they controlled the entire city.²³

Even with this ill will between the Japanese and American forces, MG Graves continued to feel friendly

toward the Japanese generals with whom he worked. The Japanese always treated him courteously and even awarded him a Japanese decoration. A battalion of Japanese troops was sent to the Vladivostok dock for MG Graves to inspect before his departure. Generals Ui, Inagaki, and Takayanaga accompanied the battalion.²⁴ Japan elected to retain troops in Siberia until October 1922 when political pressure at home and outside diplomatic pressure forced Japan's withdrawal.²⁵ The United States left Siberia before Japan because the United States was tired of war. A massive troop deployment would have been necessary to generate sufficient military power to forcibly establish a government for the Russian people. After World War I, there was no popular support in the United States for long-term, expensive foreign involvement.

Lessons That Should Have Been Learned

Casualties to US units were light considering the number of troops committed and the length of time in country.

A casualty summary follows:

Killed in Action	27
Died of Wounds	8
Died of Disease and	
Other Causes	<u>135</u>
Total Dead	170
Wounded	52
Deserted	50 ²⁶

Deserters did not fare well if caught. American soldiers discovered several in Vladivostok at the time of the evacuation and dragged them back to their units for court-martial.²⁷ Semenov captured twelve Americans after the AEF left Vladivostok. One was a lieutenant that resigned in Vladivostok and tried to go to Verkhne-Udinsk to marry a Russian girl. The other eleven were deserters. The twelve decided to escape rather than face torture and imprisonment at Cossack hands. The ex-lieutenant and one deserter succeeded. The others were killed in the escape attempt. The two escapees walked to China and freedom.²⁸

AEF soldiers were fortunate that Congresswoman Jeannette Rankin of Montana did not get her way with them. She felt that the AEF soldiers would be too diseased and morally corrupt to be able to live in the United States. Therefore, she suggested that the US government purchase land in Siberia for the soldiers to settle after discharge.²⁹ The Congress did not agree.

The AEF intervention did preclude Japanese control of the Trans-Siberian railroad which then prevented Japan's controlling the Maritime Provinces. American presence gave the Czechs and Siberians hope that some day their misery would end. Material, medical, and financial aid was provided by the AEF elements scattered all over the country.³⁰

This was one of the first times this century an American military force was sent to a foreign area to

accomplish limited goals. The military did not fully understand what this meant.³¹ The State and War Departments did not coordinate their actions. The senior State Department representative, Consul General Harris, and MG Graves viewed each other with mutual contempt. The results were confusion and misunderstanding. One veteran of the expedition recommended that future expeditionary force headquarters have a State Department representative assigned to coordinate political and military activities.³²

The Secretary of War and Army Chief of Staff were pleased with MG Graves' performance.³³ He was confronted with a confused situation for nineteen months, untrustworthy allies and a poorly-defined enemy. Yet he never faltered or turned from the direction his orders provided. He was a remarkable person.

What about the AEF's mission, its orders? The "Aide Memoire" stated that establishing an Eastern Front against Germany would not serve Russia, it would only make use of Russia.³⁴ Therefore, establishing an Eastern Front was explicitly not a mission of the AEF. MG Graves complied with this order. He never sent US troops westward to reinforce the Czechs in the Urals, let alone reestablish an Eastern Front.

The "Aide Memoire" stated that intervention was necessary to aid the Czechs who were attempting to leave Siberia.³⁵ By the time the AEF arrived in Siberia, the

Czechs did not need help. They already controlled the railroad. The Allied intervention delayed the Czech departure because the Czechs stopped moving to Vladivostok in order to prepare to reestablish the Eastern Front. This development was not caused by MG Graves but resulted from other Allied and American representatives interfering. This original mission, therefore, was not applicable once the AEF landed.

Another mission was to "steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense."³⁶ There were so many factions vying for power that it was virtually impossible to determine whom to "steady." Whites and Reds abused the local population and promised reforms which were never implemented. The "Aide Memoire" pledged the US would not interfere "with the political sovereignty of Russia," or intervene "in her internal affairs."³⁷ Therefore, MG Graves' neutrality in the civil war was appropriate. The War Department never ordered MG Graves to change his policy.

However, as pointed out by MG Graves, guarding the railroad gave the impression that the AEF was assisting Kolchak. Since Kolchak's forces were controlling who could ride trains, Allied guarding of the rail line benefited Kolchak, not everyone. Kolchak's brutality turned the Russian people against him. Allied moral and material aid supported Kolchak. Therefore, the Siberian people could not help but conclude that the presence of

foreign troops contributed to their abuse. The Russian people experienced a great deal of horror due to World War I. By the time of the intervention, they were tired of war and tired of suffering at the hands of others. The Soviets promised peace. Therefore, the majority of the Russian people taking an active part in the Civil War supported the Soviets rather than Kolchak.³⁸ The intervention turned the Communist leaders against the West because the West opposed Soviet rule.³⁹

The "Aide Memoire" also provided for the AEF to guard military stores "which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces."⁴⁰ Certainly, the AEF guarded those stores under its supervision but lack of Allied cooperation precluded efficient and fair distribution of the supplies.

This review of AEF missions shows that MG Graves accomplished his missions as best anyone could. However, if President Wilson's intent was to ensure a democratic government in Siberia, the intervention was a dismal failure. The "Aide Memoire" pledged non-interference in internal affairs. Therefore, one must assume that the US government was not prepared to forcibly establish a Russian government. Given that conclusion, the subsequent Communist victory was not a defeat -- it did not mean the intervention was a failure. But one cannot help but wonder what the world might be like today if the AEF had taken sides. Who can say? The only clear objective was to help

the Czechs, and they did not need our help. The other objectives were so nebulous they forced MG Graves to do nothing. That made the intervention a pointless endeavor.

The Army units that participated in the Siberian intervention had reason to be proud of their record. Given poor instructions, they never shirked their moral and lawful duty to their country. Harsh conditions did not deter them. Unfaithful allies did not stop them. The AEF performed well.

However, political leaders of 1918-1920 America had no reason to be proud. They provided poor, uncoordinated, pointless missions to the AEF. Lives were lost, equipment was destroyed, money was wasted, all for no reason. The United States accomplished nothing in Siberia beyond providing a good example of national morality and regard for human life and property (unlike the Cossacks and Japanese). Of course, America's political leaders may have realized the impossibility of the situation in which they placed the AEF. Will this intervention ever pay dividends? There is no way to tell. At this time one must conclude the intervention did not help either the American or Russian people. Few today even know it occurred.

The US experience in Siberia does provide an example of the problems that can be encountered when military forces are used to accomplish limited objectives. The military was not used to destroy the military power of an opponent.

Therefore, it may provide lessons to guide future actions if anyone cares to study them. Political and military goals must be carefully planned and specified. These goals must be coordinated with any allies that will participate. There must be a central authority to lead and coordinate the actions of all forces. Sufficient resources must be provided to accomplish the mission. We must understand the situation in the host country before we intervene. We must carefully choose our allies. Their political, ideological, and moral objectives must not contradict our own. Failure to do these things will doom any intervention to be a waste of time, energy, and resources.

It is unfortunate for the AEF veterans that their efforts served no long-term purpose. They obeyed their country and sacrificed life and limb when necessary. They did not let down America. But whether through lack of experience, knowledge of international realities, or will, the leaders that ordered the AEF to Siberia failed the AEF and this country. They sent American troops to accomplish a mission that was impossible.

This study has discussed the operations of the units assigned to the AEF. Most previous studies of the Siberian intervention have concentrated on MG Graves' actions, the reasons for the intervention, and the United States's relations with its allies. The men of the AEF performed exceptionally well. Hopefully, this study has done them justice.

Chapter 11 Notes

1. National Archives, M917, Reel 10, Graves, "Operations 1 July 1919 to 31 March 1920," pp. 6-7.
2. Ibid., p. 8.
3. Ibid.
4. Goldhurst, The Midnight War, pp. 86-110.
5. National Archives, M917, Reel 10, Graves, "Operations 1 July 1919 to 31 March 1920," p. 9.
6. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
7. Ibid., p. 10.
8. Ibid., p. 11.
9. Ibid., pp. 12-13.
10. Ibid., p. 13.
11. Ibid., p. 14.
12. Ibid., pp. 14-15.
13. Ibid., p. 15.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
16. Ibid., pp. 17-18.
17. Ibid., p. 17.
18. Ibid., p. 18.
19. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
20. Ibid., p. 21.
21. Ibid., pp. 23-25.
22. Ibid., p. 28.
23. Ibid., p. 29.
24. Ibid.

25. CPT Mark G. Brislawn, "Allied Intervention in Russia" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Command and General Staff School, Individual Research Paper No. 17, 1932), p. 19.
26. March, The Nation at War, p. 132.
27. Channing, Siberia's Untouched Treasure, p. 302.
28. Kindall, American Soldiers, pp. 250-251.
29. Ibid., p. 229.
30. Pelzel, "American Intervention in Siberia, 1918-1920," p. 82.
31. CPT Judith A. Lockett, "The Siberian Intervention: Military Support of Foreign Policy," Military Review 64 (April 1984): 62.
32. Slaughter, "The American Expeditionary Force in Siberia," pp. 23-24.
33. March, The Nation at War, p. 131.
34. National Archives, M917, Reel 10, "Aide Memoire," p. 3.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., p. 5.
38. Ibid., Graves "Operations 1 July 1919 to 31 March 1920," pp. 32-34.
39. Goldhurst, The Midnight War, p. 240.
40. National Archives, M917, Reel 10, "Aide Memoire," p. 4.

Appendix A. Glossary

AEF - American Expeditionary Force
BAR - Browning Automatic Rifle
CPT - Captain
COL - Colonel
LT - Lieutenant
LTC - Lieutenant Colonel
MAJ - Major
MG - Major General
POW - Prisoner of War
SGT - Sergeant
Verst - approximately two-thirds of a mile

Appendix B. Aide Memoire

The whole heart of the people of the United States is in the winning of this war. The controlling purpose of the Government of the United States is to do everything that is necessary and effective to win it. It wishes to cooperate in every practicable way with the allied governments, and to cooperate ungrudgingly; for it has not ends of its own to serve and believes that the war can be won only by common counsel and intimate concert of action. It has sought to study every proposed policy or action in which its cooperation has been asked in this spirit, and states the following conclusions in the confidence that, if it finds itself obliged to decline participation in any undertaking or course of action, it will be understood that it does so only because it deems itself precluded from participating by imperative considerations either of policy or of fact.

In full agreement with the allied governments and upon the unanimous advice of the Supreme War Council, the Government of the United States adopted, upon its entrance into the war, a plan for taking part in the fighting on the western front into which all its resources of men and materials were to be put, and put as rapidly as possible, and it has carried out that plan with energy and success, pressing its execution more and more rapidly forward and

literally putting into it the entire energy and executive force of the nation. This was its response, its very willing and hearty response, to what was the unhesitating judgment alike of its own military advisers and of the advisers of the allied governments. It is now considering, at the suggestion of the Supreme War Council, the possibility of making very considerable additions even to this immense programme which, if they prove feasible at all, will tax the industrial processes of the United States and the shipping facilities of the whole group of associated nations to the utmost. It has thus concentrated all its plans and all its resources upon this single absolutely necessary object.

In such circumstances it feels it to be its duty to say that it cannot, so long as the military situation on the western front remains critical, consent to break or slacken the force of its present effort by diverting any part of its military force to other points or objectives. The United States is at a great distance from any other field of action. The instrumentalities by which it is to handle its armies and its stores have at great cost and with great difficulty been created in France. They do not exist elsewhere. It is practicable for her to do a great deal in France; it is not practicable for her to do anything of importance or on a large scale upon any other field. The American Government, therefore, very respect-

fully requests its Associates to accept its deliberate judgment that it should not dissipate its force by attempting important operations elsewhere.

It regards the Italian front as closely coordinated with the western front, however, and is willing to divert a portion of its military forces from France to Italy if it is the judgment and wish of the Supreme Command that it should do so. It wishes to defer to the decision of the Commander-in-Chief in this matter, as it would wish to defer in all others, particularly because it considers these two fronts so closely related as to be practically but separate parts of a single line and because it would be necessary that any American troops sent to Italy should be subtracted from the number used in France and be actually transported across French territory from the ports now used by the armies of the United States.

It is the clear and fixed judgment of the Government of the United States, arrived at after repeated and very searching reconsiderations of the whole situation in Russia, that military intervention there would add to the present sad confusion in Russia rather than cure it, injure her rather than help her, and that it would be of no advantage in the prosecution of our main design, to win the war against Germany. It cannot, therefore, take part in such intervention or sanction it in principle. Military intervention would, in its judgment, even supposing it to

be efficacious in its immediate avowed object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the east, be merely a method of making use of Russia, not a method of serving her. Her people could not profit by it, if they profitted at all, in time to save them from their present distresses, and their substance would be used to maintain foreign armies, not to reconstitute their own. Military action is admissible in Russia, as the Government of the United States sees the circumstances, only to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen and to steady any efforts at self-government or self defense in which the Russian themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk or Archangel, the only legitimate object for which American or allied troops can be employed, it submits, is to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense. For helping the Czecho-Slovaks there is immediate necessity and sufficient justification. Recent developments have made it evident that that is in the interest of what the Russian people themselves desire, and the Government of the United States is glad to contribute the small force at its disposal for that purpose. It yields, also, to the judgment of the Supreme Command in

the matter of establishing a small force at Murmansk, to guard the military stores at Kola and to make it safe for Russian forces to come together in organized bodies in the north. But it owes it to frank counsel to say that it can go no further than these modest and experimental plans. It is not in a position, and has no expectation of being in a position, to take part in organized intervention in adequate force from either Vladivostok or Murmansk and Archangel. It feels that it ought to add, also, that it will feel at liberty to use the few troops it can spare only for the purpose here stated and shall feel obliged to withdraw those forces, in order to add them to the forces at the western front, if the plans in whose execution it is now intended that they shall cooperate should develop into others inconsistent with the policy to which the Government of the United States feels constrained to restrict itself.

At the same time the Government of the United States wishes to say with the utmost cordiality and good will that none of the conclusions here stated is meant to wear the least color of criticism of what the other governments associated against Germany may think it wise to undertake. It wishes in no way to embarrass their choices of policy. All that is intended here is a perfectly frank and definite statement of the policy which the United States feels obliged to adopt for herself and in the use of her

own military forces. The Government of the United States does not wish it to be understood that in so restricting its own activities it is seeking, even by implication, to set limits to the action of or to define the policies of its Associates.

It hopes to carry out the plans for safeguarding the rear of the Czecho-Slovaks operating from Vladivostok in a way that will place it and keep it in close cooperation with a small military force like its own from Japan, and if necessary from other Allies, and that will assure it of the cordial accord of all the allied powers; and it proposes to ask all associated in this course of action to unite in assuring the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that none of the governments uniting in action either in Siberia or in northern Russia contemplates any interference of any kind with the political sovereignty of Russia, any intervention of her internal affairs, or any impairment of her territorial integrity either now or hereafter, but that each of the associated powers has the single object of affording such aid as shall be acceptable, and only such aid as shall be acceptable, to the Russian people in their endeavor to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory, and their own destiny.

It is the hope and purpose of the Government of the United States to take advantage of the earliest opportunity

to send to Siberia a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labor advisers, Red Cross representatives, and agents of the Young Men's Christian Association accustomed to organizing the best methods of spreading useful information and rendering educational help of a modest sort, in order in some systematic manner to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the people there in every way for which opportunity may open. The execution of this plan will follow and will not be permitted to embarrass the military assistance rendered in the rear of the westward-moving forces of the Czecho-Slovaks.

Department of State,

Washington, July 17, 1918.

Appendix C. Figures.

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


Figure 1. Siberia.

- +--- Railroad
- City
- - - Border
- Lake




Figure 2. Ussuri Campaign Area of Operations.

- City/town
- Trans-Siberian Railroad
- ≡ Bridge




Figure 3. Suchon Mines Area.

● City/Town
 + + + Railroad





Figure 4. AEF Railroad Guard Sectors.



Appendix D. AEF Principal Officers

<u>Position</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Name</u>
Commander	16 August 1918	COL Henry D. Styer
	3 September 1918	MG William S. Graves
	11 July 1919	COL Frederic H. Sargent
	7 September 1919	MG William S. Graves
Chief of Staff	3 September 1918	LTC Oliver P. Robinson
	11 September 1918	MAJ Robert L. Eichelberger
	17 September 1918	LTC Oliver P. Robinson
	30 March 1919	COL Oliver P. Robinson
	24 September 1919	No Chief of Staff
	28 September 1919	COL Joseph D. Leitch
	4 March 1920	No Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff	3 September 1918	MAJ Robert L. Eichelberger
	30 March 1919	LTC Robert L. Eichelberger
Intelligence Officer	16 August 1918	MAJ David P. Barrows
	26 October 1918	LTC David P. Barrows
	8 December 1918	MAJ Robert L. Eichelberger
	3 January 1919	LTC David P. Barrows
	10 March 1919	MAJ Robert L. Eichelberger
	30 March 1919	LTC Robert L. Eichelberger
Adjutant General	16 August 1918	COL Edwin Landon
	15 September 1918	CPT Thomas W. King
	8 November 1918	MAJ Thomas W. King
	30 March 1919	LTC Thomas W. King
Inspector General	16 August 1918	LTC Willis V. Morris
	11 November 1918	COL Willis V. Morris
	5 June 1919	COL Joseph D. Leitch
	4 March 1920	No Inspector General
Chief Quarter- master	16 August 1918	MAJ Richard Allen
	25 August 1918	No Chief Quartermaster
	3 September 1918	LTC Gideon H. Williams
	29 September 1918	COL Hugh J. Gallagher
	8 October 1919	COL William F. Lewis
Chief Surgeon	16 August 1918	COL James S. Wilson
	5 June 1919	COL William F. Lewis
Chief Engineer Officer	16 August 1918	CPT Earle W. Jennings
	30 March 1919	MAJ Earle W. Jennings
	8 October 1919	CPT Harold Van V. Fay
	1 March 1920	2LT Robert H. Soule
	31 March 1920	No Chief Engineer

Judge Advocate	3 September 1918 30 March 1919 5 June 1919 8 October 1919	MAJ Albert J. Galen LTC Albert J. Galen MAJ George R. McLean LTC Philip R. Faymonville
Chief Ordnance Officer	3 September 1918 29 September 1918 1 December 1918	CPT James A. Lynch MAJ Philip R. Faymonville LTC Philip R. Faymonville
Chief Signal Officer	18 September 1918 7 March 1919 8 September 1919 31 March 1920	1LT Jones H. Kirk CPT Charles Barrett CPT William McC. Chapman No Chief Signal Officer
Commander, 27th Infantry	16 August 1918 25 August 1918 7 September 1918 11 April 1919 4 March 1920	COL Henry D. Styer LTC Charles H. Morrow COL Henry D. Styer COL Charles H. Morrow COL Joseph D. Leitch
Commander, 31st Infantry	22 August 1918 8 October 1919	COL Frederic H. Sargent COL Fred W. Bugbee

(NOTE: The above information was extracted from US Army War College, Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War, American Expeditionary Forces (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937), p. 385.

Appendix E. AEF Strength Figures

<u>Date</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
16 August 1918	53	1,537
21 August 1918	145	4,805
2 September 1918	188	5,693
29 September 1918	306	9,257
1 July 1919	329	8,038
29 August 1919	326	8,713
16 October 1919	299	8,643
8 November 1919	267	7,621
31 December 1919	264	7,009

(NOTE: The strength figures above were compiled from information in National Archives, M917, Reel 10, Packard, "AEF, 1918-1919," and Graves, "Operations 1 July 1919 to 31 March 1920.")

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